Case Name:	Ristow v. County of San Bernardino et al.		07/31/2012
Summary:	Plaintiff and appellant Cheryl Ristow (Ristow) sued (1) the County of San Bernardino (the County); (2) the San Bernardino County District Attorney's Office (the Office); and (3) San Bernardino County District Attorney Michael A. Ramos (Ramos) (the three defendants are collectively referred to as "defendants"). The FAC lists three defendants: (1) "County of San Bernardino"; (2) "San Bernardino County District Attorney's Office"; and (3) "District Attorney Michael A. Ristow reasons the Office prevailed in the trial court, because "judgment was entered against the County of San Bernardino (erroneously sued and served as San Bernardino County District Attorney's Office). "In the County's supplemental letter brief to this court, it concedes, "The San Bernardino County District Attorney's Office is not a separate entity from the County of San Bernardino, but is a department within San Bernardino County. "The County goes on to write, "Since the Office is not a separate entity from the County of San Bernardino, but is a department within San Bernardino County, it stands in the same shoes as the County. "
Note:	Exclusive remedy bars a lawsuit alleging assault by the San Bernardino County District Attorney because the plaintiff did not name the D.A. in his individual capacity.
Citation:	E053531
WCC Citation:	WCC 39172012 CA

Case Name:	Ritchie v. WCAB		05/04/1994
Summary:	ROCKY D. RITCHIE, Petitioner v. ,WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD AND CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, Respondents. Procedural History On August 20, 1991, Rocky D. Ritchie (petitioner), then a police detective for the respondent City of Bakersfield (the City), sustained an admitted injury to his back. Petitioner appealed the consultant's decision to respondent Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). In due course, the WCAB adopted and incorporated the report and recommendation of the WCJ and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Lack of Discrimination [6a] Petitioner claims that the result arrived at by the WCAB impermissibly discriminates against municipal peace officers.
Note:	Officer not entitled to voc. rehab. after effective date of retirement under PERS.
Citation:	24 Cal.App.4th 1174
WCC Citation:	WCC 26831994 CA

Case Name:	Rivas v. Altawood, Inc.		04/18/2012
Summary:	RIVAS v. ALTAWOOD, INC. CINDY RIVAS, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent, v. ALTAWOOD, INC. , Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant. )*fn1 Altawood, a paint manufacturer, employed Rivas as a bookkeeper from February 2006 through November 26, 2006. In a special verdict, the jury found that (1) Rivas was employed by Altawood, (2) Altawood discharged Rivas from her employment based on her pregnancy, (3) Altawood acted with malice, oppression, and fraud, and (4) Altawood was liable to Rivas for $82,777 in damages. In her original complaint, Rivas alleged that Altawood hired her around February 2006 and terminated her on November 26, 2006, "due to her pregnancy. "Accordingly, Rivas requested leave to file the FAC to "amend a typographical error" in her first cause of action.
Note:	A California appellate court on Wednesday upheld an $82,777 award in favor of a bookkeeper who claimed her employer fired her for being pregnant.
Citation:	E049597
WCC Citation:	WCC 38862012 CA

Case Name:	Rivera v. Tower Staffing, etc., et al		11/08/2002
Summary:	------------------- WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD STATE OF CALIFORNIA JUAN A. RIVERA, Applicant, vs. TOWER STAFFING SOLUTIONS; STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Defendant(s). "With respect to interest and penalties under. . . section 4650(d), applicant received $10,424. 84 in section4650(d) penalties and $1,535. 93 in interest. Between the Award and the Order of Commutation, $109,659. 08 in benefits should have been paid the applicant and applicant's attorney by January 2, 2001. This would mean that the proper amount of the section4650(d) penalty should have been $10,965. 91, not $10,424. 84 as alleged by SCIF. As noted at the outset, SCIF's petition for reconsideration was granted to allow sufficient opportunity to further study the factual and legal issues.
Note:	4650(d) penalties do not apply to lump sum payments.
Citation:	67 CCC 473 [En Banc]
WCC Citation:	WCC 28952002 CA

Case Name:	Rivera v. WCAB		04/08/1987
Summary:	EDDIE RIVERA, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH AUTHORITY et al. , Respondents. OPINION STONE, P. J. Petitioner Eddie Rivera (applicant) seeks review of a decision of respondent Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Board) reinstating the decision of the Rehabilitation Bureau (Bureau) which terminated [190 Cal. App. 3d 1454] applicant's rehabilitation benefits. We conclude that the Board erred in determining that applicant's appeal from the Bureau decision was procedurally defective. After his initial request for rehabilitation benefits, Bureau proceedings commenced and he was paid vocational-rehabilitation temporary-disability indemnity. In view of the foregoing, the Board erred in determining that applicant's appeal from the Bureau decision was procedurally defective.
Note:	Declaration of Readiness not procedurally defective as an appeal of Rehab Bureau decision.
Citation:	190 Cal.App.3d 1452
WCC Citation:	WCC 27551987 CA

Case Name:	Rivera v. WCAB		04/08/1987
Summary:	EDDIE RIVERA, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH AUTHORITY et al. , Respondents. OPINION STONE, P. J. Petitioner Eddie Rivera (applicant) seeks review of a decision of respondent Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Board) reinstating the decision of the Rehabilitation Bureau (Bureau) which terminated [190 Cal. App. 3d 1454] applicant's rehabilitation benefits. We conclude that the Board erred in determining that applicant's appeal from the Bureau decision was procedurally defective. After his initial request for rehabilitation benefits, Bureau proceedings commenced and he was paid vocational-rehabilitation temporary-disability indemnity. In view of the foregoing, the Board erred in determining that applicant's appeal from the Bureau decision was procedurally defective.
Note:
Citation:	190 Cal.App.3d 1452
WCC Citation:	WCC 27561987 CA

Case Name:	Rivera vs. WCAB (Tower Staffing)		10/03/2003
Summary:	Rivera also requested commutation of future indemnity payments into a lump sum, which was approved by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). Accordingly, the decision of the WCAB is annulled and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On December 12, 2000, Rivera and Tower entered into Stipulations with Request for Award (Stipulations), which was awarded by the WCJ. In addition, Rivera would receive a life pension at the indemnity rate of $51. 75 per week after the payment of permanent disability indemnity. At the same time, Rivera petitioned for commutation into a lump sum all future indemnity payments, including the life pension.
Note:	Overrules En Banc decision in Rivera vs Tower Staffing: 4650 applies to both periodic and accrued indemnity, but not commuted lump sums.
Citation:	112 Cal.App.4th 1124
WCC Citation:	WCC 29562003 CA

Case Name:	Rivera-Sanchez v. Perez		03/19/2013
Summary:	RIVERA-SANCHEZ v. PEREZ DOLORES RIVERA-SANCHEZ, Individually and as Successor in Interest, etc. , et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. ALEJANDRO PEREZ, Defendant and Respondent. Prior to the incident, Defendant Perez was informed and believed that there were some areas of dry rot under the eaves on various portions of the roof. The sole cost of the roof repairs was $186. 68, which was the cost of supplies purchased by Perez. The decedent used his own tools and ladder to make the repairs, with the exception of one saw which was provided by Defendant Perez. As decedent was familiar with roof repairs, Defendant Perez did not direct the details of the decedent's work.
Note:	The widow of a California man who fell to his death while performing roof repairs for a friend could not assert a viable claim against the property owner as the putative employer of her late-husband or in tort.
Citation:	C065350
WCC Citation:	WCC 39922013 CA

Case Name:	Rivera-Sanchez v. WCAB		01/16/2009
Summary:	Rules of Court, rule 8. 494) contending a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) reducing his permanent disability award from 38 percent to 28 percent following reconsideration lacks substantial evidence. Foster Farms petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration, contending the WCJ's decision was not based on substantial evidence in part because Dr. Burt had not reviewed x-rays of Rivera-Sanchez taken on December 4, 2003. Foster Farms again petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration, which the WCAB granted. Rivera-Sanchez contends the WCAB never stated it disbelieved Dr. Burt's assessment of applicant's subjective factors of disability and wonders why his lack of credibility somehow tainted Dr. Burt's opinion. In referring to the "range of evidence" theory in its opinion, the WCAB relied on U. S. Auto Stores v. Workmen's Comp.
Note:	A forklift operator is not entitled to a higher permanent partial disability rating because he failed to present a legal basis to reverse the Workers Compensation Appeals Boards factual findings
Citation:	F056372
WCC Citation:	WCC 34802009 CA

Case Name:	Riverview Fire Protection Dist. v. WCAB		03/25/1994
Summary:	RIVERVIEW FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and WALTER SMITH, Respondents. 1 Background Walter Smith (applicant), born September 10, 1947, was a firefighter for Riverview Fire Protection District (employer) from September 1980 on. For example, for certain peace officers compensable injury is defined to include a hernia, heart trouble or pneumonia developed during employment. The WCJ and the Board found that the presumption of industrial causation in section 3212. 1 applied in this case. That statute does not provide the level of presumption enumerated in the other statutes listed in the preceding paragraph.
Note:	Presumption of cancer in firefighters eliminates need to show that cancer proximately caused by exposure to carcinogens.
Citation:	23 Cal.App.4th 1120
WCC Citation:	WCC 28891994 CA