Case Name:	Meadows v. Farrell		11/22/2010
Summary:	Meadows eventually filed an action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and other tort claims based on statements allegedly made by Farrell. Sentry Insurance told Meadows that a "case nurse," defendant Barbara Farrell, would meet with her and any doctors to "manage [her] care. "According to Meadows, Farrell did not "publish Dr. Huffer's retraction to the extent that the original false and/or misleading information had been published. "She also denied disseminating false, misleading, or private medical information about Meadows, or communicating to anyone that Meadows was addicted to and/or abusing drugs. Meadows's declaration did not include any reference to the alleged comments by Farrell about Meadows potentially getting fired and/or not getting chiropractic care.
Note:	A nurse case manager's motion to strike an applicant's lawsuit failed because the nurse failed to show that her allegedly injurious comments were protected speech.
Citation:	H035309
WCC Citation:	WCC 36822010 CA

Case Name:	Medrano v. WCAB		09/25/2008
Summary:	The letter advised Medrano that he was not eligible for vocational rehabilitation services based on his employer's offer of modified or alternative work. The WCJ determined that Medrano was entitled to full vocational rehabilitation services, as the offer of modified/alternative work was not appropriate because it was made while Medrano was still medically temporarily disabled, which meant he was completely unable to work. The termination date of the VRMA awarded was when Medrano returned to the labor market. The Board granted review and issued an Opinion and Decision agreeing with the WCJ's decision that Medrano was entitled to full vocational rehabilitation services. And State Fund should not be the beneficiary of the work Medrano undertook, because it was State Fund's denial of services that resulted in Medrano needing the work for compensation.
Note:	Vocational rehabilitation maintenance allowance (VRMA) is not a wage replacement benefit, and thus it is not subject to wage-loss credit.
Citation:	B202828
WCC Citation:	WCC 34292008 CA

Case Name:	Meeks Building Center v. WCAB (Najjar)		06/26/2012
Summary:	MEEKS BUILDING CENTER v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD MEEKS BUILDING CENTER et al. , Petitioners, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and SALEM NAJJAR, Respondents. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Applicant and respondent Salem Najjar worked as a paint sales associate at Meeks Building Center through June 12, 2007. The WCAB concluded that "the mandated payment for attending a [qualified medical evaluation] exam is not the equivalent of commencing temporary disability payments. "The WCAB granted Najjar's petition for reconsideration and rescinded the findings of fact and order of the WCJ. Because the WCAB could not determine on the record before it when temporary disability payments had in fact commenced, the matter was remanded.
Note:	A single payment of benefits to an injured worker for attending a defense-requested medical evaluation is a reimbursement of a medical-legal expense, not a payment of temporary disability benefits.
Citation:	C065944
WCC Citation:	WCC 39102012 CA

Case Name:	Mehta v. Activor Corp.		03/20/2018
Summary:	.             B276151 .             (Los Angeles County Super. Plaintiff initiated workers’ compensation proceedings (Mehta WCAB) 1 and sued Activor and Zaveri for damages pursuant to Labor Code section 3706 (Mehta v. Zaveri et al. , Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. YC057627 (Mehta I). Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Fraudulent Transfers .           Defendants next argue that “even if Mehta was a creditor and Activor was a debtor . V. Money Judgment as Remedy for Fraudulent Transfers  .           The Mehta I judgment against Activor included Mehta’s attorney fees for successfully prosecuting that action. There is no authority for the damages award in Mehta II against Activor, however, because those damages were already awarded to plaintiff in Mehta I.
Note:
Citation:	B276151
WCC Citation:	Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC 488531

Case Name:	Mejia-Gutierrez v. Comcast of California III		01/28/2013
Summary:	MEJIA-GUTIERREZ v. COMCAST OF CALIFORNIA III, INC. BERNARDINO MEJIA-GUTIERREZ et al. , Plaintiffs, SEABRIGHT INSURANCE COMPANY, Intervener and Appellant, v. COMCAST OF CALIFORNIA III, INC. , Defendant and Respondent. He did not rely on any Comcast employee to determine the safety of the jobsite because he had already made that determination. AC Square, not Comcast, instructed AC Square employees on how to use a ladder when replacing a drop line. Comcast has a system of cable wire inspection, the purpose of which is "safety for everyone," including employees and subcontractors. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent, Comcast of California III, Inc. Lambden, J. and Richman, J. , concurs.
Note:	A contractor was not liable as a matter of law, for injuries sustained by an employee of one of its subcontractors in a fall from a ladder.
Citation:	A132933
WCC Citation:	WCC 39782013 CA

Case Name:	Melman v. PDF Solutions, Inc.		03/22/2013
Summary:	MELMAN v. PDF SOLUTIONS, INC. PHILIP STEVEN MELMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PDF SOLUTIONS, INC. , et al. , Defendants and Respondents. In March 2009, Kibarian offered Melman employment through December 31, 2009, at his current salary plus 30,000 shares of PDF. In December 2008, Melman voluntarily began negotiations with PDF to end his employment in exchange for an increase in his PDF stock options. According to Melman, the investigator's notes include the following statements: "(1) PDF Board Chairman Lucio Lanza, Audit Chair Steve Heinrichs, and Board Member Albert Yu discussed their desire to fire Steve Melman at one or more PDF Board meetings. Melman argues that "because these statements demonstrated the discriminatory animus of PDF decision-makers, [he] should have prevailed on summary judgment. "
Note:	A former corporate officer with multiple sclerosis could not prove that his company terminated him on the basis of his disability as a matter of law.
Citation:	H037703
WCC Citation:	WCC 39962013 CA

Case Name:	Mendez v. LAUSD		04/09/2013
Summary:	This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8. 1115. WILLHITE, J. Elvira Tapia Mendez appeals from a summary judgment in favor of respondents Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and Marcia Koff, the principal of the school where Mendez worked. In the first week of October 2010, Mendez refused to proceed with the workers compensation claim the LAUSD had filed on her behalf. In March 2011, Mendez sued Koff for assault and battery and the LAUSD for wrongful termination under Labor Code section 1102. 5, subdivision (b). Mendez argues a jury could find she was terminated by principal Koff or someone at a higher level at the LAUSD who knew of her complaints. But the LAUSD carried its burden when it showed Mendez was laid off as a result of the RIF process.
Note:	A Los Angeles Unified School District clerk who decided to file a civil action against her employer and an elementary school teacher who she says attacked her instead of filing a workers' compensation claim is not entitled to a tort claim.
Citation:	B240919
WCC Citation:	WCC 40002013 CA

Case Name:	Mendiola v. Crestwood Behavioral Health		12/31/1969
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT  (Sacramento)  ---- .             CHRISTINE MENDIOLA, Plaintiff and Appellant, .             v. .             CRESTWOOD BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INC. , Defendant and Respondent. .             C082345 .             (Super. Ct. No. 34-2013- 00147943-CU-WT-GDS) .             Plaintiff Christine Mendiola worked with mentally ill residents in a locked facility at defendant Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. (Crestwood). .             On July 11, 2011, Mendiola was working the night shift and monitoring three clients on the patio during a smoke break. Crestwood failed to report the attack to the Department of Mental Health, its successor the Department of Social Services, or the county’s mental health director.
Note:	A California appellate court ruled that a health care worker was limited to a remedy through workers’ compensation for her injuries from an assault by a mentally ill patient.
Citation:	C082345
WCC Citation:	Super. Ct. No. 34-2013- 00147943-CU-WT-GDS

Case Name:	Mendoza v. Brodeur		08/18/2006
Summary:	CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE ERNESTO MENDOZA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GLENN BRODEUR, Defendant and Respondent. Defendant Glenn Brodeur hired plaintiff Ernesto Mendoza, an unlicensed roofer, to replace his roof. Plaintiff claims that defendant and his handyman, Robert Harris, approached plaintiff and asked him to work on defendant's roof. Section 3352 excludes certain persons from the section 3351 definitions of "employee," and thus excludes them from workers' compensation coverage. In his negligence cause of action, plaintiff alleged: "Plaintiff was hired as an employee by Defendant Brodeur to do roofing work on Defendant's home.
Note:	It was was premature to require the employee to come forward with evidence to show a triable issue of fact when the employer had not shifted the evidentiary burden.
Citation:	142 Cal. App. 4th 72
WCC Citation:	WCC 31742006 CA

Case Name:	Mendoza v. Huntington Hospital		06/03/2010
Summary:	ADJ6820138 ADJ6820197 AMELIA MENDOZA, Applicant, vs. HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL, Permissibly Self-Insured; and SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. (Adjusting Agent), Defendant(s). (EN BANC) We granted the petition for removal filed by applicant, Amelia Mendoza, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem and Trustee, Rafael Mendoza. *fn5 Applicant worked as a patient case associate for Huntington Hospital (Huntington). Applicant argued that the matter should be set for trial on the threshold issues of industrial injury and employment. *fn6 Applicant filed a timely petition requesting that the Appeals Board remove this matter to itself under section 5310 and WCAB Rule 10843.
Note:	[En Banc] AD Rule 30(d)(3) is invalid because it conflicts with sections 4060(c) and 4062.2 and exceeds the scope of section 5402(b).
Citation:	ADJ6820138
WCC Citation:	WCC 36342010 CA

Case Name:	Mendoza v. United Air Lines		08/05/2009
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR LOUISA MENDOZA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC. , et al. , Defendants and Respondents. Ct. No. CGC-05-439627) Appellant Louisa Mendoza (Mendoza) brought suit against respondents United Air Lines, Inc. (United) and Tish DeVere (DeVere) after her employment was terminated. The trial court granted United and DeVere's motion for judgment pursuant to a settlement by proposed order. She continued to work in her position until January 2003, when United expressed concern that because of her injury, she might be unable to perform her work tasks. The trial court had evidence to support its implied finding that Mendoza knew of the content of the proposed order.
Note:	[Unpublished] Because Mendoza failed to give any notice of intent to contest the tentative ruling, she waived her right to challenge that ruling.
Citation:	A122632
WCC Citation:	WCC 35502009 CA

Case Name:	Mercer-Fraser Co. v. IAC		01/06/1953
Summary:	The prefabricated wooden structure here involved was one of three units, A, B, and C, being constructed by petitioner for the Hammond Lumber Company. Hammond supplied the materials and hardware and prefabricated the lumber, and petitioner supplied the construction 'know-how' and the men for the job. Each unit, when completed, was to be approximately 500 feet long in a north- south direction and 192 feet wide. Units A and B, standing side by side, were up and all of the bracing, except for the roof panels, was in. Brushing aside the sophistry with which the majority opinion is replete, what are the realities of the situation here presented?
Note:	Employer's duty for safe workplace not absolute as to liability under 4553.
Citation:	40 Cal.2d 102, 18 CCC 3
WCC Citation:	WCC 24101953 CA

Case Name:	Mercier vs. WCAB, City of Los Angeles		04/20/1976
Summary:	PATRICK F. MERCIER, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondents In Bank. [16 Cal. 3d 713] Frank H. Batlin, Philip M. Miyamoto, Thomas J. McBirnie, Charles L. Swezey, Burt Pines, City Attorney, John T. Neville and H. John Wittorff, Assistant City Attorneys, and William G. Lorenzetti, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondents. OPINION CLARK, J. Petitioner seeks annulment of a workers' compensation award apportioning part of his permanent disability to a prior industrial injury. In 1970 petitioner, a Los Angeles police officer, suffered an industrial injury to his back. In 1971 petitioner was found to have suffered an industrially related heart disability occurring over the entire period of employment with the city, 1949 to 1971.
Note:	Where factors of disability from different injuries overlap apportionment is applicable.
Citation:	16 Cal.3d 711
WCC Citation:	WCC 29761976 CA

Case Name:	Merritt v. Equinox Fitness Woodland Hills, Inc.		12/27/2018
Summary:	_________________________ INTRODUCTION David Merritt sued his former employer, Equinox Fitness Woodland Hills and Equinox Fitness, Inc. (collectively, Equinox), for disability discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12900, et seq. 1 The trial court granted Equinox’s motion for summary adjudication on the FEHA-based claims, concluding the undisputed facts established that Merritt did not suffer from a “disability” as defined by FEHA, and that Equinox terminated his employment for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. Merritt’s Employment as a Personal Trainer for Equinox On September 25, 2012, Equinox hired Merritt as a personal trainer at its Woodland Hills gym. Merritt reported to the personal trainer manager, Cameron McGarr; fitness managers, Don Powers and Jana King; and the gym’s general manager, Chris Wellbaum. In mid-January 2013, Equinox approved and paid for Merritt to participate in a new training program, “Animal Flow. ” After completing the training, Merritt conducted weekly presentations on Animal Flow for gym clients. On July 5, 2013, King notified Merritt that Equinox had decided to terminate his employment.
Note:	A California appellate court revived an injured personal trainer’s discrimination action against his former employer, finding that he was disabled for purposes of the Fair Employment and Housing Act.
Citation:	B266534
WCC Citation:	Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC532180

Case Name:	Messele v. Pitco Foods, Inc.		09/26/2011
Summary:	[Editor's Note: On Nov. 4, the Appeals Board issued an en banc decision saying its holding in Messele v. Pitco Foods Inc. should only apply to requests made after Sept. 26, the day it issued the first en banc Messele decision. ]Relying on Poster v. Southern California Rapid Transit District (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 266 (Poster), and distinguishing Camper v. Workers' Comp. In his Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration (Report), the WCJ recommended that we grant removal and find both panel requests premature. DISCUSSION We note initially that applicants petition seeks reconsideration of a Finding of Fact determining which QME panel was properly assigned. Applicants petition should have requested removal instead of reconsideration, and we erred in granting reconsideration instead of removal.
Note:	A Sept. 27 decision by the California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board has opened a can of worms for the Division of Workers' Compensation, which is now giving attorneys an opportunity to request new qualified medical evaluator panels if the previous panels weren't selected according to the timing endorsed by the WCAB.
Citation:	ADJ7232076
WCC Citation:	WCC 38172011 CA

Case Name:	Messenger Courier Association of the Americas, et al. v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board		07/15/2009
Summary:	Filed 7/15/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA MESSENGER COURIER ASSOCIATION OF THE AMERICAS, et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent. We review a trial court judgment denying declaratory relief to plaintiffs and appellants Messenger Courier Association of the Americas and California Delivery Association (plaintiff). Plaintiff sought declaratory relief that would have invalidated a precedential decision by the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (the Board). The Unemployment Insurance Code also provides disability benefits to compensate eligible persons for unemployment caused by injury or sickness. =========FOOTNOTES========= All further statutory references or references to the code are to the Unemployment Insurance Code unless otherwise indicated.
Note:	An appellate court issued a published decision upholding the application of S.G. Borello & Sons to cases outside the workers' comp arena.
Citation:	D053391
WCC Citation:	WCC 35422009 CA

Case Name:	Messinese vs. Automatic Heating; SCIF		05/21/2004
Summary:	[FN 2] Applicant sustained an admitted industrial injury on April 14, 2003, while employed by Automatic Heating, which was then insured by SCIF. On August 18, 2003, County Child Support Services sent SCIF the earnings assignment order at issue here. Applicant sought penalties against SCIF under Labor Code sections 4650(d) and 5814, plus sanctions and attorney's fees under Labor Code section 5813. Code, ?Code, ?
Note:	Child support orders against past and future indemnity enforceable without WCJ signature.
Citation:	68 CCC 480; Panel
WCC Citation:	WCC 29872004 CA

Case Name:	Meza v. Aerol		10/06/2011
Summary:	INTRODUCTION Defendant, Aerol Corporation, Inc. , appeals from a judgment which was entered in accordance with a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, Rodolfo Meza, on an age and disability discrimination complaint. Mr. Meza lives with plaintiff. Mr. Meza described plaintiff as sad and withdrawn from activities. According to Mr. Meza, plaintiff became "teary eyed" when discussing losing the opportunity to work. Plaintiff, Rodolfo Meza, is awarded his costs and reasonable attorney fees from defendant, Aerol Corporation, Inc. ARMSTRONG, J. and KRIEGLER, J. , concurs.
Note:	The defendant forfeited its challenges to the damages award by failing to object or file a motion for a new trial at the trial court. Regardless, substantial evidence supported the jury's $467,000 award.
Citation:	B228865
WCC Citation:	WCC 38102011 CA

Case Name:	Miceli vs. Jacuzzi, Inc.; Remedy Temp, Inc.		03/28/2003
Summary:	OPINION AND DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION (EN BANC) INTRODUCTION Jacuzzi, Inc. (Jacuzzi) contracted with Remedy Temp, Inc. (Remedy Temp), a temporary staffing agency, to supply temporary employees to Jacuzzi. Temporary employee Mark Miceli was on Remedy Temp's payroll and working at a Jacuzzi jobsite when he sustained an industrial injury. Pursuant to Remedy Temp's contract with Jacuzzi to provide employees to help meet Jacuzzi's temporary staffing needs, Miceli was on Remedy Temp's payroll, not on Jacuzzi's payroll. Jacuzzi was included as an "alternate employer" in the "alternate employer endorsement" contained within the policy between Remedy Temp and Reliance. Jacuzzi, Inc. and Remedy Temp have joint and several liability for the compensation benefits to the injured employee.
Note:	Policy of special employer is 'other insurance' absolving CIGA of liability.
Citation:	68 CCC 434 (En Banc)
WCC Citation:	WCC 29252003 CA

Case Name:	Miceli vs. Jacuzzi; RemedyTemp, Inc.		05/12/2006
Summary:	The petition filed by Assurance for reimbursement of costs it claims to have incurred in the Court of Appeal proceeding is dismissed. Reliance, for RemedyTemp, admitted the industrial injury to applicant and began to provide workers' compensation benefits. On October 31, 2002, the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) issued the Findings and Order in this case. In December 2002, defendants Jacuzzi, RemedyTemp and Assurance all petitioned for reconsideration of the October 31, 2002 Findings and Order. However, Assurance, RemedyTemp and Jacuzzi timely petitioned for rehearing and those petitions were granted by the Court of Appeal.
Note:	Consolidation of cases on issue of CIGA liability for exclusions from the workers' compensation policy of the special employer must be tried on individual basis.
Citation:	71 CCC 599 (2006)
WCC Citation:	WCC 31562006 CA

Case Name:	Michael v. Denbeste Transp., Inc.		03/23/2006
Summary:	At the time of the Subhaul Agreement, Michael had no employees, and he was required to notify Denbeste if he needed to hire any employees. Michael could work for other haulers if Denbeste had no work for him, but the Subhaul Agreement prohibited him from using Denbeste's trailer on other jobs. Sometime before January 18, 2002, Michael discussed with Denbeste the possibility of using a newer trailer on which Michael could install an automatic tarping system. The court determined that Denbeste could not be held liable to Michael for its own negligence because Michael contractually assumed the risk of any such negligence. The provisions of the Subhaul Agreement required that Michael wear protective clothing, and a Denbeste employee made certain that Michael complied.
Note:	Privette doctrine applies where an injured plaintiff is an independent contractor of an independent contractor.
Citation:	137 Cal. App. 4th 1082
WCC Citation:	WCC 31502006 CA

Case Name:	Midas Recovery Services, Inc. v. WCAB		06/20/1997
Summary:	MIDAS RECOVERY SERVICES, INC. , Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, CALIFORNIA FEDERAL BANK et al. , Respondents. 1 Petitioner also seeks review of the order of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board denying its petition for reconsideration. We find that the order of the workers' compensation judge and the board's order denying reconsideration were in error. It was later stipulated by the parties that he was temporarily totally disabled from March 24, 1991, to August 10, 1992. The matter is remanded to allow entry of an award in favor of petitioner consistent with the views expressed herein.
Note:	Reimbursement is paid at rate in effect when payments are made, not during actual disability period.
Citation:	55 Cal.App.4th 1321, 62 CCC 763
WCC Citation:	WCC 25231997 CA

Case Name:	Mihesuah v. WCAB		02/25/1976
Summary:	HENRY E. MIHESUAH, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and UNION OIL COMPANY, Respondents (Opinion by Rattigan, Acting P. J. , with Christian, J. , and Emerson, J. , concurring. )OPINION RATTIGAN, Acting P. J. Petitioner Henry E. Mihesuah received multiple injuries in an industrial accident. (Mihesuah v. Workmen's Comp. (See Mihesuah v. Workmen's Comp. Both requests were made and returned on a form designated "DIA WCAB Form 75 (rev.
Note:	The MDT is only a guide and the disability evaluator may rely on his expertise only.
Citation:	55 Cal.App.3d 720; 41 CCC 181
WCC Citation:	WCC 28631976 CA

Case Name:	Miklosy v. The Regents		07/31/2008
Summary:	Filed 7/31/08 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA LES G. MIKLOSY et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al. , Alameda County Defendants and Respondents. We have observed that 'Article IX, section 9, grants the [R]egents broad powers to organize and govern the university and limits the Legislature's power to regulate either the university or the [R]egents. (Ishimatsu v. Regents of University of California (1968) 266 Cal. App. 2d 854, 864; see also Apte v. Regents of University of California (1988) 198 Cal. App. 3d 1084, 1091. )(Regents of University of California v. City of Santa Monica (1978) 77 Cal. App. 3d 130, 135, citing Hamilton v. Regents (1934) 293 U. S. Name of Opinion Miklosy v. Regents of University of California Unpublished Opinion NP opn.
Note:	The alleged wrongful conduct occurred at the worksite, in the normal course of the employer-employee relationship, and therefore workers' compensation is plaintiffs' exclusive remedy for any injury that may have resulted.
Citation:	RG04140484
WCC Citation:	WCC 34062008 CA

Case Name:	Miklosy v. The Regents of the University of California Part 1/2		07/31/2018
Summary:	Filed 7/31/08 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA .             LES G. MIKLOSY et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, .             v. .             THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al. , Defendants and Respondents. .             S139133 .             Ct. App. 1/4 A107711 .             Alameda County Super. .             Plaintiffs Leo Miklosy and Luciana Messina are computer scientists who, in February 2003, were employed by the Regents of the University of California (hereafter the University of California or the University), filling positions at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (the Laboratory). As we explained in Campbell: “The California Constitution establishes the Regents [i. e. , the University of California] as a ‘public trust . (Ishimatsu v. Regents of University of California (1968) 266 Cal. App. 2d 854, 864; see also Apte v. Regents of University of California (1988) 198 Cal. App. 3d 1084, 1091. )
Note:
Citation:	S139133
WCC Citation:	Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG04140484

Case Name:	Miklosy v. The Regents of the University of California Part 2/2		07/31/2018
Summary:	“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered. ” (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 1250, 1268, fn. the university has failed to reach a decision regarding that complaint within the time limits established for that purpose by the regents. ” (§ 8547. 10, subd. The Legislature recognized and met the need for independent review by expressly authorizing civil claims for retaliation by state agencies, the University of California, and the California State University. opn. , ante, at p. 14), whereas the new statute, former section 10550, did not require the University to hold hearings on whistleblower retaliation complaints. The difference is important, because adverse State Personnel Board findings after an evidentiary hearing were presumably reviewable for substantial evidence, while University findings were not.
Note:
Citation:	S139133
WCC Citation:	Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG04140484

Case Name:	Milan v. City of Holtville		06/23/2010
Summary:	FACTUAL BACKGROUND In April 1998 Tanya Milan began work as a water treatment operator for the City of Holtville (the city). Nonetheless, Milan believed she was still employed by the city because she was in fact receiving a regular pay check from the city, even though she had not returned to work. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 30, 2005, Milan filed a complaint against the city alleging it had violated FEHA Milan argued the city violated FEHA by failing to determine whether it could provide effective accommodations for Milan's disability. Milan opposed the motion, arguing that in light of Dr. Korsh's opinion, the city had an obligation under FEHA to contact Milan and determine whether it could accommodate her disability. The city contends that notwithstanding the fact Milan was given notice the city did not believe she could return to her job, there is no evidence in the record Milan ever requested any accommodation or even expressed to the city any desire to return to her former job.
Note:	[Unpublished] The record will not support the trial court's finding of liability under FEHA. Rather, the trial court should have granted the city's motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8
Citation:	D054139
WCC Citation:	WCC 36422010 CA

Case Name:	Milbauer vs. Boostan; UEF		12/18/2003
Summary:	It appears that UEF has done little to alleviate that confusion, although UEF has been an active participant in these proceedings since at least 1996. On October 17, 1996, UEF appeared by counsel at a Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC), at which UEF was formally joined as a party defendant. UEF offered no evidence that "American Runner Attorney Service, Inc. ," (or any other entity) was the correct legal identity of the employer. At that time, UEF again appeared and the issues were framed, including the correct legal identity of the employer. For convenience, we will refer to both UEF and the Office of the Director, Legal Unit, as "UEF. "
Note:	Active participation of UEF required in identifying correct employer; Sanctions available vs. UEF
Citation:	68 CCC 1834
WCC Citation:	WCC 29632003 CA

Case Name:	Millard v. Biosources, Inc.		11/15/2007
Summary:	No Biosources personnel were working or present at the project when Millard fell from the attic space. As first aid was being rendered to Millard immediately following the incident, Millard informed his coworker, Tyler Sterling, that the lights in the attic had "flickered" before he fell. Some time later, Millard told another Apex coworker, Paul Perry, the lights in the attic had flickered. At his deposition, Millard denied telling anyone that the lights flickered and testified that the lights had gone out. Finally, the court found that Millard failed to "submit admissible evidence to raise a material issue of fact that Privette does not apply or that [Biosources] owed [Millard] a duty due to retained control. "
Note:	Because the appellant failed to allege that he was entitled to rely on a presumption of negligence under a theory of negligence per se and did not ask permission to amend his complaint to do so in response to the appellee's motion for summary judgment, the court properly granted the motion.
Citation:	156 Cal. App. 4th 1338
WCC Citation:	WCC 32762007 CA

Case Name:	Millbauer vs. Boostan; UEF		03/10/2004
Summary:	UEF expressly states that it "does not contest" the affirmance of the WCJ's finding regarding the correct legal identity of applicant's employer. Indeed, UEF specifically acknowledges that these procedures were announced with the intent "to change how UEF cases are handled in the future. "Thus, as to this case, UEF is not "aggrieved" by any part of our decision. Here, although the Appeals Board's affirmance of the correct legal identity of applicant's employer constitutes a "final" order, UEF again expressly "does not contest" this determination. No substantive right or liability of UEF was determined by these procedures in this case.
Note:	Pronouncement of procedures to be used in future cases are not final orders from which reconsideration may be taken.
Citation:	69 CCC 246; En Banc
WCC Citation:	WCC 29752004 CA

Case Name:	Miller v. Filter		05/08/2007
Summary:	Ct. No. 6293) MICHAEL M. MILLER et al. , Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. GALE FILTER et al. , Defendants and Appellants. On November 6, 2000, Mark Fussell died in a workplace accident, while Miller was director of the Mine. Filter, Hedum, Mejlszenkier, and Patchett then prosecuted Miller and the Mine, alleging that Fussell's death was caused by the willful violation of occupational safety standards. Filter and Mejlszenkier presented the case to the Sierra County Grand Jury, and Patchett served as the grand jury advisor. Miller and the Mine (plaintiffs) then sued Filter, Hedum, Mejlszenkier, Patchett, and CDAA (defendants) for malicious prosecution, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent employment and supervision.
Note:	CDAA and its deputized employees were absolutely immune from liability in the lawsuit against them and, thus, the trial court should have granted their anti-SLAPP motion.
Citation:	150 Cal. App. 4th 652
WCC Citation:	WCC 32222007 CA

Case Name:	Miller v. WCAB		07/27/2011
Summary:	Miller reported to the Hospital on March 18, 2008, at 10:00 p. m. and was scheduled work until 8:00 a. m. the next morning. Walker arrived an hour after Miller and asked her to distribute medications in the male sexual offender unit. Miller petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration. *fn2 A two-member majority of the reviewing WCAB panel adopted and incorporated the WCJs Report and Recommendation, affirming that the WCJs conclusion that Walkers directions to Miller barred her psychological claim as a lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel action. Nothing in this opinion should be construed as expressing any opinion of this court as to whether, or to what extent, Miller sustained a psychological injury, as that decision has not been reached by the WCAB.
Note:	A split California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board panel decision did not sufficiently explain its reasoning about why Labor Code 3208.3 barred a registered nurse's psyche claim, a California appellate court ruled.
Citation:	F060092
WCC Citation:	WCC 37862011 CA

Case Name:	Mills v. WCAB		06/20/2008
Summary:	-ooOoo- *Before Ardaiz, P. J. , Wiseman, J. , and Gomes, J. Roger Mills petitions for a writ of review from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). Rules of Court, rule 8. 494. ) Mills contends the WCAB misconstrued the law of apportionment as amended by Senate Bill No. 899 (Stats 2004, ch. Mills filed an application for adjudication of claim with the WCAB in April 2004, and the parties obtained a significant amount of discovery. The WCJ filed a report and recommendation to the WCAB recommending the WCAB deny reconsideration. Accordingly, the WCAB agreed with the WCJ's finding that Mills was entitled to only a 40 percent disability award.
Note:	The new apportionment provisions in Senate Bill No. 899 became effective immediately and must be applied to all pending cases 'not yet final at the time of the legislative enactment on April 19, 2004, regardless of the earlier dates of injury and any interim decision.'
Citation:	F054144
WCC Citation:	WCC 33862008 CA

Case Name:	Millsaps v. Doehrman Company, Inc.		04/11/2011
Summary:	Plaintiff Derrick Millsaps appeals from a 2010 postjudgment order granting nearly $40,000 in costs, including expert witness fees, to defendant Doehrman Company, Inc. (Doehrman). Millsaps sued Doehrman for negligent installation of the equipment. Doehrman made a pretrial offer to compromise to Millsaps pursuant to section 998. It offered to pay Millsaps $50,000, in exchange for (among other things) Millsaps' dismissal of the action against Doehrman, and his "agree[ment] to indemnify and hold harmless DOEHRMAN COMPANY, INC. from any and all claims or liens asserted by intervener PEP BOYS, INC. " The action proceeded to jury trial in 2006; Doehrman prevailed after a jury found it did not install the equipment that caused Millsaps' injury. Even had Millsaps settled the underlying personal injury claim against Doehrman, Pep Boys' complaint in intervention could have proceeded to trial.
Note:	An injured worker's products liability suit will cost him $40,000 in costs because he rejected a settlement offer and subsequently failed to prove his case.
Citation:	C064390
WCC Citation:	WCC 37432011 CA

Case Name:	Milpitas Unified School District v. WCAB (Guzman)		08/19/2010
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT No. H034853 August 19, 2010 MILPITAS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, PETITIONER, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD AND JOYCE GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION In this original proceeding the Milpitas Unified School District (District) challenges a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB or Board) applying Labor Code section 4660*fn1 to the disability evaluation of a District employee. In his December 2, 2005 report, Dr. Feinberg noted Guzman's history of injuries prior to her employment with the District. The WCAB, however, granted the petition for reconsideration and combined the case with an ongoing dispute in Almaraz v. Environmental Recovery Services (Almaraz). The WCAB granted the petition and, in the interests of consistency, granted reconsideration on its own motion in Guzman's case.
Note:	The court concluded that the language of Labor Code 4660 permits reliance on the entire Guides, including the instructions on the use of clinical judgment, in deriving an impairment rating in a particular case.
Citation:	H034853
WCC Citation:	WCC 36572010 CA

Case Name:	Miner v. Superior Court		04/09/2001
Summary:	Miner v. Superior Court , 30 Cal. App. 3d 597 [Civ. GEORGE H. MINER, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO COUNTY, Respondent; PEDRO JIMINEZ, JR. , Real Party in Interest (Opinion by Brown (G. The cause comes to us upon a petition by Miner for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to sustain the demurrer. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 180, 185, fn. (Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal. 3d 841, 851 [92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 479 P. 2d 379]. )
Note:	An employee has limited rights to sue another employee for damages apart from work comp.
Citation:	30 Cal.App.3d 597, 38 CCC 210
WCC Citation:	WCC 4082001 CA

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship		01/31/2013
Summary:	MINISH v. HANUMAN FELLOWSHIP DIANE MARIE MINISH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HANUMAN FELLOWSHIP et al. , Defendants and Respondents. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Plaintiff Diane Marie Minish filed an action against the Hanuman Fellowship (Hanuman), Mount Madonna Institute, and the Mount Madonna Center seeking compensatory and punitive damages for personal injuries and other losses she sustained when she fell off a forklift allegedly due to defendants' negligence. She submitted evidence that Hanuman regularly compiled a list of volunteers for its compensation carrier, and Hanuman did not add plaintiff's name to the list until after the accident was reported to its carrier. She further contends that she could not have become a covered volunteer because she never agreed to that status. Plaintiff complains, "Here, of course, without the slightest advance warning, Hanuman plunged Minish into the toils of the workers compensation system not only without her knowledge but, as soon as she learned of it, very much against her will. "
Note:	Factual questions about whether a volunteer was covered by workers' compensation prevented a trial court from deciding the case on a motion for summary judgment.
Citation:	H035737
WCC Citation:	WCC 39842013 CA

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship Part 1/3		03/06/2018
Summary:	.             H041888 .             (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348) .             Plaintiff Diane Minish sustained serious personal injuries after she fell off a forklift on premises owned by defendant Hanuman Fellowship (the Fellowship). 1 Minish initially reported that her injuries occurred while she was working as a volunteer, doing construction work for the Fellowship. Both Minish and the Fellowship reported the injury to the Fellowship’s workers’ compensation carrier and Minish received more than $270,000 in workers’ compensation benefits. This court reversed the summary judgment in a prior appeal in Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 437, 443 (Minish I). .           The Fellowship reported the accident to its workers’ compensation carrier, the State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF), which provided workers’ compensation benefits to Minish.
Note:
Citation:	H041888
WCC Citation:	Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship Part 2/3		03/06/2018
Summary:	Since Minish relies on the exception for public entities in section 3363. 5, we also review the language of that section. .           The Legislature amended former section 3363. 6, but not former section 3363. 5, in 1976 and 1978. .           In reviewing this statutory history, we note that the Fellowship was formed in 1974, the same year section 3363. 6 was enacted. .         Finally, Minish argues against applying the rule of liberal construction from section 320213 in this appeal. We nonetheless mention Beverly Fabrics and Eckis, since they demonstrate that this issue may ultimately be resolved adversely to Minish.
Note:
Citation:	H041888
WCC Citation:	Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship Part 3/3		03/06/2018
Summary:	The Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment based on the trial court’s failure to analyze whether the bunkhouse rule applied. Fortunately, copies of some of the documents pertaining to Board of Directors Meetings were kept in [Ward Mailliard’s] home. ” Before trial, Minish challenged the authenticity of documents produced by the Fellowship. As we have noted, this court construed section 3363. 6 in Minish I, which is the only published opinion construing section 3363. 6. Minish cites a similar report from 1978 to the same committee for Senate Bill No. 1468 (1977-1978 Reg. The Fellowship made a motion to stay the superior court action in 2014, which the trial court denied.
Note:
Citation:	H041888
WCC Citation:	Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348

Case Name:	Minniear v. Mt. San Antonio Comm. Coll. Dist.		09/18/1996
Summary:	This presumption is rebuttable and may be controverted by a preponderance of medical opinion indicating an (sic) different level of impairment. '(b) The employee's permanent disability benefit awarded under paragraph (a) shall be adjusted based on the disability rating selected by the appeals board. Following surgery, applicant had follow-up treatment by Dr. Burres, including a lumbar MRI on July 8, 1994. According to Dr. Burres, the study showed mild postoperative change, but no evidence of recurrent disc herniation. On January 4, 1995, Dr. Burres examined applicant and submitted a report concluding that his condition was permanent and stationary.
Note:	Sufficiency of evidence necessary to rebut treating dr. presumption; award reduction required per 4065.
Citation:	61 CCC 105
WCC Citation:	WCC 24131996 CA

Case Name:	Miranda v. Bomel Construction, et al.		07/30/2010
Summary:	RUDY MIRANDA et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOMEL CONSTRUCTION CO. , INC. et al. , Defendants and Respondents. He sued general contractor, Bomel Construction Co. , Inc. (Bomel), and subcontractor, J/K Excavation & Grading Co. , Inc. , (J/K). Bomel agreed to excavate, remove, and dispose of all dirt not necessary for the project, known as the PS2 project. At the end of April 2007, Miranda and his wife (hereafter referred to collectively and in the singular as Miranda) filed a complaint for negligence and loss of consortium against Bomel and J/K. In his opposition, Miranda argued Bomel and J/K owed a duty to protect Miranda from his exposure to dust inhalation, and causation was a triable issue of material fact.
Note:	A university locksmith failed to prove that a pile of dirt in the lot near his office caused him to contract Valley Fever.
Citation:	G042073
WCC Citation:	WCC 36542010 CA

Case Name:	Mission Linen Supply v. WCAB		10/17/1994
Summary:	Mission Linen Supply, Petitioner v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, William Daniel Ferguson, Respondents. The WCJ and the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB or Board) refused to correct the error because they thought the request to correct it was untimely. In November 1981, the applicant, William D. Ferguson, was injured while working as a linen supply route salesman for the Mission Linen Supply Company, a self-insured employer. The WCJ followed the recommendation, including the incorrect calculation of the amount of the life pension, and issued a supplemental award. In dismissing the employer's petition for reconsideration, the WCAB also indicated that the employer's right to relief was barred by the doctrine of laches.
Note:	Clerical or mathematical error in award may be corrected at any time so long as not prejudicial.
Citation:	59 CCC 849
WCC Citation:	WCC 27321994 CA

Case Name:	Mitchel vs. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc.		02/26/1991
Summary:	MICHAEL MITCHELL et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC. , et al. , Defendants and Respondents. -On February 7, 1986, Wetzel told Mitchell to come to Wetzel's office to pick up a check. The adjuster also lied when she said Wetzel did not know why there were so many errors and late payments concerning Mitchell's file. Her purpose was to deprive the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) of information relevant to penalties against Wetzel. However, when the vice- president [227 Cal. App. 3d 1478] of the bank negotiating the check contacted Wetzel, Wetzel told the vice-president not to negotiate the check until three days had passed.
Note:	Intentional misconduct by the workers' compensation claims administrator of a self-insured employer falls within the exclusive remedy of work comp.
Citation:	227 Cal.App.3d 1474
WCC Citation:	WCC 29961991 CA

Case Name:	Mitchell v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co.		03/02/1995
Summary:	Zennie Mitchell, Applicant v. Golden Eagle Insurance, Defendant. (4) Restitution may be an appropriate remedy where a deposition attorney's fee has been erroneously paid pursuant to Labor Code section 5710(b)(4). In Mitchell vs. Golden Eagle Insurance, LAO 700455, applicant, Zennie Mitchell, filed a claim for cumulative trauma to her back, shoulder, neck, biceps, chest, psyche and head for the period February, 1992, to November 10, 1993. In Mitchell, the WCJ issued an order allowing a deposition attorney's fee without issuing a notice of intention. In Mitchell, the employee did attach a letter from his attorney requesting a deposition attorney's fee to the Pre-Application Request For Attorney's Fees.
Note:	Industrial injury not prerequisite to recover deposition atty. fee; Restitution appropriate for fee paid erroneously.
Citation:	60 CCC 205
WCC Citation:	WCC 3731995 CA

Case Name:	Mitchell vs. The Union Central Life Insurance Co.		05/26/2004
Summary:	DOROTHY WIMBERLY MITCHELL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE UNION CENTRAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al. , Defendants and Respondents. Dorothy Wimberly Mitchell went to work for Union Central Life Insurance Company in 1972, and held various positions (most recently, Life Department Manager) until 1999. On January 24, 2001, after Union Central had moved unsuccessfully for summary judgment, Mitchell served Union Central with an offer to compromise for $3,650,000. On January 31, Union Central served Mitchell with an offer to compromise for $1,010,000. The February 5 settlement discussions with the workers' compensation judge (at which he represented Mitchell and Almeida represented Union Central) "concerned only the value of .
Note:	C&R does not release third party liability unless evidence shows it was the intent of the parties.
Citation:	118 Cal.App.4th 1331
WCC Citation:	WCC 29882004 CA

Case Name:	Mnaskanian v. 21st Century Insurance		12/21/2007
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE ANAHID MNASKANIAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. st CENTURY INSURANCE, Defendant and Appellant. FACTS A. Anahid Mnaskanian went to work for 21st Century Insurance Company in 1995 as a file clerk, and was promoted to data entry operator in May 2000. A paralegal in the lawyer's office refused to give Jahelka permission to talk to Mnaskanian or to proceed, explaining that Mnaskanian wanted to return to 21st Century in a modified or alternate job, and that Mnaskanian had specifically inquired about a job in the mail room. In June, Mnaskanian (through her workers' compensation counsel) and 21st Century (through AIG's claims counsel) settled the workers' compensation case. Although he was (in his own words) "the top guy when it comes to Human Resources at 21st Century Insurance Company in California," he did not know about, let alone ratify, any wrongful act by any other 21st Century employee.
Note:	[Unpublished] Although the amount of an award of emotional distress damages is up to the jury, no award of emotional distress damages is proper in the absence of evidence that the plaintiff actually suffered such damages and will continue to do so in the future.
Citation:	B191052
WCC Citation:	WCC 32922007 CA

Case Name:	Monarch Consulting Inc. v Mahmoud Karkehabadi		01/06/2011
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO B214178 January 6, 2011 MONARCH CONSULTING, INC. , PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, v. MAHMOUD KARKEHABADI, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. Mahmoud Karkehabadi, also known as Mike Karkeh (appellant), appeals from a judgment after jury trial. White (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 266, 271; Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Gourmet Farms (1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 181, 187; Conolley v. Bull (1968) 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 189; Anaheim Builders Supply, Inc. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. In support of this argument, appellant cites Gordon v. Nissan Motor Co. , Ltd. (2009) 170 Cal. App. 4th 1103. V. Alter ego The jury made special verdict findings that appellant, Alliance and Confessions were alter egos of each other.
Note:	A trial court did not make an error in excluding an expert witness who was going to testify on customary practice in a breach of contract suit in which a movie production company was found to have made material misrepresentations to secure workers' compensation insurance, California's 2nd Appellate District Court of Appeals ruled.
Citation:	B214178
WCC Citation:	WCC 37002011 CA

Case Name:	Monarrez v. Auto Club of Southern California		12/12/2012
Summary:	MONARREZ v. AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RUBEN MONARREZ, an Incompetent Person, etc. , Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent. The issue presented by this appeal is whether the Automobile Club of Southern California (Auto Club) may be held liable for Monarrez's injuries. Technicians are recertified by Auto Club every four years and take a mandatory Auto Club orientation program every two years. Hirad has contracted with Auto Club for over 20 years, and 85 to 90 percent of Hirad's business comes from Auto Club. Monarrez is a member of Auto Club, and the Training Manual plainly says that to members, the technician "is" the Auto Club.
Note:	The Automobile Club of Southern California was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing a claim against it for the alleged negligence of a tow truck driver it had dispatched to assist a stranded motorist, since triable issues existed as to whether the tow truck company was an independent contractor or an agent of the Auto Club.
Citation:	B233512
WCC Citation:	WCC 39622012 CA

Case Name:	Mooney v. County of Orange		01/11/2013
Summary:	MOONEY v. COUNTY OF ORANGE VALERIE MOONEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, Defendant and Respondent. During the disability retirement application process, Mooney continued to engage in the interactive process with Chavis, and the County continued to seek a reasonable accommodation for Mooney. On January 8, 2010, the County offered Mooney the position of office assistant at the North County Field Services Office, which paid $17. 90 an hour. The court's minute order explained: "The undisputed facts show that [Mooney] was never formally terminated and that there have been on-going discussions between [Mooney] and [the County] regarding possible positions with the County. Section 31725 would require that the County reinstate Mooney to her former position if the County had dismissed her "for disability. "
Note:	A municipal employer which placed an injured worker on disability leave but continued the interactive process could not be said to have "dismissed" the worker, or "separated" her from her employment, as those terms are used in Government Code, as a matter of law.
Citation:	G046262
WCC Citation:	WCC 39722013 CA