Case Name:	Elliot vs. WCAB		12/17/1987
Summary:	LANA ELLIOT, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, WILLIAM MURPHY et al. , Respondents (Opinion by Kline, P. J. , with Rouse, J. , concurring. 1 On October 31, 1985, the applicant (Lana Elliot) fractured her left wrist when she fell from a ladder while trimming a tree for her employers, Mr. and Mrs. William Murphy (Murphys). In denying the applicant's petition for reconsideration, the Board adopted the findings and recommendation of the WCJ. First, it is necessary to determine the minimum and maximum benefits based on the employee's "actual weekly earnings from all employers. "Unless otherwise specified, all code references herein are to the Labor Code, and all subsection references are to section 4453.
Note:	Board should give consideration to the worker's acutal earnings from all sources of employment.
Citation:	196 CA 3d 1497
WCC Citation:	WCC 29891987 CA

Case Name:	Elsner v. Uveges		02/07/2003
Summary:	ROWDY ELSNER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARL UVEGES, Defendant and Appellant, STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Intervenor and Appellant. Defendant Carl Uveges appeals a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Rowdy Elsner and intervenor State Compensation Insurance Fund (State Fund) on Elsner's complaint for personal injuries stemming from a construction site accident. Because Uveges considered Frey an experienced carpenter, Uveges did not feel he had to check his work for safety purposes; he expected Frey to be able to build a scaffold correctly. Elsner does not contend Uveges falls under section 6304's definition of employer and, indeed, Uveges' status as general {Slip Opn. Consequently, this is not a situation where Elsner seeks to impute negligence to Uveges; that is, hold him vicariously or derivatively responsible for the negligence of another.
Note:	CalOSHA standards, regs, citations not admissable in employee third party suit.
Citation:	106 Cal.App.4th 73
WCC Citation:	WCC 29152003 CA

Case Name:	Emmer v. Adobe Systems, Inc.		12/28/2007
Summary:	Ct. No. 1-04-CV013697) In this appeal, Jennifer Emmer seeks review of an order denying her special motion to strike the cross-complaint of respondent Adobe Systems Incorporated (Adobe) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425. 16 ("section 425. 16"), the "anti-SLAPP" statute. Background*fn1 Appellant began working for Adobe as an Engineering Manager in November 2000, after an extensive recruiting process. Appellant initiated an action against Adobe in November 2002, asserting one cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. After hiring appellant, Chen introduced her to other Adobe employees and told them that appellant had graduated from Harvard University, without being corrected by appellant. With regard to the claim of unjust enrichment, Adobe alleged that appellant had "unjustly received salary, bonuses, and benefits .
Note:	[Unpublished] It is the gravamen of the plaintiff's cause of action that determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies, and when the allegations referring to arguably protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.
Citation:	H030685
WCC Citation:	WCC 32952007 CA

Case Name:	Empl. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of WI v WCAB		02/28/1975
Summary:	Civil No. 44901 Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 4 CCC 820 February 28, 1975 OPINION BY: Rouse, J. The only reported case directing a supplemental award of attorney's fees under section 5801 is California Comp. Unfortunately, that case offers us no guidance as to procedures to be employed when the employer's petition for writ of review is summarily denied. It has been our practice, in that instance, to make no separate ruling on the employee's request for attorney's fees. Section 5801 and section 4903, subdivision (a), govern awards of attorney's fees and costs in appellate proceedings.
Note:	Provides guidance for awarding attorney's fees in appellate proceedings.
Citation:	46 CA 3d 104, 40 CCC 820
WCC Citation:	WCC 26341975 CA

Case Name:	Employers Compensation Insurance Co. v. Designer Studio Inc. unpublished		02/16/2021
Summary:	On July 3, 2017, Insurance Company sued Designer Studio for breach of contract based on allegations that Designer Studio made misrepresentations to procure a worker’s compensation insurance policy from Insurance Company, refused to provide Insurance Company with access to its corporate records, and failed to make premium payments on its insurance policy. Designer Studio argued it had a meritorious defense to the litigation because Insurance Company miscalculated Designer Studio’s policy premiums. It found Designer Studio presented evidence of a meritorious defense because Insurance Company likely miscalculated Designer Studio’s premium payments. It contends the trial court abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment and erred in ordering that the funds levied from Designer Studio be returned to Designer Studio. Insurance Company claims Designer Studio did not have a satisfactory excuse because Designer Studio and Baillieux are not the same person or entity; therefore, Designer Studio did not technically become incapacitated when Baillieux became ill.
Note:	A California appellate court ruled that an employer was entitled to have its default set aside in a breach-of-contract dispute with its workers’ compensation insurance carrier.
Citation:	No. D076293
WCC Citation:	No. D076293

Case Name:	Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Indust. Acc. Comm'n		03/01/1940
Summary:	EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and Mrs. GRACE BURNETT, Respondents. Mrs. Burnett, under her contract of employment, was required to live at her employer's residence, and, as part of her compensation, received her board and room. She returned to her employer's residence a little before 8 P. M. She put an apron over her street dress, and washed the dinner dishes. While engaged in shortening the dress she slipped and fell, fracturing her left ankle and dislocating her left elbow. The commission found that these injuries occurred in the course of, and arose out of, the employment, and made its award accordingly.
Note:	Evidence supports determination that live-in employee was sustained in course and scope of employment.
Citation:	37 Cal.App.2d 567
WCC Citation:	WCC 30581940 CA

Case Name:	Energetic Painting and Drywall Inc. v. WCAB		07/24/2007
Summary:	As we will explain, we agree with petitioners Energetic Painting and Drywall, Inc. , and its insurer Zurich North America Insurance Company*fn1 that the WCJ used the wrong schedule. In December 2006, Energetic petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration of the WCJ's decision to apply the 1997 schedule. While that petition was pending, the WCAB (sitting en banc) decided Pendergrass v. Duggan Plumbing (2007) 72 Cal. Comp. Cases 95. The three dissenting members of the WCAB concluded that the "plain language" of sections 4061 and 4660(d) required a different result. Thus, we are concerned only with whether Energetic was required to provide Ramirez with the section 4061 notice before January 1, 2005. .
Note:	Under Labor Code section 4061, an employer must give the notice required by that statute to the injured worker 'together with the last payment of temporary disability indemnity,' and the employer is 'not required' to provide that notice until the last temporary disability payment is made or has become due.
Citation:	153 Cal. App. 4th 633; 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 72 CC
WCC Citation:	WCC 32382007 CA

Case Name:	Energy Insurance Mutual Limited v. Ace American Insurance Company Part 1/2		08/10/2017
Summary:	Filed 7/11/17 Certified for Publication 8/10/17 (order attached) IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR .             ENERGY INSURANCE MUTUAL LIMITED, Plaintiff and Appellant, .             v. .             ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. .             A140656 .             (Contra Costa County Super. .           "SECTION V—DEFINITIONS .           "[¶] . [¶] .           "M. SEPARATION OF INSUREDS   .           "Except with respect to the Limits of Insurance this policy applies: .           "1. .           "And, the professional services exclusion read in part: .           "PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY EXCLUSION [] .           "[¶] .
Note:	The 1st District Court of Appeal this week ordered publication of its decision finding that Ace American Insurance Co. did not owe coverage for an insured’s alleged negligence that led to a fatal pipeline explosion.
Citation:	A140656
WCC Citation:	Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. MSC11-0060

Case Name:	Energy Insurance Mutual Limited v. Ace Insurance Company Part 2/2		08/10/2017
Summary:	(1 New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition (2009) Self-insured Retentions Versus Large or Matching Deductibles, § 1A. 02[3][a], p. 1A-10 (Rel. According to ACE, the AEGIS policy functions as primary insurance and the EIM policy is a first-level excess above it. (4 New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition, supra, Excess Insurance and Umbrella Coverage, § 24. 02 [2][c], p. 24-15 (Rel. )  In its brief, ACE refers to the policy as both an "excess commercial umbrella liability" and an "umbrella policy. "(4 New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition, supra, Excess Insurance and Umbrella Coverage, § 24. 02 [3] & [4], pp.
Note:	The 1st District Court of Appeal this week ordered publication of its decision finding that Ace American Insurance Co. did not owe coverage for an insured’s alleged negligence that led to a fatal pipeline explosion.
Citation:	A140656
WCC Citation:	Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. MSC11-0060

Case Name:	Engle v. Endlich		09/22/1992
Summary:	MARY L. ENGLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HAROLD ENDLICH, Defendant and Respondent. Procedural and Factual Statement On June 26, 1986, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants Coast Elevator Company (Coast) and Dr. Harold Endlich (Endlich) for recovery of damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained on July 1, 1985. It found that the settling defendant, Coast, was free of negligence but that Endlich and Hospital were each 50 percent negligent. On June 21, 1990, following a hearing, the court granted the motion of Endlich for reduction of the judgment in the amount of the workers' compensation lien. These sums were deducted from the $802,851 jury award to determine the net amount due on the judgment from Endlich.
Note:	No double recovery in damage award; reduced by compensation received.
Citation:	9 Cal.App.4th 1152, 57 CCC 617
WCC Citation:	WCC 24301992 CA