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Case Law Library



 
Case Name: Larson v. Fraysse 11/16/2017
Summary: In mid-2014, Philipson, Fraysse, and Danowitz met multiple times with Larson or his attorney in this case, Michael Blue, to discuss the action against Anguizola and potentially Larson. Larson alleged Fraysse and Danowitz attended between two and four of the five meetings as partners of Knox Ricksen and were “acting in the ordinary course of business of the partnership and/or with the authority of the partnership in committing the acts alleged. ” Larson alleged Philipson attended all of the meetings and acted “within the scope of his agency or employment when he harmed [Larson]. ” .           Larson alleged that, prior to the first meeting on or about June 18, 2014, Philipson contacted Larson “for the purposes of arranging for a personal meeting. ” At the meeting, Philipson allegedly “threatened to accuse [Larson] of a crime by adding [Larson] to pending criminal proceedings unless [Larson] were to pay money. ” Larson did not allege anyone else attended the June 18 meeting. Larson alleged that at these meetings Philipson again threatened to accuse Larson of criminal wrongdoing unless Larson “pa[id] money. ” Larson alleged Philipson demanded Larson “facilitate and persuade [his] managed medical providers to withdraw all of [their] liens and accounts receivable flowing from certain workers compensation claims denied by insurance companies represented by Defendant Knox-Ricksen. ” Larson again did not allege anyone else attended the July or August meetings. .           Larson alleged that two more “personal” meetings occurred on or about September 15, 2014 and November 15, 2014, and that, in addition to Philipson, Fraysse and Danowitz attended “as partners of Knox-Ricksen. ” According to Larson’s allegations, at the September and November meetings both Philipson and Fraysse allegedly “threatened to accuse [Larson] of a crime by adding [Larson] to pending criminal proceedings unless [Larson] were to pay money. ” Larson alleged that at the November meeting Philipson, as he had at the July and August meetings, demanded Larson “facilitate and persuade [his] managed medical providers to withdraw all of [their] liens and accounts receivable flowing from certain workers compensation claims denied by insurance companies represented by Defendant Knox-Ricksen. ” Larson did not allege Danowitz threatened or even spoke to Larson. Philipson stated he attended several meetings with Larson prior to the meetings with Fraysse and Danowitz, and the purpose of those meetings was to resolve claims against Larson.
Note: The 2nd District Court of Appeal upheld a trial judge’s decision to toss a chiropractor’s extortion suit against the Knox Ricksen law firm and three attorneys.
Citation: B270061
WCC Citation: Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC580579
 
 
Case Name: LaTourtette vs. WCAB, Long Beach Comm Coll Dist 03/12/1998
Summary: SHEILA LaTOURETTE, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and LONG BEACH COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, Respondents. Beginning in December 1979, decedent Elston LaTourette was employed as a supervising groundskeeper for the Long Beach Community College District, which is permissibly self-insured for workers' compensation liability. "Certainly it is possible that he would have died when he did, as he did, even absent his . . . employment. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board denied the petition for reconsideration, adopting the recommendation and report of the workers' compensation judge. [1] The applicant for workers' compensation benefits has the burden of establishing the "reasonable probability of industrial causation. "
Note: Injury or death from a non-occupational disease not compensable unless intervening occupational event.
Citation: 17 Cal.4th 644
WCC Citation: WCC 29811998 CA
 
 
Case Name: Le Parc Comm Assoc vs. WCAB, Curren 07/25/2003
Summary: In the complaint Curren alleged that Martinez and Le Parc were presumed negligent under section 3708 fn. On July 16, 2002 Curren and Le Parc, as well as Le Parc's general liability insurance carrier, settled the civil action. In addition to releasing Le Parc, Curren agreed to indemnify Le Parc and hold it harmless against any action, claim or demand by Curren himself or by any other person for damages or compensation resulting in any way from the August 23, 2000 incident. Le Parc's Motion to Dismiss the Workers' Compensation Case On September 25, 2002 Le Parc moved to dismiss Curren's workers' compensation claim on the ground the settlement agreement resolved all of Curren's claims against Le Parc, including the application for workers' compensation benefits. c. Curren Is Not Foreclosed by the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel from Establishing that Le Parc Was His Employer The issue of Martinez's status as an independent contractor or employee of Le Parc, and therefore whether Le Parc was Curren's employer, was not actually litigated in the dismissed civil action.
Note: Civil settlement ineffective against work comp claim.
Citation: 110 CA4th 1161
WCC Citation: WCC 29492003 CA
 
 
Case Name: Leamon v. WCAB 04/07/1987
Summary: Initially, Leamon made no claim that any of the three absences were excused. Leamon had informed Campbell that the remaining two absences were personal in nature. Some nine months later, after he was fired, Leamon recanted, claiming these absences also were caused by industrial injury. The panel directed that Leamon be reinstated as of the date of the decision without backpay and benefits. . . . ' It concluded: '[The] evidence establishes that when it terminated [Leamon, Campbell] was not acting on the basis that [Leamon] had been industrially-injured or absent from work because of his industrial injury; it acted solely on the basis that, under [Campbell's] Code of Conduct, [Leamon] appeared to be an unsatisfactory employee.
Note: Increased compensation due to failure to correct corporate record to reflect industrial nature of absences.
Citation: 190 Cal App 3d 1409; 52 CCC 146
WCC Citation: WCC 3391987 CA
 
 
Case Name: LeBoeuf v. WCAB 08/03/1983
Summary: RICHARD GENE LeBOEUF, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT, Respondents (Opinion by Bird, C. J. , with Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, JJ. , and Sims, J. , concurring. Petitioner, Richard LeBoeuf, was employed as a bus driver for Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (A. C. 3 [34 Cal. 3d 239] On April 9, 1979, petitioner filed a petition for reconsideration of the permanent disability rating with the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). The WCAB denied the petition on May 9, 1979. fn. The WCAB contends that allowing reopening under these circumstances will create a disincentive for applicants to present any more than a perfunctory case to the Bureau.
Note: Disqualification from voc rehab constitutes good cause to reopen case on permanent disability.
Citation: 34 Cal.3d 234, 48 CCC 587
WCC Citation: WCC 28162003 CA
 
 
Case Name: Lee v. Harbor Distributing, LLC 02/28/2013
Summary: LEE v. HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC RONNIE LEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC et al. , Defendants and Respondents. Lee was a 53-year-old African American truck driver who worked for Harbor, a beer distributor, for about 10 years. According to Murata, Harbor permitted Lee to work as a "transfer driver" on a temporary basis in 2007 while Lee was awaiting shoulder surgery, even though Harbor did not need another transfer driver during much of that time. At the meeting, Hughes told Lee that he could not return to work as a "side loader" with his physical restrictions and discussed other positions at Harbor that Lee might perform. Lee stated that he was not qualified for the positions identified, and suggested only one position at Harbor that he could performtransfer driver.
Note: A beer distributor is getting a second chance to prove his former employer discriminated against him on the basis of his disability and wrongfully terminated him.
Citation: B238872
WCC Citation: WCC 39902013 CA
 
 
Case Name: Lee v. Yang 12/02/2012
Summary: .             Claremont Law Group, David K. Lee and Shirin R. Delkhah for Defendant and Respondent Jun Yang. INTRODUCTION .             Plaintiffs and appellants Joung Hyen Lee, Hyen Uk Lee, and Esther Lee (plaintiffs) are former employees of The Christian Herald, Inc. (the Herald), a corporation they allege is solely owned and was managed by their former boss, defendant Jun Yang. Hyen Uk Lee asserted three additional causes of action (assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Yang, and premises liability against the Herald) arising out of alleged physical confrontations with Yang. Joung Hyen Lee was a reporter, while Hyen Uk Lee and Esther Lee were administrative assistants. .           Plaintiff Hyen Uk Lee asserted three additional causes of action: two against Yang (assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress) and one against the Herald (premises liability).
Note: A California appellate court ruled that the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation law did not bar a worker from suing her former supervisor after he allegedly threw a phone at her and knocked her unconscious by pushing her into a door.
Citation: B266853
WCC Citation: Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC543345
 
 
Case Name: Lee vs. Miracle Ford; CIGA 02/18/2003
Summary: WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD STATE OF CALIFORNIA Case No. LAO 781284 OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR REMOVAL AND DECISION AFTER REMOVAL ALFRED R. LEE, JR. (Deceased), VALERIE L. LEE (Widow), Applicant, vs. Therefore, we will grant removal, rescind the order allowing election against CIGA, and return this matter to the WCJ for further proceedings. We also conclude that it is premature to dismiss CIGA as a party defendant at this point in the proceedings. The application named Miracle Ford as the employer and HIH as the insurance carrier. However, the WCJ also issued the rulings disputed here, approving applicant's election against CIGA and submitting this matter for decision.
Note: Applicant may not elect against CIGA when there are other viable carriers having liability during the alleged CT period.
Citation: 68 CCC 213 (Panel)
WCC Citation: WCC 29192003 CA
 
 
Case Name: Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. Diaz 08/18/2005
Summary: The Complaint On June 17, 2003, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (Leegin) filed a fraud complaint against Carolina Diaz Santiaguin alleging the following facts. On January 3, 2003, Santiaguin informed Leegin that she was suffering from work-related injuries based on an event that had occurred on December 2, 2002. Leegin sent Santiaguin to the industrial health clinic it uses to diagnose and treat its employees for work-related injuries. From January 4, 2003 to April 8, 2003, Santiaguin worked "on light duty" because Leegin "reasonably believed" Santiaguin had suffered work-related injuries. Leegin alleged that Santiaguin falsely represented that she had been injured on the job "with the intent to have [Leegin] rely upon [those false representations] and with the foreseeable consequence of having [Leegin] submit [her] claim to its workers' compensation carrier[. ]"
Note: Employer cannot bring civil suit for fraud against claimant.
Citation: 131 Cal.App.4th 1517
WCC Citation: WCC 31142005 CA
 
 
Case Name: Leek v. Cooper 04/15/2011
Summary: DONNA LEEK et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. JAY COOPER, Defendant and Respondent. The plaintiffs responded to the summary judgment motion, arguing that Cooper was the alter ego of Auburn Honda on the apparent theory that Cooper was their employer. They pointed to evidence that Cooper was the president of Auburn Honda, and that there were no directors of the corporation, that Cooper "individually" fired the plaintiffs, that Cooper "individually" makes all policy, procedure, and management decisions for Auburn Honda, that Cooper "individually" owns the land on which the dealership is located, and that he raises the rent as he sees fit. Instead, they argue that Cooper was in fact the employer because of the control he exercised over them. In fact, plaintiffs pleaded that Cooper was their employer. 2 Defendant's summary judgment motion adduced facts showing that plaintiffs were employed by Auburn Honda, rather than Cooper.
Note: Although several plaintiff employees of a sole shareholder's auto sales business could not show that he was an alter ego of his corporation, he still could be personally liable for their Fair Employment and Housing Act claims if the plaintiffs prevail and his corporation cannot pay the judgment.
Citation: C061510
WCC Citation: WCC 37482011 CA
 
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