| The liability of an employer prescribed by the last preceding section shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever, to such employee, his or her personal representatives, spouse, parents, dependents, distributees, or any person otherwise entitled to recover damages, contribution or indemnity, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death or liability arising therefrom, except that if an employer fails to secure the payment of compensation for his or her injured employees and their dependents as provided in section 50 of this chapter, an injured employee, or his or her legal representative in case of death results from the injury, may, at his or her option, elect to claim compensation under this chapter, or to maintain an action in the courts for damages on account of such injury; and in such an action it shall not be necessary to plead or prove freedom from contributory negligence nor may the defendant plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant nor that the employee assumed the risk of his or her employment, nor that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee. The liability under this chapter of The New York Jockey Injury Compensation Fund, Inc. created under section 213-a of the racing, pari-mutuel wagering and breeding law shall be limited to the provision of workers' compensation coverage and any statutory penalties resulting from the failure to provide such coverage.
For purposes of this section the terms "indemnity" and "contribution" shall not include a claim or cause of action for contribution or indemnification based upon a provision in a written contract entered into prior to the accident or occurrence by which the employer had expressly agreed to contribution to or indemnification of the claimant or person asserting the cause of action for the type of loss suffered.
An employer shall not be liable for contribution or indemnity to any third person based upon liability for injuries sustained by an employee acting within the scope of his or her employment for such employer unless such third person proves through competent medical evidence that such employee has sustained a "grave injury" which shall mean only one or more of the following: death, permanent and total loss of use or amputation of an arm, leg, hand or foot, loss of multiple fingers, loss of multiple toes, paraplegia or quadriplegia, total and permanent blindness, total and permanent deafness, loss of nose, loss of ear, permanent and severe facial disfigurement, loss of an index finger or an acquired injury to the brain caused by an external physical force resulting in permanent total disability.
For purposes of this section "person" means any individual, firm, company, partnership, corporation, joint venture, joint-stock association, association, trust or legal entity.
The liability under this chapter of the New York black car operators' injury compensation fund, inc. shall be limited to: (i) securing the payment of workers' compensation in accordance with article 6-F of the executive law to black car operators, as defined in such article, whose injury arose out of and in the course of providing services for a central dispatch facility, as defined in such article, that is a registered member of such fund, and (ii) any statutory penalty resulting from the failure to secure such payment. The liability under this chapter of a central dispatch facility, as defined in article 6-F of the executive law, that is a registered member of the New York black car operators' injury compensation fund, inc. that shall be limited to remaining a registered member in good standing of such fund and any statutory penalty, including loss of immunity provided by this section, resulting from the failure to become or remain a registered member in good standing of such fund, except, however, that such central dispatch facility shall be subject to the provisions of section 131 of this chapter and shall be liable for any payments for which it may become responsible pursuant to such section or pursuant to section 14-a of this chapter.
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Relevant Case Law
Note: Brain-related permanent total disability for purposes of employer tort liability requires unemployability, not a "vegetative state."
Note: Third party complaint not viable if there is no grave injury.
Note: Employer who fails to secure work comp for injured employee not protected from 3rd party liability by section 11.
Note: Injured hospital employee not precluded from bringing a claim for negligent care against hospital.
Note: Contract for indemnification pursuant to section 11 does not need to be signed.
Note: Court can vacate dismissal order based on exclusive remedy provision if Board removes basis for that order.
Note: Evidence does not establish that defendants were general or special employers of injured employee.
Note: Exclusivity provision precludes common law claims against employer where employer did not direct actions of aggressor.
Note: Employer not liable for indemnification to third party unless employee suffers grave injury.
Note: A brain injury could possibly be determined to be a "grave injury."
Note: Insurer failing to investigate and defend against claims breaches duties of work comp policy.
Note: Broad indemnification clause makes employer liable to indemnify property owner for injury claims.
Note: Showing of negligence required to succeed in a suit for common law indemnification.
Note: Work comp grave injury requirement does not apply to third party action commenced before effective date of the Act.
Note: Dual capacity doctrine doesn't apply to impose liability on an employer protected by the exclusivity provision.
Note: Written indemnification provision need only encompass agreement to indemnify person asserting indemnification claim for the type of loss suffered to be valid.
Note: New information warrants renewal.
Note: Exclusivity provisions apply to unfounded claims of false imprisonment and assault and battery.
Note: Section 11 permits an alleged tortfeasor in an action arising from a workplace accident to assert a claim against the employee's employer sounding in common-law indemnity or contribution only where the employee suffered a grave injury, a term which includes the total loss of use of a foot.
Note: There is no evidence of the existence of an express agreement between the employer and the third party for contribution and/or indemnification.
Note: The indemnification provisions in the relevant construction contracts are enforceable since there is no evidence of active negligence on the part of either Neighborhood or F & S Real Estate Development Corp.
Note: Since defendant and the school did not secure workers' compensation coverage for this extern, she could opt, pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law 11, to commence the instant action for damages rather than making a claim for workers' compensation benefits.
Note: As a municipal employee at the Council, the decedent was covered by workers' compensation, therefore plaintiff's recovery was limited to the workers' compensation award she already received.
Note: Claimant's alleged injuries to his back do not fall within the legal definition of 'grave injuries,' barring a common-law indemnification claim.
Note: Employer demonstrated, prima facie, that she was a statutory employer of the plaintiff within the meaning of Workers' Compensation Law Section 2(3).
Note: The fact that claimant settled the underlying action does not preclude it from seeking indemnification from the third-party defendant, though any recovery by claimant based upon common-law indemnification would be contingent upon a showing that the third-party defendant was 100% at fault for the plaintiff's injuries.
Note: An injured worker's employer is not liable for common-law indemnification of a general contractory and steel fabricator because the worker's injury, a partial amputation of an index finger, is not a 'grave injury' according to workers' compensation law.
Note: Defendents have raised triable issues of fact concerning whether plaintiff's claims are by by the workers' compensation law because plaintiff was an ad hoc, de facto, and/or special employee of defendent.
Note: Appellant's motion for summary judgment was barred because plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact that their injuries fell under the definition of 'grave injury.'
Note: An out-of-possession landlord of a business is liable for an electrical explosion that caused injuries to the business' owner, but the business is bound to indemnify the landlord.
Note: Defendent did not clearly establish that claimant had not suffered permanent and severe facial disfigurement, therefore defendent's motion for summary judgment was properly dismissed.
Note: Plaintiff's failure to purchase a new index number for a summons and complaint was a defect, but the defect was not timely objected to, and the defendent's motion to dismiss therefore fails.
Note: Two laundry companies were not shown conclusively to be alter ego's of each other, therefore the granting of summary judgment releasing one company from liability does not serve to bar claims against the other company.
Note: Section 11 of the Workers' Compensation Law does not shield the Formica defendants from providing indemnification to the City because the decedent's injuries are 'grave injuries.'
Note: Plaintiff's loss of both interphalangeal joints of his index finger qualifies under statute as the loss of his index finger.
Note: Insurer is obligated to indemnify Harmon in the first third-party action with respect to the order and interim judgment entered against him in that action.
Note: In the absence of evidence that an actual employment relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant, or that plaintiff was performing duties on behalf of and under the direction of defendant at the time of the accident, or that defendant was, for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law, an alter ego of the managing agent, the workers' compensation exclusivity defense is denied.
Note: Because plaintiff's injury was not a 'grave injury,' the causes of action seeking common-law indemnification and contribution should have been dismissed.
Note: Since the plaintiff's employer and the defendant trucking company functioned as one company, plaintiff's claims against the trucking firm are barred by the exclusive remedy of Workers' Compensation Law section 11.
Note: It cannot be determined from the evidence what the category of "household services" is meant to cover therefore court vacated the $150,111 award for household services.
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