Case Name:	Sanchez v. City of Los Banos		04/16/2008
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT JOSE REFUGIO BANUELOS SANCHEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS BANOS, Defendant and Respondent. He was injured and taken from the scene by ambulance; he did not discover at that time that the other truck was owned by the City of Los Banos and driven by a city employee. Physical and Mental Incapacity In Draper v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 502, plaintiff was seriously injured when she was struck by a car while in a crosswalk. (Draper v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal. 3d at p. 509, italics added. )He asserts he could not travel to Los Banos to present a claim, but does not explain why he could not have mailed a claim to the city.
Note:	[Unpublished] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief from the claim presentation requirement, based on its conclusion that appellant did not establish that his failure to present a timely claim was due to physical or mental incapacity or to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Citation:	F052641
WCC Citation:	WCC 33442008 CA

Case Name:	Sanchez v. County of Los Angeles		10/26/2005
Summary:	WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD STATE OF CALIFORNIA Case No. MON 0307506 OPINION AND DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION (EN BANC) VIRGINIA SANCHEZ, Applicant, vs. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Permissibly Self-Insured; and TRISTAR RISK MANAGEMENT (Adjusting Agent), Defendant(s). BACKGROUND Virginia Sanchez (applicant) sustained an industrial injury to her left foot on December 18, 2002, while employed as a deputy sheriff by the County of Los Angeles (defendant). The apportionment of pre-existing permanent disability has been a fixture of California workers' compensation law since its inception. In any event, verification is not required when the defendant is the state, a county, a city or other specified public entity. We recognize that, often, the applicant may satisfy this burden by establishing the factors of disability underlying the prior permanent disability award.
Note:	Apportionment for permanent disabilities to the same body region required only where the applicant fails to disprove overlap.
Citation:	70 CCC 1440
WCC Citation:	WCC 31302005 CA

Case Name:	Sanchez v. WCAB		12/31/2009
Summary:	Baldemar Sanchez petitions this court for a writ of review from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). Rules of Court, rule 8. 495. ) Sanchez contends the WCAB erred in concluding that his employer's conduct was negligent, thus avoiding serious and willful misconduct penalties (§ 4553), by failing to properly train and supervise a co-employee in operating a piece of heavy machinery. Unfortunately, between 1:00 and 1:30 p. m. , Haines brought the eight-ton compactor too close to the fuel tank and violated the space where Sanchez was working. Haines realized he had come into contact with Sanchez and panicked, mistakenly causing the eight-ton compactor to move forward rather than backwards. Sanchez sustained injuries to his pelvis, hips, abdomen, bilateral knees, right thigh, and groin from being crushed by the eight-ton compactor.
Note:	Substantial evidence showed that the employer's conduct was negligent, which does not amount to serious and willful misconduct.
Citation:	F058246
WCC Citation:	WCC 35892009 CA

Case Name:	Sanchez v. WCAB		01/23/1990
Summary:	LAWRENCE SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, DELTA LINES, INC. , et al. , Respondents (Opinion by Anderson, P. J. , with Poche and Perley, JJ. , concurring. )The WCJ further held that section 5405. 5 was not applicable to injuries sustained before its effective date of January 1, 1983. The Board then held that applicant's claim for rehabilitation in case OAK 92934 was barred by the five-year limitation in section 5410. On review, we address applicant's right to request rehabilitation benefits only in connection with his injury of December 1, 1978 (OAK 92934). Austin v. Pacific Bell (1988) 53 Cal. Comp. Cases 535, was decided concurrently with Sanchez.
Note:	Applicants' requests for vocational rehab. denied due to 1 year statute of limitations.
Citation:	217 Cal.App.3d 346
WCC Citation:	WCC 25091990 CA

Case Name:	Sandhagen vs. Cox & Cox Construction, SCIF		11/16/2004
Summary:	See Sandhagen vs. Cox & Cox Construction, SCIF (II) (02/07/2005). The May 14, 2004 report reflects it was served by mail on SCIF at its address of record. SCIF has now exceeded the outside time limit of 14 days set forth in Labor Code Section 4610(g)(1). It stated, in relevant part: "I am performing Utilization Review for [SCIF] . . . [in] the case of your patient: Brice Sandhagen. In addition, SCIF submitted in evidence Chapter 8 of the ACOEM guidelines (pages 165-193), entitled: "Neck and Upper Back Complaints. "
Note:	UR deadlines are mandatory - failure to meet deadline precludes use of UR procedure for med treatment dispute in question.
Citation:	69 CCC 1452; En Banc
WCC Citation:	WCC 30652004 CA

Case Name:	Sandhagen vs. Cox & Cox Construction; SCIF (II)		02/07/2005
Summary:	WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD STATE OF CALIFORNIA Case No. RDG 0115958 BRICE SANDHAGEN, Applicant, vs. COX & COX CONSTRUCTION, INC. ; and STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Defendant(s). A "final" order has been defined as one "which determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case. "(Pointer) (1980) 104 Cal. App. 3d 528, 534-535 [45 Cal. Comp. Cases 410, 413]; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers' Comp. Interlocutory procedural or evidentiary decisions, entered in the midst of the workers' compensation proceedings, are not considered to be "final" orders. Nevertheless, there is nothing in section 4610 that requires an employer to use the utilization review process in every case.
Note:	Utilization review is not a condition precedent to a defendant's use of a QME/AME under section 4062(a).
Citation:	69 CCC 1452 (2005) (En Banc)
WCC Citation:	WCC 30792005 CA

Case Name:	Sandvik v. Bozung		04/09/2013
Summary:	Bozung asked Sandvik to draft an employment contract to memorialize their agreement under which Sandvik would work on the Jackson Street property. Sandvik worked for Bozung from June 2007 through November 2008 when it became clear to Sandvik that Bozung was in arrears in paying him and that he could no longer afford to work for her. Initially, Bozung paid Sandvik regularly, but as the project progressed, Bozung paid him less frequently. Bozung testified that the terms of the partnership with Sandvik changed significantly in July 2008 when Sandvik realized that he did not want to be liable for the mortgage on the Upper Terrace property. The evidence also showed that Bozung paid Sandvik wages of $75 an hour on the Jackson Street project pursuant to the employment contract; that Sandvik drafted the contract per Bozung's request, and Bozung made several revisions to the agreement before it was finalized; that Bozung applied for the permit to perform the remodel on the Jackson Street project and designated herself as the owner-builder; and that Sandvik testified that Bozung "pull[ed] her own permits" because she knew that Sandvik was unlicensed.
Note:	A worker who performed labor on behalf of a property owner at two locations was an employee and not an independent contractor.
Citation:	A131667
WCC Citation:	WCC 40012013 CA

Case Name:	Sandy v. Exxon Mobil Corp.		03/27/2008
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO RONALD SANDY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant. Moreover, Exxon retained a measure of control over Albay's conduct at the refinery, and the way Exxon exercised that control affirmatively contributed to plaintiff's injuries. The instruction would have told the jury: "You may consider customs or practice in the community in deciding whether Exxon Mobil Corporation or Merle Sandy acted reasonably. Customs and practice do not necessarily determine what a reasonable person would have done in Exxon Mobil Corporation's or Merle Sandy's situation. References hereinafter to "plaintiff" or "Sandy" will be understood as designating Merle Sandy.
Note:	[Unpublished] There is substantial evidence to establish liability against Defendant.
Citation:	A114238
WCC Citation:	WCC 33352008 CA

Case Name:	Santa Rosa Junior College v. WCAB		11/12/1985
Summary:	SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA S. F. No. 24758 November 12, 1985 SANTA ROSA JUNIOR COLLEGE, PETITIONER, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD AND JOANNE SMYTH, RESPONDENTS Mullen & Filippi, James T. Ponzio and Karen M. Land for Petitioner. Santa Rosa Junior College (college) challenges a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (board) awarding death benefits to JoAnne Smyth, widow of a community college instructor who was killed in an automobile accident on his way home from the campus. His home was located in Ukiah, about 60 miles from the Santa Rosa campus. For several years before the accident, he stayed overnight in Santa Rosa once every two or three weeks and worked at home on some week nights. Edmund Buckley, associate dean of instruction at the college, testified that the administration neither encouraged nor discouraged working at home.
Note:	Home is not second jobsite unless employee must work at home as condition of employment.
Citation:	40 Cal. 3d 345
WCC Citation:	WCC 30351985 CA

Case Name:	Sapp v. GEICO		06/01/2011
Summary:	Sapp signed an employment application and specifically initialed a provision which stated the following: "I understand that the GEICO Companies are at will employers . According to Sapp, however, during her interview process GEICO told her they were looking for "long-term," "career" employees. After Sapp starting making complaints to her, Warford was distant and dismissive and often appeared irritated with Sapp. When she came to work the next day, Warford told Sapp that Warford was glad to see Sapp back, did not want Sapp to quit, and wanted to make sure Sapp received her profit sharing. E. Defamatory Statements Sapp's former coworkers consistently testified that they were informed by GEICO management that Sapp was "no longer with [GEICO]" and that no reason was given, although Rhea may have associated the separation with the review.
Note:	Exclusive remedy barred a claims supervisor's suit against GEICO for intentional infliction of emotional distress, according to an unpublished decision from the 4th District Court of Appeal.
Citation:	D056603
WCC Citation:	WCC 37682011 CA