Case Name:	Argonaut Ins. Co. v. WCAB (Lopez)		02/22/1971
Summary:	ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and RICHARD LOPEZ, Respondents (Opinion by Fleming, J. , with Herndon, Acting P. J. , and Compton, J. , concurring. )Under this section permanent disability must be apportioned between two injuries producing the disability. [2] However, the board awarded Lopez 11 1/2 percent permanent disability without regard to its prior awards or findings. Nevertheless, the board did not follow the logic of its finding, but instead awarded Lopez compensation for an additional 11 1/2 percent permanent disability. Lopez's employer reported the following hours worked by Lopez during the 12 months which followed his second injury: Tabular Material Omitted
Note:	Insurer entitled to specific finding on amount of PD relied on by WCAB, can controvert finding through legal process.
Citation:	15 Cal.App.3d 436, 36 CCC 89
WCC Citation:	WCC 26491971 CA

Case Name:	Argonaut Ins. Co. v. WCAB (Thompson)		05/09/1972
Summary:	[n3] Counsel for Argonaut prepared a settlement agreement on a printed WCAB form captioned 'Third Party Compromise and Release. 'On May 11, counsel for Argonaut sent the settlement agreement to WCAB for its approval. After Argonaut petitioned for reconsideration, the WCAB on April 6, 1971, affirmed the referee's action. The second error was committed by Argonaut when it was led into the precise error invited by the WCAB form. By ordering Argonaut, rather than Thompson or Cayocca, to pay the $ 1,404, WCAB attempted to take from Argonaut money which had never been in its hands.
Note:	Settlement of 3rd party liability not set aside for superseding, unsatisfied lien.
Citation:	37 CCC 324
WCC Citation:	WCC 27491972 CA

Case Name:	Argonaut Ins. Exch. v. IAC (Bellinger)		02/14/1958
Summary:	ARGONAUT INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and M. FRANCES BELLINGER et al. , Respondents. The panel set aside the referee's approval of the compromise and release agreement and substituted its own findings and award. Petitioner first challenges the jurisdiction of respondent commission to annul the referee's order approving the parties' compromise and release agreement. In 1951, the Legislature amended section 115 of the Labor Code so as to grant referees authority to issue original decisions. However, no authority was given to referees to render an original decision approving a compromise or release agreement.
Note:	IAC not required to take further evidence and could redetermine case on existing record.
Citation:	49 Cal.2d 706, 23 CCC 34
WCC Citation:	WCC 26521958 CA

Case Name:	Arkius Inc. v. Hyundae Health Center et al.		09/27/2011
Summary:	ARKIUS, INC. , Plaintiff and Appellant,v. HYUNDAE HEALTH CENTER, INC. , et al. , Defendants and Respondents. Arkius provided all services pursuant to the agreements but Yeh failed to pay for the work. Arkius filed a complaint alleging causes of action for breach of contract and common counts against several defendants. Defendants called Alex Valles, who had worked for plaintiff on several projects simultaneously, one of which was Ardmore Plaza. Respondents also called Mr. Yeh, who testified he was unaware of any cash payments made to employees working at Ardmore Plaza.
Note:	The license of a general contractor is not suspended by operation of law because it underreported payroll to State Compensation Insurance Fund.
Citation:	B228093
WCC Citation:	WCC 38042011 CA

Case Name:	Arnold v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.		12/30/2011
Summary:	ARNOLD v. MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY KIMBLY ARNOLD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. Plaintiff Kimbly Arnold worked as a nonexclusive insurance agent for Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company (Mutual). During her appointment with Mutual, Arnold did not receive performance evaluations, and he did not monitor or supervise her work schedule. At the time Arnold terminated her appointment in March 2008, she owed Mutual approximately $2,288 for such expenses. Her appointment with Mutual was nonexclusive, and she in fact solicited for other insurance companies during her appointment with Mutual.
Note:	An insurer proved that it was entitled to summary judgment against a worker's suit by proving that she was an independent contractor, a California appellate court ruled in a published decision.
Citation:	A131440
WCC Citation:	WCC 38392011 CA

Case Name:	Arnulfo Aldridge v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority		12/18/2008
Summary:	[U] Aldridge v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, No. B202578 (Cal. App. Dist. 2 12/18/2008) IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT No. B202578 December 18, 2008 ARNULFO ALDRIDGE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Tricia Ann Bigelow, Judge. Raymond G. Fortner, Jr. , County Counsel, and Richard P. Chastang, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 1126; see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318. )(Williams v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles (2004) 121 Cal. App. 4th 708, 714; see 4 Witkin, Cal.
Note:	A lower court properly dismissed a self-represented worker's fourth attempt to state a proper cause of action against his former employer, which he charged had harassed and fired him after he filed a workers' compensation claim.
Citation:	B202578
WCC Citation:	WCC 34692008 CA

Case Name:	Arp v. WCAB		05/05/1977
Summary:	CHRIS P. ARP, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, CHRIS ARP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. , et al. , Respondents (Opinion by Richardson, J. , expressing the unanimous view of the court. )Astrid Arp, petitioner's deceased wife, was an employee of Chris Arp Construction Company, Inc. She was fatally injured in an industrial accident and petitioner applied for and received temporary disability payments accrued by Astrid before her death, and expenses for Astrid's medical care. Astrid Arp earned $6,000 per year as an employee of the construction company wholly owned by her husband. Petitioner asserted a claim for maximum death benefits founded upon the conclusive presumption of section 3501, subdivision (a). Petitioner filed a timely petition for reconsideration with the board, challenging the constitutionality of section 3501's gender-based classification.
Note:	The conclusive presumption of total dependency under section 3501, subdivision (a), is invalid and that, pending action by the Legislature, all applicants must be left to establish proof of dependency under section 3502.
Citation:	19 Cal.3d 395
WCC Citation:	WCC 33881977 CA

Case Name:	Arriaga vs. County of Alameda		04/25/1995
Summary:	LINDA ARRIAGA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA et al. , Defendants and Respondents. (Superior Court of Alameda County, No. 710500-3, James R. Lambden, Judge. )* Linda Arriaga appeals from a judgment dismissing her action for personal injury against respondents County of Alameda (County) and State of California (State). [Arriaga] was assigned by Cal Trans to clean greasy walls of a ventilation duct deep inside the building over the Posey Tube connecting the city of Alameda to Oakland. In each of those cases the person injured was, unlike Arriaga, a county jail inmate at the time of the injury.
Note:	Person convicted of crime but not incarcerated, who performs community service in lieu of paying a fine, is an employee.
Citation:	9 Cal.4th 1055
WCC Citation:	WCC 28761995 CA

Case Name:	Arteaga v. Brink's Inc.		05/28/2008
Summary:	Ruiz also spoke to Arteaga, letting him know that there was an ongoing investigation into the March 1, 2004 variance. At his deposition, Arteaga said he began experiencing these symptoms "[p]robably a year before, two years before" he reported them. But Arteaga concluded that the policy did not apply to him because he was not to blame for his injuries. The physician indicated that Arteaga could return to work without any restrictions and completed a workers' compensation form to that effect. From March 17, 2004 -- when Arteaga first mentioned his symptoms -- to March 23, 2004 -- the day of his termination, Arteaga did not display any difficulty in performing his duties.
Note:	Where the employee relies solely on temporal proximity in response to the employer's evidence of a nonretaliatory reason for termination, he or she does not create a triable issue as to pretext, and summary judgment for the employer is proper.
Citation:	B194082
WCC Citation:	WCC 33742008 CA

Case Name:	Ashdown vs. Ameron Int'l Corp.		08/17/2000
Summary:	ELLEN ASHDOWN, Individually and as Executor, etc. , et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. AMERON INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. This action was brought against respondent Ameron International Corporation (Ameron) by his estate, by and through the decedent's surviving spouse and executor Ellen Ashdown (Ashdown) and his children Kristy Smith and Ian Smith, alleging wrongful death and survival rights of action for negligence, strict liability and loss of consortium caused by his exposure to asbestos during his employment as a pipe inspector for respondent's predecessor company. On April 9, 1997, appellants filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint naming Ameron as a defendant, alleging they had failed to name Ameron as a defendant initially because they had only 'recently learned of facts indicating liability of Ameron . Respondent subsequently moved for summary judgment on these grounds, and noticed a hearing to be held on Friday, July 3, 1998. We conclude on the basis of the undisputed evidence that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was correct, and therefore affirm.
Note:	Dual Capacity and Fraudulent Concealment doctrines narrowly construed v. exclusive remedy.
Citation:	83 Cal.App.4th 868, 65 CCC 1026
WCC Citation:	WCC 24172000 CA