Case Name:	Minniear v. Mt. San Antonio Comm. Coll. Dist.		09/18/1996
Summary:	This presumption is rebuttable and may be controverted by a preponderance of medical opinion indicating an (sic) different level of impairment. '(b) The employee's permanent disability benefit awarded under paragraph (a) shall be adjusted based on the disability rating selected by the appeals board. Following surgery, applicant had follow-up treatment by Dr. Burres, including a lumbar MRI on July 8, 1994. According to Dr. Burres, the study showed mild postoperative change, but no evidence of recurrent disc herniation. On January 4, 1995, Dr. Burres examined applicant and submitted a report concluding that his condition was permanent and stationary.
Note:	Sufficiency of evidence necessary to rebut treating dr. presumption; award reduction required per 4065.
Citation:	61 CCC 105
WCC Citation:	WCC 24131996 CA

Case Name:	Miranda v. Bomel Construction, et al.		07/30/2010
Summary:	RUDY MIRANDA et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOMEL CONSTRUCTION CO. , INC. et al. , Defendants and Respondents. He sued general contractor, Bomel Construction Co. , Inc. (Bomel), and subcontractor, J/K Excavation & Grading Co. , Inc. , (J/K). Bomel agreed to excavate, remove, and dispose of all dirt not necessary for the project, known as the PS2 project. At the end of April 2007, Miranda and his wife (hereafter referred to collectively and in the singular as Miranda) filed a complaint for negligence and loss of consortium against Bomel and J/K. In his opposition, Miranda argued Bomel and J/K owed a duty to protect Miranda from his exposure to dust inhalation, and causation was a triable issue of material fact.
Note:	A university locksmith failed to prove that a pile of dirt in the lot near his office caused him to contract Valley Fever.
Citation:	G042073
WCC Citation:	WCC 36542010 CA

Case Name:	Mission Linen Supply v. WCAB		10/17/1994
Summary:	Mission Linen Supply, Petitioner v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, William Daniel Ferguson, Respondents. The WCJ and the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB or Board) refused to correct the error because they thought the request to correct it was untimely. In November 1981, the applicant, William D. Ferguson, was injured while working as a linen supply route salesman for the Mission Linen Supply Company, a self-insured employer. The WCJ followed the recommendation, including the incorrect calculation of the amount of the life pension, and issued a supplemental award. In dismissing the employer's petition for reconsideration, the WCAB also indicated that the employer's right to relief was barred by the doctrine of laches.
Note:	Clerical or mathematical error in award may be corrected at any time so long as not prejudicial.
Citation:	59 CCC 849
WCC Citation:	WCC 27321994 CA

Case Name:	Mitchel vs. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc.		02/26/1991
Summary:	MICHAEL MITCHELL et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC. , et al. , Defendants and Respondents. -On February 7, 1986, Wetzel told Mitchell to come to Wetzel's office to pick up a check. The adjuster also lied when she said Wetzel did not know why there were so many errors and late payments concerning Mitchell's file. Her purpose was to deprive the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) of information relevant to penalties against Wetzel. However, when the vice- president [227 Cal. App. 3d 1478] of the bank negotiating the check contacted Wetzel, Wetzel told the vice-president not to negotiate the check until three days had passed.
Note:	Intentional misconduct by the workers' compensation claims administrator of a self-insured employer falls within the exclusive remedy of work comp.
Citation:	227 Cal.App.3d 1474
WCC Citation:	WCC 29961991 CA

Case Name:	Mitchell v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co.		03/02/1995
Summary:	Zennie Mitchell, Applicant v. Golden Eagle Insurance, Defendant. (4) Restitution may be an appropriate remedy where a deposition attorney's fee has been erroneously paid pursuant to Labor Code section 5710(b)(4). In Mitchell vs. Golden Eagle Insurance, LAO 700455, applicant, Zennie Mitchell, filed a claim for cumulative trauma to her back, shoulder, neck, biceps, chest, psyche and head for the period February, 1992, to November 10, 1993. In Mitchell, the WCJ issued an order allowing a deposition attorney's fee without issuing a notice of intention. In Mitchell, the employee did attach a letter from his attorney requesting a deposition attorney's fee to the Pre-Application Request For Attorney's Fees.
Note:	Industrial injury not prerequisite to recover deposition atty. fee; Restitution appropriate for fee paid erroneously.
Citation:	60 CCC 205
WCC Citation:	WCC 3731995 CA

Case Name:	Mitchell vs. The Union Central Life Insurance Co.		05/26/2004
Summary:	DOROTHY WIMBERLY MITCHELL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE UNION CENTRAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al. , Defendants and Respondents. Dorothy Wimberly Mitchell went to work for Union Central Life Insurance Company in 1972, and held various positions (most recently, Life Department Manager) until 1999. On January 24, 2001, after Union Central had moved unsuccessfully for summary judgment, Mitchell served Union Central with an offer to compromise for $3,650,000. On January 31, Union Central served Mitchell with an offer to compromise for $1,010,000. The February 5 settlement discussions with the workers' compensation judge (at which he represented Mitchell and Almeida represented Union Central) "concerned only the value of .
Note:	C&R does not release third party liability unless evidence shows it was the intent of the parties.
Citation:	118 Cal.App.4th 1331
WCC Citation:	WCC 29882004 CA

Case Name:	Mnaskanian v. 21st Century Insurance		12/21/2007
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE ANAHID MNASKANIAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. st CENTURY INSURANCE, Defendant and Appellant. FACTS A. Anahid Mnaskanian went to work for 21st Century Insurance Company in 1995 as a file clerk, and was promoted to data entry operator in May 2000. A paralegal in the lawyer's office refused to give Jahelka permission to talk to Mnaskanian or to proceed, explaining that Mnaskanian wanted to return to 21st Century in a modified or alternate job, and that Mnaskanian had specifically inquired about a job in the mail room. In June, Mnaskanian (through her workers' compensation counsel) and 21st Century (through AIG's claims counsel) settled the workers' compensation case. Although he was (in his own words) "the top guy when it comes to Human Resources at 21st Century Insurance Company in California," he did not know about, let alone ratify, any wrongful act by any other 21st Century employee.
Note:	[Unpublished] Although the amount of an award of emotional distress damages is up to the jury, no award of emotional distress damages is proper in the absence of evidence that the plaintiff actually suffered such damages and will continue to do so in the future.
Citation:	B191052
WCC Citation:	WCC 32922007 CA

Case Name:	Monarch Consulting Inc. v Mahmoud Karkehabadi		01/06/2011
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO B214178 January 6, 2011 MONARCH CONSULTING, INC. , PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, v. MAHMOUD KARKEHABADI, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. Mahmoud Karkehabadi, also known as Mike Karkeh (appellant), appeals from a judgment after jury trial. White (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 266, 271; Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Gourmet Farms (1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 181, 187; Conolley v. Bull (1968) 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 189; Anaheim Builders Supply, Inc. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. In support of this argument, appellant cites Gordon v. Nissan Motor Co. , Ltd. (2009) 170 Cal. App. 4th 1103. V. Alter ego The jury made special verdict findings that appellant, Alliance and Confessions were alter egos of each other.
Note:	A trial court did not make an error in excluding an expert witness who was going to testify on customary practice in a breach of contract suit in which a movie production company was found to have made material misrepresentations to secure workers' compensation insurance, California's 2nd Appellate District Court of Appeals ruled.
Citation:	B214178
WCC Citation:	WCC 37002011 CA

Case Name:	Monarrez v. Auto Club of Southern California		12/12/2012
Summary:	MONARREZ v. AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RUBEN MONARREZ, an Incompetent Person, etc. , Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent. The issue presented by this appeal is whether the Automobile Club of Southern California (Auto Club) may be held liable for Monarrez's injuries. Technicians are recertified by Auto Club every four years and take a mandatory Auto Club orientation program every two years. Hirad has contracted with Auto Club for over 20 years, and 85 to 90 percent of Hirad's business comes from Auto Club. Monarrez is a member of Auto Club, and the Training Manual plainly says that to members, the technician "is" the Auto Club.
Note:	The Automobile Club of Southern California was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing a claim against it for the alleged negligence of a tow truck driver it had dispatched to assist a stranded motorist, since triable issues existed as to whether the tow truck company was an independent contractor or an agent of the Auto Club.
Citation:	B233512
WCC Citation:	WCC 39622012 CA

Case Name:	Mooney v. County of Orange		01/11/2013
Summary:	MOONEY v. COUNTY OF ORANGE VALERIE MOONEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, Defendant and Respondent. During the disability retirement application process, Mooney continued to engage in the interactive process with Chavis, and the County continued to seek a reasonable accommodation for Mooney. On January 8, 2010, the County offered Mooney the position of office assistant at the North County Field Services Office, which paid $17. 90 an hour. The court's minute order explained: "The undisputed facts show that [Mooney] was never formally terminated and that there have been on-going discussions between [Mooney] and [the County] regarding possible positions with the County. Section 31725 would require that the County reinstate Mooney to her former position if the County had dismissed her "for disability. "
Note:	A municipal employer which placed an injured worker on disability leave but continued the interactive process could not be said to have "dismissed" the worker, or "separated" her from her employment, as those terms are used in Government Code, as a matter of law.
Citation:	G046262
WCC Citation:	WCC 39722013 CA