Case Name:	Eliapo v. SCI California Funeral Services		07/17/2009
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ESTHER ELIAPO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SCI CALIFORNIA FUNERAL SERVICES, INC. , et al. , Defendants and Respondents. INTRODUCTION On September 9, 2002, plaintiff Esther Eliapo drove across town on an errand for her employer, defendant Oak Hill Improvement Company (Oak Hill). G. The Motion to Tax Costs The trial court awarded costs to Oak Hill and the related entity, SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. , both of which were represented by one attorney and were treated as a single defendant during trial. Rules of Court, rule 3. 1700(a)(1)), and since the caption on the memorandum of costs filed in this case lists only SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. , Oak Hill is not entitled to costs. SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. , is a related entity.
Note:	[Unpublished] Since plaintiff obtained no recovery in this case, the trial court had discretion to award expert fees as allowed under Code of Civil Procedure section 998.
Citation:	H031761
WCC Citation:	WCC 35442009 CA

Case Name:	Elijahjuan et al. v. the Superior Court of Los Angeles County		10/17/2012
Summary:	Hireem Elijahjuan et al. v. the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. B234794 /17/2012 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT HIREEM ELIJAHJUAN ET AL. , PETITIONERS, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, RESPONDENT; MIKE CAMPBELL & ASSOCIATES, LTD. , ET AL. , REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST. In contrast, here the court stayed litigation on the alleged violations of the Unfair Business Practices Act. "An appellate court has discretion to treat a purported appeal from a non-appealable order as a petition for writ of mandate. "(Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal. 4th 83, 97; Truly Nolen of America v. Superior Court (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 487, 498. )If the trial court were to conclude that the arbitration provision is not unconscionable, then I would order the trial court to reinstate the order compelling arbitration.
Note:	A trial court judge erred in directing a dispute between four workers and their employer based on their alleged misclassification as independent contractors to arbitration, since the terms of the agreement that some of the workers had signed only compelled arbitration for disputes regarding the application or interpretation of that agreement.
Citation:	B234794
WCC Citation:	WCC 39432012 CA

Case Name:	Elliot v. WCAB		02/25/2010
Summary:	After this matter became fully briefed, the WCAB issued its en banc decision in Cervantes v. El Aguila Food Products, Inc. (2009) 74 Cal. Comp. Cases 1336 (Cervantes), explicitly denouncing the Brasher holding relied on by the WCAB in this case. The WCAB agreed with respondents, granted reconsideration and rescinded the workers' compensation judge's order directing respondents to authorize the spinal surgery. Pointedly, the Cervantes court acknowledges that in the present case, the WCAB panel had followed the repudiated Brasher holding which the entire board, including the panelists deciding Elliott's case, now rejects. Unlike en banc decisions of the WCAB, significant panel decisions are not binding precedent in workers' compensation proceedings. However, the WCAB does deem them to be of "significant interest and importance to the workers' compensation community. "
Note:	The spinal surgery second opinion process commences after utilization review has denied the requested spinal surgery.
Citation:	A125585
WCC Citation:	WCC 36022010 CA

Case Name:	Elliot vs. WCAB		12/17/1987
Summary:	LANA ELLIOT, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, WILLIAM MURPHY et al. , Respondents (Opinion by Kline, P. J. , with Rouse, J. , concurring. 1 On October 31, 1985, the applicant (Lana Elliot) fractured her left wrist when she fell from a ladder while trimming a tree for her employers, Mr. and Mrs. William Murphy (Murphys). In denying the applicant's petition for reconsideration, the Board adopted the findings and recommendation of the WCJ. First, it is necessary to determine the minimum and maximum benefits based on the employee's "actual weekly earnings from all employers. "Unless otherwise specified, all code references herein are to the Labor Code, and all subsection references are to section 4453.
Note:	Board should give consideration to the worker's acutal earnings from all sources of employment.
Citation:	196 CA 3d 1497
WCC Citation:	WCC 29891987 CA

Case Name:	Elsner v. Uveges		02/07/2003
Summary:	ROWDY ELSNER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARL UVEGES, Defendant and Appellant, STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Intervenor and Appellant. Defendant Carl Uveges appeals a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Rowdy Elsner and intervenor State Compensation Insurance Fund (State Fund) on Elsner's complaint for personal injuries stemming from a construction site accident. Because Uveges considered Frey an experienced carpenter, Uveges did not feel he had to check his work for safety purposes; he expected Frey to be able to build a scaffold correctly. Elsner does not contend Uveges falls under section 6304's definition of employer and, indeed, Uveges' status as general {Slip Opn. Consequently, this is not a situation where Elsner seeks to impute negligence to Uveges; that is, hold him vicariously or derivatively responsible for the negligence of another.
Note:	CalOSHA standards, regs, citations not admissable in employee third party suit.
Citation:	106 Cal.App.4th 73
WCC Citation:	WCC 29152003 CA

Case Name:	Emmer v. Adobe Systems, Inc.		12/28/2007
Summary:	Ct. No. 1-04-CV013697) In this appeal, Jennifer Emmer seeks review of an order denying her special motion to strike the cross-complaint of respondent Adobe Systems Incorporated (Adobe) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425. 16 ("section 425. 16"), the "anti-SLAPP" statute. Background*fn1 Appellant began working for Adobe as an Engineering Manager in November 2000, after an extensive recruiting process. Appellant initiated an action against Adobe in November 2002, asserting one cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. After hiring appellant, Chen introduced her to other Adobe employees and told them that appellant had graduated from Harvard University, without being corrected by appellant. With regard to the claim of unjust enrichment, Adobe alleged that appellant had "unjustly received salary, bonuses, and benefits .
Note:	[Unpublished] It is the gravamen of the plaintiff's cause of action that determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies, and when the allegations referring to arguably protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.
Citation:	H030685
WCC Citation:	WCC 32952007 CA

Case Name:	Empl. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of WI v WCAB		02/28/1975
Summary:	Civil No. 44901 Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 4 CCC 820 February 28, 1975 OPINION BY: Rouse, J. The only reported case directing a supplemental award of attorney's fees under section 5801 is California Comp. Unfortunately, that case offers us no guidance as to procedures to be employed when the employer's petition for writ of review is summarily denied. It has been our practice, in that instance, to make no separate ruling on the employee's request for attorney's fees. Section 5801 and section 4903, subdivision (a), govern awards of attorney's fees and costs in appellate proceedings.
Note:	Provides guidance for awarding attorney's fees in appellate proceedings.
Citation:	46 CA 3d 104, 40 CCC 820
WCC Citation:	WCC 26341975 CA

Case Name:	Employers Compensation Insurance Co. v. Designer Studio Inc. unpublished		02/16/2021
Summary:	On July 3, 2017, Insurance Company sued Designer Studio for breach of contract based on allegations that Designer Studio made misrepresentations to procure a worker’s compensation insurance policy from Insurance Company, refused to provide Insurance Company with access to its corporate records, and failed to make premium payments on its insurance policy. Designer Studio argued it had a meritorious defense to the litigation because Insurance Company miscalculated Designer Studio’s policy premiums. It found Designer Studio presented evidence of a meritorious defense because Insurance Company likely miscalculated Designer Studio’s premium payments. It contends the trial court abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment and erred in ordering that the funds levied from Designer Studio be returned to Designer Studio. Insurance Company claims Designer Studio did not have a satisfactory excuse because Designer Studio and Baillieux are not the same person or entity; therefore, Designer Studio did not technically become incapacitated when Baillieux became ill.
Note:	A California appellate court ruled that an employer was entitled to have its default set aside in a breach-of-contract dispute with its workers’ compensation insurance carrier.
Citation:	No. D076293
WCC Citation:	No. D076293

Case Name:	Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Indust. Acc. Comm'n		03/01/1940
Summary:	EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and Mrs. GRACE BURNETT, Respondents. Mrs. Burnett, under her contract of employment, was required to live at her employer's residence, and, as part of her compensation, received her board and room. She returned to her employer's residence a little before 8 P. M. She put an apron over her street dress, and washed the dinner dishes. While engaged in shortening the dress she slipped and fell, fracturing her left ankle and dislocating her left elbow. The commission found that these injuries occurred in the course of, and arose out of, the employment, and made its award accordingly.
Note:	Evidence supports determination that live-in employee was sustained in course and scope of employment.
Citation:	37 Cal.App.2d 567
WCC Citation:	WCC 30581940 CA

Case Name:	Energetic Painting and Drywall Inc. v. WCAB		07/24/2007
Summary:	As we will explain, we agree with petitioners Energetic Painting and Drywall, Inc. , and its insurer Zurich North America Insurance Company*fn1 that the WCJ used the wrong schedule. In December 2006, Energetic petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration of the WCJ's decision to apply the 1997 schedule. While that petition was pending, the WCAB (sitting en banc) decided Pendergrass v. Duggan Plumbing (2007) 72 Cal. Comp. Cases 95. The three dissenting members of the WCAB concluded that the "plain language" of sections 4061 and 4660(d) required a different result. Thus, we are concerned only with whether Energetic was required to provide Ramirez with the section 4061 notice before January 1, 2005. .
Note:	Under Labor Code section 4061, an employer must give the notice required by that statute to the injured worker 'together with the last payment of temporary disability indemnity,' and the employer is 'not required' to provide that notice until the last temporary disability payment is made or has become due.
Citation:	153 Cal. App. 4th 633; 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 72 CC
WCC Citation:	WCC 32382007 CA