Case Name:	Fortich v. WCAB		09/09/1991
Summary:	JOSEPH FORTICH, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, KTLA GOLDEN WEST BROADCASTING et al. , Respondents. At the time of the injury, KTLA was insured by respondent Employers Insurance of Wausau (Wausau). Wausau orally moved for dismissal, and the workers' compensation judge (WCJ) denied Wausau's motion without prejudice. Judge of the Municipal Court for the Los Angeles Judicial District sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. The Board later understood this language to mean: 'Sixty days was given to defendant to file a Petition for Dismissal. '
Note:	Lack of notice of intention to order dismissal deprives applicant of due process.
Citation:	233 Cal.App.3d 1449, 56 CCC 537
WCC Citation:	WCC 27201991 CA

Case Name:	Forzetting v. WCAB		06/18/2009
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX DOUGLAS FORZETTING, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, OCEANO ICE COMPANY et al. , Respondents. While working as a forklift operator for Oceano Ice Company, Douglas Forzetting industrially injured his back on November 19, 1999, and again on January 27, 2000. Forzetting petitioned for reconsideration, arguing that these PD ratings should have been combined (merged) under Wilkinson v. Workers' Comp. In this case, Forzetting would receive $55,330 if his awards remained separate, but $98,095 if the awards were combined. Forzetting contends that the decisions in Brodie and Benson are unconstitutional because SB 899 did not explicitly repudiate Wilkinson.
Note:	[Unpublished] Each injury must be separately apportioned for cause under sections 4663 and 4664, and PD awards may not be combined.
Citation:	B209323
WCC Citation:	WCC 35352009 CA

Case Name:	Foster v. WCAB		04/17/2008
Summary:	A workers' compensation judge (WCJ) concluded Foster was entitled to two periods of temporary disability indemnity under section 4656(c)(1) for his injuries. The WCAB agreed that Foster was entitled to two periods of temporary disability, but disagreed that the periods should run consecutively. In subsequent workers' compensation proceedings, the WCJ determined that Foster was entitled to two periods of temporary disability benefits. According to the WCAB, the WCJ properly concluded Foster was entitled to two periods of temporary disability indemnity pursuant to section 4656(c)(1) because he suffered two injuries. The WCAB also agreed with the WCJ that Foster could not receive temporary disability indemnity concurrently for both injuries "in the sense that [Foster] cannot collect double benefits. "
Note:	Where independent injuries result in concurrent periods of temporary disability, the 104-week / two-year limitation likewise runs concurrently.
Citation:	C056820
WCC Citation:	WCC 33452008 CA

Case Name:	Fotheringham v. Avery Denison Corp.		02/13/2013
Summary:	FOTHERINGHAM v. AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION SILVANA FOTHERINGHAM, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The litigation between Fotheringham and Avery Dennison has consumed more than a decade. FOTHERINGHAM v. AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION SILVANA FOTHERINGHAM, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. FOTHERINGHAM v. AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION SILVANA FOTHERINGHAM, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. FOTHERINGHAM v. AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION SILVANA FOTHERINGHAM, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent.
Note:	A worker whose disability discrimination allegations against her former employer spawned litigation lasting more than a decade has lost her challenge to the attorney fee and cost award she received for prevailing at the second of the two trials on her claims.
Citation:	B238282
WCC Citation:	WCC 39862013 CA

Case Name:	Fotheringham v. Avery Dennison		03/19/2008
Summary:	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Pre-Litigation Background Silvana Fotheringham was a representative in Avery Dennison's Consumer Call Service Center, where she answered consumer inquiries about Avery Dennison products. Breakdown of the Interactive Process Avery Dennison contends that Fotheringham caused the breakdown in the interactive process because after her attorney wrote the November 27 letter to Avery Dennison, Avery Dennison "offered to sit down and discuss the issues with [counsel]," but "nothing else happened. "What Avery Dennison neglects to mention is that its letter offering to discuss the employment issues came after Avery Dennison had told Fotheringham that she no longer had a job. Whether in 1999 Avery Dennison tried to mislead the DFEH with the date on a job analysis, if this is what Fotheringham could prove, is not relevant to whether Avery Dennison properly accommodated Fotheringham's disability. Fotheringham also contends that because Avery Dennison's insurer made the workers' compensation payments and there was no evidence that the insurer had assigned collection rights to Avery Dennison, Avery Dennison was not entitled to the offset for the workers' compensation settlement.
Note:	[Unpublished] It was up to Fotheringham to demonstrate that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether Avery Dennison terminated her employment in retaliation for engaging an attorney to represent her and seek accommodations. Fotheringham met that burden. She produced evidence that Avery Dennison fired her the day after it received her attorney's letter requesting accommodations.
Citation:	B187949
WCC Citation:	WCC 33282008 CA

Case Name:	Fotheringham v. Avery Dennison Corporation		03/22/2011
Summary:	FOTHERINGHAM v. AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION SILVANA FOTHERINGHAM, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS ZELON, J. Silvana Fotheringham sued her former employer, Avery Dennison Corporation, and a jury found that Avery Dennison failed to accommodate her disability. "Silvana Fotheringham was a representative in Avery Dennison's Consumer Call Service Center, where she answered consumer inquiries about Avery Dennison products. Whether in 1999 Avery Dennison tried to mislead the DFEH with the date on a job analysis, if this is what Fotheringham could prove, is not relevant to whether Avery Dennison properly accommodated Fotheringham's disability. A review of the opposition papers filed by Avery Dennison demonstrates that Avery Dennison raised numerous arguments concerning the reasonableness of the fees requested by Fotheringham.
Note:	A plaintiff worker who proved that her employer failed to accommodate her disability, in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, is entitled to more than $474,000 in attorney fees and costs in addition to her $54,000 damages award.
Citation:	B217757
WCC Citation:	WCC 37362011 CA

Case Name:	Francies v. Kapla		03/30/2005
Summary:	Francies was diagnosed as HIV positive shortly after Kapla became his primary care physician in 1993. Kapla testified that although he continued to treat Francies for two months after the disclosure and knew that Francies was upset that his employer had learned of his HIV status, Kapla did not know that the report had been faxed to the restaurant until after Francies filed this lawsuit. Kapla contends Francies is precluded from asserting a cause of action based on the first report because the report is a privileged communication under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). Kapla contends Francies did not meet his burden of proof because "(1) neither Dr. Kapla nor Janet Blair intentionally disclosed that Francies was HIV-positive; (2) there was no egregious breach of social norms; (3) there was no public disclosure of private facts; (4) Francies consented to the disclosure; and (5) Francies did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. "*fn10 Kapla points out correctly that Francies did not raise his other arguments concerning the calculation of recoverable damages in the trial court.
Note:	Filing of work comp claim does not amount to consent to disclosure of HIV status.
Citation:	127 Cal.App.4th 1381
WCC Citation:	WCC 30882005 CA

Case Name:	FRANCISCO GONZALEZ v. JOSE SOARES, as Trustee, etc., et al., unpublished		02/10/2021
Summary:	When a party completely fails to plead an affirmative defense in its answer, it is deemed to have waived the defense. insured Jose Soares dba Jose Soares Dairy, but did not insure the others listed. Jose, Teresa, and Avila met with the broker, and Jose and Teresa chose the coverage to buy. In this case, plaintiff was employed by Jose and Teresa, a married couple who owned and operated the dairy known as Jose Soares Dairy. The parties stipulated that Jose and Teresa were the sole trustees of the J&T Soares 2006 Trust, a revocable living trust.
Note:	A California appellate court ruled that the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation law barred a dairy worker’s claim for damages for injuries he sustained when his employer-provided home caught fire.
Citation:	NO. F077672
WCC Citation:	NO. F077672

Case Name:	Francisco Gonzalez vs Jose Soares		02/10/2021
Summary:	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed this action against “Jose Soares, individually and dba Joe D. Soares and Jose D. Soares Dairy; Teresa Soares; J&T Soares 2006 Trust;” and Does. By later amendment, he identified two of the Doe defendants as Jose D. Soares as trustee for the J&T Soares 2006 Trust and Teresa Soares as trustee for the J&T Soares 2006 Trust. The parties also stipulated that: As a result of his injuries, plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim against Jose Soares Dairy, Jose Soares dba Jose Soares Dairy, Teresa Soares, and Jose D. Soares Dairy; plaintiff’s injuries were sustained while he was in the course and scope of his employment with Jose and Teresa; the only policy of workers’ compensation insurance in effect at the time was a policy with Zenith Insurance Company (Zenith); and Zenith filed a notice of lien in this civil action, asserting a lien on any settlement or judgment in favor of plaintiff and against anyone other than Jose Soares dba Jose Soares Dairy. The first amended application for adjudication of claim named Jose Soares Dairy, Jose Soares, individually and dba Jose Soares Dairy, Teresa Soares, and Jose and Teresa Soares Dairy, as plaintiff’s employer; it identified Zenith as the insurer. insured Jose Soares dba Jose Soares Dairy, but did not insure the others listed.
Note:	A California appellate court ruled that the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation law barred a dairy worker’s claim for damages for injuries he sustained when his employer-provided home caught fire.
Citation:	F077672
WCC Citation:	F077672

Case Name:	Franczak v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.		05/24/1977
Summary:	JOSEF FRANCZAK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent (Opinion by Mosk, J. , with Tobriner, Acting C. J. , Sullivan, J. , and Lillie, J. , concurring. We conclude that under the plain language of section 5806 of the Labor Code, the court does have such jurisdiction. Each of the awards contained an order that it was to be paid 'with interest as provided by law. 'Although defendant paid plaintiffs an amount equal to the principal sum of each award, it failed to pay the interest thereon. Franczak was awarded $1,485 by the board on April 22, 1965, but defendant did not pay that sum until April 27, thereby incurring $1. 44 in interest payments.
Note:	Superior court had jurisdiction to enforce interest awarded by WCAB.
Citation:	19 Cal.3d 481, 42 CCC 422
WCC Citation:	WCC 26061977 CA

Case Name:	Frank D. Brown v. Desert Christian Center		03/17/2011
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT F060139 March 17, 2011 FRANK D. BROWN, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, v. DESERT CHRISTIAN CENTER, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION OPINION In this personal injury case, defendant Desert Christian Center was successful in proving its affirmative defense that the injuries alleged by plaintiff Frank D. Brown were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the workers' compensation system. Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court had jurisdiction to award costs under the particular circumstances of this case. The total amount of costs claimed in the memorandum was $7,909. 88, the majority of which consisted of deposition costs. The trial court agreed that it lacked jurisdiction to award costs and granted the motion to strike the memorandum of costs.
Note:	A trial court had jurisdiction to award a defendant employer $7,910 in costs it incurred while defending against an employee's civil suit.
Citation:	F060139
WCC Citation:	WCC 37302011 CA

Case Name:	Fred T. Hines v. New United Motors Mfg.		04/30/2001
Summary:	Fred T. Hines, Applicant v. New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc. , Great American Risk Management, Defendants W. C. A. B. Nos. Such an award coupled with section 4600 entitles the injured worker to reasonable changes of treating physicians. BACKGROUND Applicant sustained industrial injury to his lower back while employed as a truck conveyer worker on August 18, 1998. On June 29, 2000, Dr. Bernfeld reported that applicant requested chiropractic care and evaluation for his work-related low back injury. The WCJ found that applicant was entitled to the further medical treatment recommended by his newly selected treating physician, Dr. Bernfeld.
Note:	If existing award for treatment, employee does NOT need to follow 4061/4062 for new physician.
Citation:	66 CCC 478 (En Banc)
WCC Citation:	WCC 28152001 CA

Case Name:	Fremont Comp Ins Co vs. Sierra Pine, Ltd.		08/04/2004
Summary:	FREMONT COMPENSATION INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SIERRA PINE, LTD. et al. , Defendants and Respondents. Fremont paid Nesmith $125,000 in death benefits pursuant to a Board order, and is obligated for other amounts, such as burial expenses. Code, § 3503), was his actual dependent and would have been entitled to benefits even had they never been married. Because a subrogee stands in the shoes of the subrogor, they argued Fremont had no standing to sue to recoup the benefits. If for some reason he chose not to sue them, Fremont "likewise" could have sued defendants to recoup its payments.
Note:	Carrier has subrogation rights independent of work comp beneficiary.
Citation:	121 Cal. App. 4th 389
WCC Citation:	WCC 30182004 CA

Case Name:	Fremont Indemnity Co. v. WCAB		03/31/1980
Summary:	FREMONT INDEMNITY COMPANY, Petitioner v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; EMELDA ROCHA; and DOMESTIC LAUNDRY & CLEANING COMPANY, Respondents. OPINION: Petitioner Fremont Indemnity Company (Fremont) contends that respondent Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Board) has erred in finding Fremont was the workers' compensation insurance carrier for respondent Domestic Laundry & Cleaning Company (Domestic) on March 1, 1977, when Domestic's employee, respondent Emelda Rocha, claims she sustained an industrial injury. Fremont avers the deposition of Henderson is important as therein Henderson testifies concerning the cancellation of Domestic's policy with Fremont. Fremont asserted (1) substantial evidence did not support the findings of coverage by Fremont on the date of injury, and (2) the WCJ failed to comply with Labor Code section 5313. Fremont asserts that the WCJ's report was not served upon Fremont or its counsel as required by WCAB Rules section 10860.
Note:	WCJ's failure to specify reasoning in decision deprives party of meaningful right to petition for recon.; WCJ's Notice of Intention was not sufficient for proper service.
Citation:	45 CCC 391
WCC Citation:	WCC 27361980 CA

Case Name:	Fremont Indemnity Co. v. WCAB		03/29/1984
Summary:	FREMONT INDEMNITY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and HENRY H. ZEPEDA, Respondents. OPINION DANIELSON, J. Petitioner Fremont Indemnity Company petitions for review and annulment of an order of the Workers' Compensation Appeals [153 Cal. App. 3d 968] Board (Board) finding that the applicant sustained an injury to the right hip. Facts Applicant and respondent Henry H. Zepeda (applicant) filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits alleging industrial injury to his back and right leg on March 18, 1976, against Service Greeting Card Company and its insurer Fremont Indemnity. Petitioner, insurance carrier Fremont Indemnity, contested injury to the right hip. Said reports . . . have been stricken due [153 Cal. App. 3d 969] to counsel for Fremont Indemnity Company's objection to the indicated communication and because the record was complete without them. '
Note:	Judge's two phone calls to independent medical examiner denied parties a fair trial.
Citation:	153 Cal.App.3d 965, 49 CCC 288
WCC Citation:	WCC 27971984 CA

Case Name:	French Valley Aviation, Inc. v. Superior Court of Riverside County		10/17/2008
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO No. E046169 October 17, 2008 FRENCH VALLEY AVIATION, INC. , PETITIONER, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, RESPONDENT; AIR PETRO CORP. , REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. The opinion of the court was delivered by: McKINSTER Acting P. J. McKaye himself answered interrogatories indicating ATW was his employer, although in a deposition he stated that both entities were employers. The Supreme Court noted as an additional factor that the worker believed his employment relationship was with the maintenance company. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to set aside its order denying FVA's motion for summary judgment and to issue a new order granting the motion.
Note:	[Unpublished] Under Labor Code section 3864 real party in interest is barred from seeking contribution or indemnity from employer.
Citation:	E046169
WCC Citation:	WCC 34362008 CA

Case Name:	Fresno Unif. School Dist. v. WCAB		11/22/2000
Summary:	* ] FRESNO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and DANIEL HUMPHREY, Respondents. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW Respondent Daniel Humphrey was employed as a custodian for petitioner Fresno Unified School District (FUSD) between September 15, 1982, and August 20, 1997. FUSD filed a timely petition for reconsideration with the WCAB on December 9, 1999. Although FUSD argues that all three apply in this instance, the WCJ and WCAB found that none do. (Dills v. Redwoods Assocs. , Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal. App. 4th 888, 890, fn. 1. ) DISPOSITION The judgment (order) of the WCAB is affirmed.
Note:	Unrelated noncompensable injury means a disabling event which, had it been work-related, would be compensable under the worker's compensation laws; Apportionment requires pre-existing labor disability.
Citation:	84 Cal. App. 4th 1295, 65 CCC 1232
WCC Citation:	WCC 4042000 CA

Case Name:	Fruehauf Corp. v. WCAB		07/13/1967
Summary:	FRUEHAUF CORPORATION et al. , Petitioners, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and THOMAS C. STANSBURY, Respondents. OPINION MOSK, J. Petitioners, Fruehauf Corporation and its insurance carrier, seek review of a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board (hereinafter board) awarding compensation to Thomas C. Stansbury, an employee who suffered an industrial injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by Fruehauf. Stansbury was employed by Fruehauf from July 21, 1962 to July 5, 1964, as an assembler. It persisted while he was at home and when he was in bed at night, as well as at work. He did not work for Fruehauf after July 2, 1964.
Note:	Statute of limitations begins on date of last exposure for cumulative injuries.
Citation:	68 Cal.2d 569, 33 CCC 300
WCC Citation:	WCC 25301967 CA

Case Name:	Fuentes v. WCAB		02/02/1976
Summary:	JOHN FUENTES, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, PACIFIC STATES STEEL CORPORATION et al. , Respondents In Bank. However, in 1971 the Legislature amended section 4658, establishing a different method for computing the number of weekly benefits to be awarded. From this figure is subtracted the dollar value (§ 6,422. 50) of the 24. 25 percent of the noncompensable, nonindustrial disability. [16 Cal. 3d 6] [1a] We have concluded that formula A is the proper one, and accordingly affirm the decision of the Board. As we have previously noted, the purpose of that statute is to encourage employers to hire physically handicapped persons.
Note:	4658 is limited by 4750 only where employee had preexisiting disability.
Citation:	16 Cal.3d 1, 41 CCC 42
WCC Citation:	WCC 25101976 CA

Case Name:	Fuller v. County of Los Angeles		01/22/2013
Summary:	FULLER v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DOUGLAS FULLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al. , Defendants and Respondents. This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8. 1115. PERLUSS, P. J. Douglas Fuller, a former firefighter trainee with the Los Angeles County Fire Department, appeals the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County of Los Angeles and County employees Dave Saran and Pitt Gilmore (collectively the County defendants) on Fuller's claims of employment discrimination, harassment, retaliation and related torts. Under County Civil Service Rules, either termination was sufficient by itself to disqualify Fuller from employment with the County Fire Department. On March 17, 2007 the Board of Supervisors denied the claims on the merits, informing Fuller its investigation of the matter "fail[ed] to indicate any liability on the part of the County of Los Angeles. "Fuller's Lawsuit On April 25, 2007 Fuller filed a lawsuit in the Los Angeles County Superior Court asserting claims for (1) violation of his federal civil rights (42 U. S. C. § 1983) (against County only); (2) interference with prospective economic advantage (against County and Saran); (3) retaliatory conduct in violation of Los Angeles County Code section 5. 02. 060 and Labor Code section 1102. 5 (against County, Saran and Gilmore); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (against County, Saran and Gilmore).
Note:	A California appellate court has rejected a former firefighter trainee's claims of employment discrimination, harassment, retaliation and related torts based on the conduct of the fire department and its officials after he boiled his foot during a training exercise.
Citation:	B228815
WCC Citation:	WCC 39742013 CA