| Relevant Case Law
Note: Allegation of colorably meritorious claim sufficient to permit late filing for violations of 200 & 240 Labor Law, but not 241.
Note: Section 11 permits an alleged tortfeasor in an action arising from a workplace accident to assert a claim against the employee's employer sounding in common-law indemnity or contribution only where the employee suffered a grave injury, a term which includes the total loss of use of a foot.
Note: the employee's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability should have been granted, and the branch of the cross motion of the employer's third-party plaintiffs was properly denied.
Note: The Supreme Court improperly granted summary judgment to the employer with respect to the employee's common-law negligence claim as, triable issues of fact existed.
Note: Even if there was construction and repair work taking place elsewhere on the job site at the time of injury, there is no indication that the employee's work was integrated therewith and, thus, he may not rely upon work conducted by others in order to bring him within the statute's protections.
Note: There is evidence that the plaintiff was doing anything other than performing routine maintenance associated with the defendant's manufacture of paper products, work that is not covered by Labor Law � 241 (6).
Note: Plaintiff's testimony indicated that the alleged air contaminants were not present prior to commencement of the work, thus employer demonstrated its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Note: The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he fell from a height or that the height or adequacy of the scaffold was the proximate cause of his injuries.
Note: The violations alleged by the plaintiff in his complaint and the bill of particulars either do not provide a basis for liability under Labor Law section 241(6) or are inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Note: 12 NYCRR 23-2.1 (b) is sufficiently specific to support a cause of action pursuant to section 241 (6).
Note: Because the absence of a safety railing or any other device to prevent plaintiff's fall constituted a violation of Labor Law Section 240 (1), plaintiff's alleged conduct in attempting to move the scaffold without first unlocking the wheel brakes would amount only to comparative fault and thus cannot bar recovery.
Note: Despite plaintiff's later contentions that the use of the scaffolding was prevented by the obstructions in the room, the issue is irrelevant since there was no evidence that the ladder was otherwise defective or inadequate to perform the job such that another safety device was required.
Note: There is no liability because the rebar steel over which plaintiff tripped was an integral part of the work being performed, not debris, scattered tools and materials, or a sharp projection.
Note: A new trial is granted because the testimony of the defense witnesses regarding potential Building Code violations was based, at least in part, on the erroneous premise that 23-2.5(b)(3) required a partition between the elevator shaftways and the testimony was improperly admitted.
Note: Because the safety measures required by 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b) bespeak of protections against falls from an elevated area to a lower area through openings large enough for a person to fit, the evidence that plaintiff's coworker was already in the trench when plaintiff fell in is sufficient to show a violation of that section.
Note: The architect on a contruction project who was named as a third-party defendent was entitled to summary judgement because he did not direct workers in their performance of the injury-producing work.
Note: Property owner's motion for summary judgement dismissing a claim under Labor Law Section 200 should have been granted, as the owner was not responsible for supervision or control of the work site and had no notice of a hazardous condition.
Note: The mere fact that the building superintendent told the decedent which windows to clean and directed the time he was to perform the work did not raise a triable issue of fact as to the defendants' supervision and control over the decedent's work, therefore the superintendent is not liable under Labor Law Section 200.
Note: A stone that fell and hit the head of a worker fell due to the absence or inadequacy of a safety device, therefore the injured worker was granted summary judgement on his claim under Labor Law Section 240 (1).
Note: A claim for contractual indemnification was severed from a proceeding involving a negligence issue because both issues being tried before the same jury would be prejudicial.
Note: When a crane is being used to move a large, heavy or unwieldy item from one spot to another, the term
Note: Defendent was entitled to summary dismissal of the Labor Law 240(6) action brought against it by demonstrating that the injured parties fall was due to a hazard entirely unrelated to the danger brought about by the need for a ladder.
Note: Plaintiff's Labor Law 240(1) claim should have been denied because his duties as a theator stagehand do not fall within the occupations protected by the statute
Note: Even if the form from which plaintiff fell could be considered a ladder within the meaning of those regulations, they are nevertheless inapplicable because there is no evidence that the accident was caused by or related to any insufficiency in the strength of the form.
Note: 12 NYCRR 23-8.1 (f) (2) and 23-8.2 are inapplicable to this case because there is no evidence that the crane involved caused the accident or that the crane came into contact with any trees.
Note: Defendent is not liable to plaintiff pursuant to the relevant sections of the Labor Law because the air conditioning installation was performed without its consent and in violation of the lease, which required prior written approval for any installations
Note: The plaintiff was struck by a falling object that had been inadequately secured, therefore the accident clearly falls within the purview of Labor Code Section 240(1).
Note: The defendant assumed responsibility for safety concerns on the job site, so it was liable for the labor code violations on that site.
Note: The defendants did not exercise any control over the manner or method of the work and that they did not create or have notice of any alleged defective condition on the property, so the Labor Law Section 200 complaint against them should have been dismissed.
Note: The open, ground level of the work site where the injured plaintiff fell did not constitute a passageway, walkway, or other elevated working surface contemplated by 22 NYCRR 23-1.7(d).
Note: Defendants' instruction to the plaintiff related to the aesthetic appearance of the home, which does not constitute the kind of control necessary to overcome the statutory exemption from liability.
Note: Defendants failed to meet their initial burden of establishing that they did not supervise the flooring work or the general condition of the premises, and they failed to establish that they did not create or have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
Note: Defendant has failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether its nine-month delay in providing notice to plaintiff was reasonably founded upon a good-faith belief that it should not have anticipated a claim.
Note: An issue of fact remained as to whether the cause of plaintiff's fall was his own conduct or a problem with the ladder he was using, therefore summary judgment was inappropriate.
Note: Although the heating unit that plaintiff was manually realigning had been placed on the roof by a crane, the injury plaintiff suffered when his hand got stuck between the unit and the platform on which it was resting was a general hazard of the workplace and not the result of a significant risk inherent in the elevation differential between the unit and the platform.
Note: Since the defendant failed to carry its prima facie burden of showing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action based on Labor Law Section 241(6).
Note: Labor Law Section 241 is not applicable because the facts of the case do not conform with the conditions in the statute.
Note: The defendant established her entitlement to summary judgment dismissing causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law Sections 200, 240(1) and 241(6), by demonstrating that she was the owner of a two-family dwelling at the time of the accident and that she did not direct or control the work.
Note: The approximately five-foot elevation between the top of a truck's utility bin and the ground did not present the type of elevation-related risk contemplated by Labor Law Section 240(1).
Note: Because plaintiff's injury was not a 'grave injury,' the causes of action seeking common-law indemnification and contribution should have been dismissed.
Note: Because the record is inconclusive as to whether the claimant could have affixed his lanyard to a standing object, and whether that would have been a proper safety measure in satisfaction of Labor Law Section 240(1), the claimant's motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law Section 240(1) claim was properly denied.
Note: One third-party defendant was not required to indemnify another third party defendant because the indemnification clause purported to imdemnify the second third-party defendent for its own negligence, and was therefore void.
Note: Plaintiff's injuries were caused by the normal dangers of a construction site, and he is therefore unable to obtain relief under Labor Law Section 240(1).
Note: The court erred in denying the owners' cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 claim, since there was no evidence that the owners supervised or controlled plaintiff's work, or created or knew of the allegedly hazardous conditions.
Note: In order for section 240(1) to apply, there must be a significant, inherent risk attributable to an elevation differential. The statute does not cover the type of ordinary and usual peril to which a worker is commonly exposed at a construction site.
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