Case Name:	Miklosy v. The Regents of the University of California Part 1/2		07/31/2018
Summary:	Filed 7/31/08 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA .             LES G. MIKLOSY et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, .             v. .             THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al. , Defendants and Respondents. .             S139133 .             Ct. App. 1/4 A107711 .             Alameda County Super. .             Plaintiffs Leo Miklosy and Luciana Messina are computer scientists who, in February 2003, were employed by the Regents of the University of California (hereafter the University of California or the University), filling positions at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (the Laboratory). As we explained in Campbell: “The California Constitution establishes the Regents [i. e. , the University of California] as a ‘public trust . (Ishimatsu v. Regents of University of California (1968) 266 Cal. App. 2d 854, 864; see also Apte v. Regents of University of California (1988) 198 Cal. App. 3d 1084, 1091. )
Note:
Citation:	S139133
WCC Citation:	Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG04140484

Case Name:	Miklosy v. The Regents of the University of California Part 2/2		07/31/2018
Summary:	“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered. ” (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 1250, 1268, fn. the university has failed to reach a decision regarding that complaint within the time limits established for that purpose by the regents. ” (§ 8547. 10, subd. The Legislature recognized and met the need for independent review by expressly authorizing civil claims for retaliation by state agencies, the University of California, and the California State University. opn. , ante, at p. 14), whereas the new statute, former section 10550, did not require the University to hold hearings on whistleblower retaliation complaints. The difference is important, because adverse State Personnel Board findings after an evidentiary hearing were presumably reviewable for substantial evidence, while University findings were not.
Note:
Citation:	S139133
WCC Citation:	Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG04140484

Case Name:	Milan v. City of Holtville		06/23/2010
Summary:	FACTUAL BACKGROUND In April 1998 Tanya Milan began work as a water treatment operator for the City of Holtville (the city). Nonetheless, Milan believed she was still employed by the city because she was in fact receiving a regular pay check from the city, even though she had not returned to work. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 30, 2005, Milan filed a complaint against the city alleging it had violated FEHA Milan argued the city violated FEHA by failing to determine whether it could provide effective accommodations for Milan's disability. Milan opposed the motion, arguing that in light of Dr. Korsh's opinion, the city had an obligation under FEHA to contact Milan and determine whether it could accommodate her disability. The city contends that notwithstanding the fact Milan was given notice the city did not believe she could return to her job, there is no evidence in the record Milan ever requested any accommodation or even expressed to the city any desire to return to her former job.
Note:	[Unpublished] The record will not support the trial court's finding of liability under FEHA. Rather, the trial court should have granted the city's motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8
Citation:	D054139
WCC Citation:	WCC 36422010 CA

Case Name:	Milbauer vs. Boostan; UEF		12/18/2003
Summary:	It appears that UEF has done little to alleviate that confusion, although UEF has been an active participant in these proceedings since at least 1996. On October 17, 1996, UEF appeared by counsel at a Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC), at which UEF was formally joined as a party defendant. UEF offered no evidence that "American Runner Attorney Service, Inc. ," (or any other entity) was the correct legal identity of the employer. At that time, UEF again appeared and the issues were framed, including the correct legal identity of the employer. For convenience, we will refer to both UEF and the Office of the Director, Legal Unit, as "UEF. "
Note:	Active participation of UEF required in identifying correct employer; Sanctions available vs. UEF
Citation:	68 CCC 1834
WCC Citation:	WCC 29632003 CA

Case Name:	Millard v. Biosources, Inc.		11/15/2007
Summary:	No Biosources personnel were working or present at the project when Millard fell from the attic space. As first aid was being rendered to Millard immediately following the incident, Millard informed his coworker, Tyler Sterling, that the lights in the attic had "flickered" before he fell. Some time later, Millard told another Apex coworker, Paul Perry, the lights in the attic had flickered. At his deposition, Millard denied telling anyone that the lights flickered and testified that the lights had gone out. Finally, the court found that Millard failed to "submit admissible evidence to raise a material issue of fact that Privette does not apply or that [Biosources] owed [Millard] a duty due to retained control. "
Note:	Because the appellant failed to allege that he was entitled to rely on a presumption of negligence under a theory of negligence per se and did not ask permission to amend his complaint to do so in response to the appellee's motion for summary judgment, the court properly granted the motion.
Citation:	156 Cal. App. 4th 1338
WCC Citation:	WCC 32762007 CA

Case Name:	Millbauer vs. Boostan; UEF		03/10/2004
Summary:	UEF expressly states that it "does not contest" the affirmance of the WCJ's finding regarding the correct legal identity of applicant's employer. Indeed, UEF specifically acknowledges that these procedures were announced with the intent "to change how UEF cases are handled in the future. "Thus, as to this case, UEF is not "aggrieved" by any part of our decision. Here, although the Appeals Board's affirmance of the correct legal identity of applicant's employer constitutes a "final" order, UEF again expressly "does not contest" this determination. No substantive right or liability of UEF was determined by these procedures in this case.
Note:	Pronouncement of procedures to be used in future cases are not final orders from which reconsideration may be taken.
Citation:	69 CCC 246; En Banc
WCC Citation:	WCC 29752004 CA

Case Name:	Miller v. Filter		05/08/2007
Summary:	Ct. No. 6293) MICHAEL M. MILLER et al. , Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. GALE FILTER et al. , Defendants and Appellants. On November 6, 2000, Mark Fussell died in a workplace accident, while Miller was director of the Mine. Filter, Hedum, Mejlszenkier, and Patchett then prosecuted Miller and the Mine, alleging that Fussell's death was caused by the willful violation of occupational safety standards. Filter and Mejlszenkier presented the case to the Sierra County Grand Jury, and Patchett served as the grand jury advisor. Miller and the Mine (plaintiffs) then sued Filter, Hedum, Mejlszenkier, Patchett, and CDAA (defendants) for malicious prosecution, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent employment and supervision.
Note:	CDAA and its deputized employees were absolutely immune from liability in the lawsuit against them and, thus, the trial court should have granted their anti-SLAPP motion.
Citation:	150 Cal. App. 4th 652
WCC Citation:	WCC 32222007 CA

Case Name:	Miller v. WCAB		07/27/2011
Summary:	Miller reported to the Hospital on March 18, 2008, at 10:00 p. m. and was scheduled work until 8:00 a. m. the next morning. Walker arrived an hour after Miller and asked her to distribute medications in the male sexual offender unit. Miller petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration. *fn2 A two-member majority of the reviewing WCAB panel adopted and incorporated the WCJs Report and Recommendation, affirming that the WCJs conclusion that Walkers directions to Miller barred her psychological claim as a lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel action. Nothing in this opinion should be construed as expressing any opinion of this court as to whether, or to what extent, Miller sustained a psychological injury, as that decision has not been reached by the WCAB.
Note:	A split California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board panel decision did not sufficiently explain its reasoning about why Labor Code 3208.3 barred a registered nurse's psyche claim, a California appellate court ruled.
Citation:	F060092
WCC Citation:	WCC 37862011 CA

Case Name:	Mills v. WCAB		06/20/2008
Summary:	-ooOoo- *Before Ardaiz, P. J. , Wiseman, J. , and Gomes, J. Roger Mills petitions for a writ of review from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). Rules of Court, rule 8. 494. ) Mills contends the WCAB misconstrued the law of apportionment as amended by Senate Bill No. 899 (Stats 2004, ch. Mills filed an application for adjudication of claim with the WCAB in April 2004, and the parties obtained a significant amount of discovery. The WCJ filed a report and recommendation to the WCAB recommending the WCAB deny reconsideration. Accordingly, the WCAB agreed with the WCJ's finding that Mills was entitled to only a 40 percent disability award.
Note:	The new apportionment provisions in Senate Bill No. 899 became effective immediately and must be applied to all pending cases 'not yet final at the time of the legislative enactment on April 19, 2004, regardless of the earlier dates of injury and any interim decision.'
Citation:	F054144
WCC Citation:	WCC 33862008 CA

Case Name:	Millsaps v. Doehrman Company, Inc.		04/11/2011
Summary:	Plaintiff Derrick Millsaps appeals from a 2010 postjudgment order granting nearly $40,000 in costs, including expert witness fees, to defendant Doehrman Company, Inc. (Doehrman). Millsaps sued Doehrman for negligent installation of the equipment. Doehrman made a pretrial offer to compromise to Millsaps pursuant to section 998. It offered to pay Millsaps $50,000, in exchange for (among other things) Millsaps' dismissal of the action against Doehrman, and his "agree[ment] to indemnify and hold harmless DOEHRMAN COMPANY, INC. from any and all claims or liens asserted by intervener PEP BOYS, INC. " The action proceeded to jury trial in 2006; Doehrman prevailed after a jury found it did not install the equipment that caused Millsaps' injury. Even had Millsaps settled the underlying personal injury claim against Doehrman, Pep Boys' complaint in intervention could have proceeded to trial.
Note:	An injured worker's products liability suit will cost him $40,000 in costs because he rejected a settlement offer and subsequently failed to prove his case.
Citation:	C064390
WCC Citation:	WCC 37432011 CA

Case Name:	Milpitas Unified School District v. WCAB (Guzman)		08/19/2010
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT No. H034853 August 19, 2010 MILPITAS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, PETITIONER, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD AND JOYCE GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION In this original proceeding the Milpitas Unified School District (District) challenges a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB or Board) applying Labor Code section 4660*fn1 to the disability evaluation of a District employee. In his December 2, 2005 report, Dr. Feinberg noted Guzman's history of injuries prior to her employment with the District. The WCAB, however, granted the petition for reconsideration and combined the case with an ongoing dispute in Almaraz v. Environmental Recovery Services (Almaraz). The WCAB granted the petition and, in the interests of consistency, granted reconsideration on its own motion in Guzman's case.
Note:	The court concluded that the language of Labor Code 4660 permits reliance on the entire Guides, including the instructions on the use of clinical judgment, in deriving an impairment rating in a particular case.
Citation:	H034853
WCC Citation:	WCC 36572010 CA

Case Name:	Miner v. Superior Court		04/09/2001
Summary:	Miner v. Superior Court , 30 Cal. App. 3d 597 [Civ. GEORGE H. MINER, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO COUNTY, Respondent; PEDRO JIMINEZ, JR. , Real Party in Interest (Opinion by Brown (G. The cause comes to us upon a petition by Miner for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to sustain the demurrer. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 180, 185, fn. (Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal. 3d 841, 851 [92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 479 P. 2d 379]. )
Note:	An employee has limited rights to sue another employee for damages apart from work comp.
Citation:	30 Cal.App.3d 597, 38 CCC 210
WCC Citation:	WCC 4082001 CA

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship		01/31/2013
Summary:	MINISH v. HANUMAN FELLOWSHIP DIANE MARIE MINISH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HANUMAN FELLOWSHIP et al. , Defendants and Respondents. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Plaintiff Diane Marie Minish filed an action against the Hanuman Fellowship (Hanuman), Mount Madonna Institute, and the Mount Madonna Center seeking compensatory and punitive damages for personal injuries and other losses she sustained when she fell off a forklift allegedly due to defendants' negligence. She submitted evidence that Hanuman regularly compiled a list of volunteers for its compensation carrier, and Hanuman did not add plaintiff's name to the list until after the accident was reported to its carrier. She further contends that she could not have become a covered volunteer because she never agreed to that status. Plaintiff complains, "Here, of course, without the slightest advance warning, Hanuman plunged Minish into the toils of the workers compensation system not only without her knowledge but, as soon as she learned of it, very much against her will. "
Note:	Factual questions about whether a volunteer was covered by workers' compensation prevented a trial court from deciding the case on a motion for summary judgment.
Citation:	H035737
WCC Citation:	WCC 39842013 CA

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship Part 1/3		03/06/2018
Summary:	.             H041888 .             (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348) .             Plaintiff Diane Minish sustained serious personal injuries after she fell off a forklift on premises owned by defendant Hanuman Fellowship (the Fellowship). 1 Minish initially reported that her injuries occurred while she was working as a volunteer, doing construction work for the Fellowship. Both Minish and the Fellowship reported the injury to the Fellowship’s workers’ compensation carrier and Minish received more than $270,000 in workers’ compensation benefits. This court reversed the summary judgment in a prior appeal in Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 437, 443 (Minish I). .           The Fellowship reported the accident to its workers’ compensation carrier, the State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF), which provided workers’ compensation benefits to Minish.
Note:
Citation:	H041888
WCC Citation:	Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship Part 2/3		03/06/2018
Summary:	Since Minish relies on the exception for public entities in section 3363. 5, we also review the language of that section. .           The Legislature amended former section 3363. 6, but not former section 3363. 5, in 1976 and 1978. .           In reviewing this statutory history, we note that the Fellowship was formed in 1974, the same year section 3363. 6 was enacted. .         Finally, Minish argues against applying the rule of liberal construction from section 320213 in this appeal. We nonetheless mention Beverly Fabrics and Eckis, since they demonstrate that this issue may ultimately be resolved adversely to Minish.
Note:
Citation:	H041888
WCC Citation:	Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship Part 3/3		03/06/2018
Summary:	The Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment based on the trial court’s failure to analyze whether the bunkhouse rule applied. Fortunately, copies of some of the documents pertaining to Board of Directors Meetings were kept in [Ward Mailliard’s] home. ” Before trial, Minish challenged the authenticity of documents produced by the Fellowship. As we have noted, this court construed section 3363. 6 in Minish I, which is the only published opinion construing section 3363. 6. Minish cites a similar report from 1978 to the same committee for Senate Bill No. 1468 (1977-1978 Reg. The Fellowship made a motion to stay the superior court action in 2014, which the trial court denied.
Note:
Citation:	H041888
WCC Citation:	Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348

Case Name:	Minniear v. Mt. San Antonio Comm. Coll. Dist.		09/18/1996
Summary:	This presumption is rebuttable and may be controverted by a preponderance of medical opinion indicating an (sic) different level of impairment. '(b) The employee's permanent disability benefit awarded under paragraph (a) shall be adjusted based on the disability rating selected by the appeals board. Following surgery, applicant had follow-up treatment by Dr. Burres, including a lumbar MRI on July 8, 1994. According to Dr. Burres, the study showed mild postoperative change, but no evidence of recurrent disc herniation. On January 4, 1995, Dr. Burres examined applicant and submitted a report concluding that his condition was permanent and stationary.
Note:	Sufficiency of evidence necessary to rebut treating dr. presumption; award reduction required per 4065.
Citation:	61 CCC 105
WCC Citation:	WCC 24131996 CA

Case Name:	Miranda v. Bomel Construction, et al.		07/30/2010
Summary:	RUDY MIRANDA et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOMEL CONSTRUCTION CO. , INC. et al. , Defendants and Respondents. He sued general contractor, Bomel Construction Co. , Inc. (Bomel), and subcontractor, J/K Excavation & Grading Co. , Inc. , (J/K). Bomel agreed to excavate, remove, and dispose of all dirt not necessary for the project, known as the PS2 project. At the end of April 2007, Miranda and his wife (hereafter referred to collectively and in the singular as Miranda) filed a complaint for negligence and loss of consortium against Bomel and J/K. In his opposition, Miranda argued Bomel and J/K owed a duty to protect Miranda from his exposure to dust inhalation, and causation was a triable issue of material fact.
Note:	A university locksmith failed to prove that a pile of dirt in the lot near his office caused him to contract Valley Fever.
Citation:	G042073
WCC Citation:	WCC 36542010 CA

Case Name:	Mission Linen Supply v. WCAB		10/17/1994
Summary:	Mission Linen Supply, Petitioner v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, William Daniel Ferguson, Respondents. The WCJ and the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB or Board) refused to correct the error because they thought the request to correct it was untimely. In November 1981, the applicant, William D. Ferguson, was injured while working as a linen supply route salesman for the Mission Linen Supply Company, a self-insured employer. The WCJ followed the recommendation, including the incorrect calculation of the amount of the life pension, and issued a supplemental award. In dismissing the employer's petition for reconsideration, the WCAB also indicated that the employer's right to relief was barred by the doctrine of laches.
Note:	Clerical or mathematical error in award may be corrected at any time so long as not prejudicial.
Citation:	59 CCC 849
WCC Citation:	WCC 27321994 CA

Case Name:	Mitchel vs. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc.		02/26/1991
Summary:	MICHAEL MITCHELL et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC. , et al. , Defendants and Respondents. -On February 7, 1986, Wetzel told Mitchell to come to Wetzel's office to pick up a check. The adjuster also lied when she said Wetzel did not know why there were so many errors and late payments concerning Mitchell's file. Her purpose was to deprive the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) of information relevant to penalties against Wetzel. However, when the vice- president [227 Cal. App. 3d 1478] of the bank negotiating the check contacted Wetzel, Wetzel told the vice-president not to negotiate the check until three days had passed.
Note:	Intentional misconduct by the workers' compensation claims administrator of a self-insured employer falls within the exclusive remedy of work comp.
Citation:	227 Cal.App.3d 1474
WCC Citation:	WCC 29961991 CA