Case Name:	Miklosy v. The Regents of the University of California Part 1/2		07/31/2018
Summary:	Filed 7/31/08 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA .             LES G. MIKLOSY et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, .             v. .             THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al. , Defendants and Respondents. .             S139133 .             Ct. App. 1/4 A107711 .             Alameda County Super. .             Plaintiffs Leo Miklosy and Luciana Messina are computer scientists who, in February 2003, were employed by the Regents of the University of California (hereafter the University of California or the University), filling positions at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (the Laboratory). As we explained in Campbell: “The California Constitution establishes the Regents [i. e. , the University of California] as a ‘public trust . (Ishimatsu v. Regents of University of California (1968) 266 Cal. App. 2d 854, 864; see also Apte v. Regents of University of California (1988) 198 Cal. App. 3d 1084, 1091. )
Note:
Citation:	S139133
WCC Citation:	Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG04140484

Case Name:	Miklosy v. The Regents of the University of California Part 2/2		07/31/2018
Summary:	“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered. ” (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 1250, 1268, fn. the university has failed to reach a decision regarding that complaint within the time limits established for that purpose by the regents. ” (§ 8547. 10, subd. The Legislature recognized and met the need for independent review by expressly authorizing civil claims for retaliation by state agencies, the University of California, and the California State University. opn. , ante, at p. 14), whereas the new statute, former section 10550, did not require the University to hold hearings on whistleblower retaliation complaints. The difference is important, because adverse State Personnel Board findings after an evidentiary hearing were presumably reviewable for substantial evidence, while University findings were not.
Note:
Citation:	S139133
WCC Citation:	Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG04140484

Case Name:	Milan v. City of Holtville		06/23/2010
Summary:	FACTUAL BACKGROUND In April 1998 Tanya Milan began work as a water treatment operator for the City of Holtville (the city). Nonetheless, Milan believed she was still employed by the city because she was in fact receiving a regular pay check from the city, even though she had not returned to work. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 30, 2005, Milan filed a complaint against the city alleging it had violated FEHA Milan argued the city violated FEHA by failing to determine whether it could provide effective accommodations for Milan's disability. Milan opposed the motion, arguing that in light of Dr. Korsh's opinion, the city had an obligation under FEHA to contact Milan and determine whether it could accommodate her disability. The city contends that notwithstanding the fact Milan was given notice the city did not believe she could return to her job, there is no evidence in the record Milan ever requested any accommodation or even expressed to the city any desire to return to her former job.
Note:	[Unpublished] The record will not support the trial court's finding of liability under FEHA. Rather, the trial court should have granted the city's motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8
Citation:	D054139
WCC Citation:	WCC 36422010 CA

Case Name:	Milbauer vs. Boostan; UEF		12/18/2003
Summary:	It appears that UEF has done little to alleviate that confusion, although UEF has been an active participant in these proceedings since at least 1996. On October 17, 1996, UEF appeared by counsel at a Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC), at which UEF was formally joined as a party defendant. UEF offered no evidence that "American Runner Attorney Service, Inc. ," (or any other entity) was the correct legal identity of the employer. At that time, UEF again appeared and the issues were framed, including the correct legal identity of the employer. For convenience, we will refer to both UEF and the Office of the Director, Legal Unit, as "UEF. "
Note:	Active participation of UEF required in identifying correct employer; Sanctions available vs. UEF
Citation:	68 CCC 1834
WCC Citation:	WCC 29632003 CA

Case Name:	Millard v. Biosources, Inc.		11/15/2007
Summary:	No Biosources personnel were working or present at the project when Millard fell from the attic space. As first aid was being rendered to Millard immediately following the incident, Millard informed his coworker, Tyler Sterling, that the lights in the attic had "flickered" before he fell. Some time later, Millard told another Apex coworker, Paul Perry, the lights in the attic had flickered. At his deposition, Millard denied telling anyone that the lights flickered and testified that the lights had gone out. Finally, the court found that Millard failed to "submit admissible evidence to raise a material issue of fact that Privette does not apply or that [Biosources] owed [Millard] a duty due to retained control. "
Note:	Because the appellant failed to allege that he was entitled to rely on a presumption of negligence under a theory of negligence per se and did not ask permission to amend his complaint to do so in response to the appellee's motion for summary judgment, the court properly granted the motion.
Citation:	156 Cal. App. 4th 1338
WCC Citation:	WCC 32762007 CA

Case Name:	Millbauer vs. Boostan; UEF		03/10/2004
Summary:	UEF expressly states that it "does not contest" the affirmance of the WCJ's finding regarding the correct legal identity of applicant's employer. Indeed, UEF specifically acknowledges that these procedures were announced with the intent "to change how UEF cases are handled in the future. "Thus, as to this case, UEF is not "aggrieved" by any part of our decision. Here, although the Appeals Board's affirmance of the correct legal identity of applicant's employer constitutes a "final" order, UEF again expressly "does not contest" this determination. No substantive right or liability of UEF was determined by these procedures in this case.
Note:	Pronouncement of procedures to be used in future cases are not final orders from which reconsideration may be taken.
Citation:	69 CCC 246; En Banc
WCC Citation:	WCC 29752004 CA

Case Name:	Miller v. Filter		05/08/2007
Summary:	Ct. No. 6293) MICHAEL M. MILLER et al. , Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. GALE FILTER et al. , Defendants and Appellants. On November 6, 2000, Mark Fussell died in a workplace accident, while Miller was director of the Mine. Filter, Hedum, Mejlszenkier, and Patchett then prosecuted Miller and the Mine, alleging that Fussell's death was caused by the willful violation of occupational safety standards. Filter and Mejlszenkier presented the case to the Sierra County Grand Jury, and Patchett served as the grand jury advisor. Miller and the Mine (plaintiffs) then sued Filter, Hedum, Mejlszenkier, Patchett, and CDAA (defendants) for malicious prosecution, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent employment and supervision.
Note:	CDAA and its deputized employees were absolutely immune from liability in the lawsuit against them and, thus, the trial court should have granted their anti-SLAPP motion.
Citation:	150 Cal. App. 4th 652
WCC Citation:	WCC 32222007 CA

Case Name:	Miller v. WCAB		07/27/2011
Summary:	Miller reported to the Hospital on March 18, 2008, at 10:00 p. m. and was scheduled work until 8:00 a. m. the next morning. Walker arrived an hour after Miller and asked her to distribute medications in the male sexual offender unit. Miller petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration. *fn2 A two-member majority of the reviewing WCAB panel adopted and incorporated the WCJs Report and Recommendation, affirming that the WCJs conclusion that Walkers directions to Miller barred her psychological claim as a lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel action. Nothing in this opinion should be construed as expressing any opinion of this court as to whether, or to what extent, Miller sustained a psychological injury, as that decision has not been reached by the WCAB.
Note:	A split California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board panel decision did not sufficiently explain its reasoning about why Labor Code 3208.3 barred a registered nurse's psyche claim, a California appellate court ruled.
Citation:	F060092
WCC Citation:	WCC 37862011 CA

Case Name:	Mills v. WCAB		06/20/2008
Summary:	-ooOoo- *Before Ardaiz, P. J. , Wiseman, J. , and Gomes, J. Roger Mills petitions for a writ of review from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). Rules of Court, rule 8. 494. ) Mills contends the WCAB misconstrued the law of apportionment as amended by Senate Bill No. 899 (Stats 2004, ch. Mills filed an application for adjudication of claim with the WCAB in April 2004, and the parties obtained a significant amount of discovery. The WCJ filed a report and recommendation to the WCAB recommending the WCAB deny reconsideration. Accordingly, the WCAB agreed with the WCJ's finding that Mills was entitled to only a 40 percent disability award.
Note:	The new apportionment provisions in Senate Bill No. 899 became effective immediately and must be applied to all pending cases 'not yet final at the time of the legislative enactment on April 19, 2004, regardless of the earlier dates of injury and any interim decision.'
Citation:	F054144
WCC Citation:	WCC 33862008 CA

Case Name:	Millsaps v. Doehrman Company, Inc.		04/11/2011
Summary:	Plaintiff Derrick Millsaps appeals from a 2010 postjudgment order granting nearly $40,000 in costs, including expert witness fees, to defendant Doehrman Company, Inc. (Doehrman). Millsaps sued Doehrman for negligent installation of the equipment. Doehrman made a pretrial offer to compromise to Millsaps pursuant to section 998. It offered to pay Millsaps $50,000, in exchange for (among other things) Millsaps' dismissal of the action against Doehrman, and his "agree[ment] to indemnify and hold harmless DOEHRMAN COMPANY, INC. from any and all claims or liens asserted by intervener PEP BOYS, INC. " The action proceeded to jury trial in 2006; Doehrman prevailed after a jury found it did not install the equipment that caused Millsaps' injury. Even had Millsaps settled the underlying personal injury claim against Doehrman, Pep Boys' complaint in intervention could have proceeded to trial.
Note:	An injured worker's products liability suit will cost him $40,000 in costs because he rejected a settlement offer and subsequently failed to prove his case.
Citation:	C064390
WCC Citation:	WCC 37432011 CA

Case Name:	Milpitas Unified School District v. WCAB (Guzman)		08/19/2010
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT No. H034853 August 19, 2010 MILPITAS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, PETITIONER, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD AND JOYCE GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION In this original proceeding the Milpitas Unified School District (District) challenges a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB or Board) applying Labor Code section 4660*fn1 to the disability evaluation of a District employee. In his December 2, 2005 report, Dr. Feinberg noted Guzman's history of injuries prior to her employment with the District. The WCAB, however, granted the petition for reconsideration and combined the case with an ongoing dispute in Almaraz v. Environmental Recovery Services (Almaraz). The WCAB granted the petition and, in the interests of consistency, granted reconsideration on its own motion in Guzman's case.
Note:	The court concluded that the language of Labor Code 4660 permits reliance on the entire Guides, including the instructions on the use of clinical judgment, in deriving an impairment rating in a particular case.
Citation:	H034853
WCC Citation:	WCC 36572010 CA

Case Name:	Miner v. Superior Court		04/09/2001
Summary:	Miner v. Superior Court , 30 Cal. App. 3d 597 [Civ. GEORGE H. MINER, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO COUNTY, Respondent; PEDRO JIMINEZ, JR. , Real Party in Interest (Opinion by Brown (G. The cause comes to us upon a petition by Miner for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to sustain the demurrer. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 180, 185, fn. (Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal. 3d 841, 851 [92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 479 P. 2d 379]. )
Note:	An employee has limited rights to sue another employee for damages apart from work comp.
Citation:	30 Cal.App.3d 597, 38 CCC 210
WCC Citation:	WCC 4082001 CA

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship		01/31/2013
Summary:	MINISH v. HANUMAN FELLOWSHIP DIANE MARIE MINISH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HANUMAN FELLOWSHIP et al. , Defendants and Respondents. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Plaintiff Diane Marie Minish filed an action against the Hanuman Fellowship (Hanuman), Mount Madonna Institute, and the Mount Madonna Center seeking compensatory and punitive damages for personal injuries and other losses she sustained when she fell off a forklift allegedly due to defendants' negligence. She submitted evidence that Hanuman regularly compiled a list of volunteers for its compensation carrier, and Hanuman did not add plaintiff's name to the list until after the accident was reported to its carrier. She further contends that she could not have become a covered volunteer because she never agreed to that status. Plaintiff complains, "Here, of course, without the slightest advance warning, Hanuman plunged Minish into the toils of the workers compensation system not only without her knowledge but, as soon as she learned of it, very much against her will. "
Note:	Factual questions about whether a volunteer was covered by workers' compensation prevented a trial court from deciding the case on a motion for summary judgment.
Citation:	H035737
WCC Citation:	WCC 39842013 CA

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship Part 1/3		03/06/2018
Summary:	.             H041888 .             (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348) .             Plaintiff Diane Minish sustained serious personal injuries after she fell off a forklift on premises owned by defendant Hanuman Fellowship (the Fellowship). 1 Minish initially reported that her injuries occurred while she was working as a volunteer, doing construction work for the Fellowship. Both Minish and the Fellowship reported the injury to the Fellowship’s workers’ compensation carrier and Minish received more than $270,000 in workers’ compensation benefits. This court reversed the summary judgment in a prior appeal in Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 437, 443 (Minish I). .           The Fellowship reported the accident to its workers’ compensation carrier, the State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF), which provided workers’ compensation benefits to Minish.
Note:
Citation:	H041888
WCC Citation:	Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship Part 2/3		03/06/2018
Summary:	Since Minish relies on the exception for public entities in section 3363. 5, we also review the language of that section. .           The Legislature amended former section 3363. 6, but not former section 3363. 5, in 1976 and 1978. .           In reviewing this statutory history, we note that the Fellowship was formed in 1974, the same year section 3363. 6 was enacted. .         Finally, Minish argues against applying the rule of liberal construction from section 320213 in this appeal. We nonetheless mention Beverly Fabrics and Eckis, since they demonstrate that this issue may ultimately be resolved adversely to Minish.
Note:
Citation:	H041888
WCC Citation:	Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348

Case Name:	Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship Part 3/3		03/06/2018
Summary:	The Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment based on the trial court’s failure to analyze whether the bunkhouse rule applied. Fortunately, copies of some of the documents pertaining to Board of Directors Meetings were kept in [Ward Mailliard’s] home. ” Before trial, Minish challenged the authenticity of documents produced by the Fellowship. As we have noted, this court construed section 3363. 6 in Minish I, which is the only published opinion construing section 3363. 6. Minish cites a similar report from 1978 to the same committee for Senate Bill No. 1468 (1977-1978 Reg. The Fellowship made a motion to stay the superior court action in 2014, which the trial court denied.
Note:
Citation:	H041888
WCC Citation:	Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. CV158348

Case Name:	Minniear v. Mt. San Antonio Comm. Coll. Dist.		09/18/1996
Summary:	This presumption is rebuttable and may be controverted by a preponderance of medical opinion indicating an (sic) different level of impairment. '(b) The employee's permanent disability benefit awarded under paragraph (a) shall be adjusted based on the disability rating selected by the appeals board. Following surgery, applicant had follow-up treatment by Dr. Burres, including a lumbar MRI on July 8, 1994. According to Dr. Burres, the study showed mild postoperative change, but no evidence of recurrent disc herniation. On January 4, 1995, Dr. Burres examined applicant and submitted a report concluding that his condition was permanent and stationary.
Note:	Sufficiency of evidence necessary to rebut treating dr. presumption; award reduction required per 4065.
Citation:	61 CCC 105
WCC Citation:	WCC 24131996 CA

Case Name:	Miranda v. Bomel Construction, et al.		07/30/2010
Summary:	RUDY MIRANDA et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOMEL CONSTRUCTION CO. , INC. et al. , Defendants and Respondents. He sued general contractor, Bomel Construction Co. , Inc. (Bomel), and subcontractor, J/K Excavation & Grading Co. , Inc. , (J/K). Bomel agreed to excavate, remove, and dispose of all dirt not necessary for the project, known as the PS2 project. At the end of April 2007, Miranda and his wife (hereafter referred to collectively and in the singular as Miranda) filed a complaint for negligence and loss of consortium against Bomel and J/K. In his opposition, Miranda argued Bomel and J/K owed a duty to protect Miranda from his exposure to dust inhalation, and causation was a triable issue of material fact.
Note:	A university locksmith failed to prove that a pile of dirt in the lot near his office caused him to contract Valley Fever.
Citation:	G042073
WCC Citation:	WCC 36542010 CA

Case Name:	Mission Linen Supply v. WCAB		10/17/1994
Summary:	Mission Linen Supply, Petitioner v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, William Daniel Ferguson, Respondents. The WCJ and the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB or Board) refused to correct the error because they thought the request to correct it was untimely. In November 1981, the applicant, William D. Ferguson, was injured while working as a linen supply route salesman for the Mission Linen Supply Company, a self-insured employer. The WCJ followed the recommendation, including the incorrect calculation of the amount of the life pension, and issued a supplemental award. In dismissing the employer's petition for reconsideration, the WCAB also indicated that the employer's right to relief was barred by the doctrine of laches.
Note:	Clerical or mathematical error in award may be corrected at any time so long as not prejudicial.
Citation:	59 CCC 849
WCC Citation:	WCC 27321994 CA

Case Name:	Mitchel vs. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc.		02/26/1991
Summary:	MICHAEL MITCHELL et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC. , et al. , Defendants and Respondents. -On February 7, 1986, Wetzel told Mitchell to come to Wetzel's office to pick up a check. The adjuster also lied when she said Wetzel did not know why there were so many errors and late payments concerning Mitchell's file. Her purpose was to deprive the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) of information relevant to penalties against Wetzel. However, when the vice- president [227 Cal. App. 3d 1478] of the bank negotiating the check contacted Wetzel, Wetzel told the vice-president not to negotiate the check until three days had passed.
Note:	Intentional misconduct by the workers' compensation claims administrator of a self-insured employer falls within the exclusive remedy of work comp.
Citation:	227 Cal.App.3d 1474
WCC Citation:	WCC 29961991 CA

Case Name:	Mitchell v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co.		03/02/1995
Summary:	Zennie Mitchell, Applicant v. Golden Eagle Insurance, Defendant. (4) Restitution may be an appropriate remedy where a deposition attorney's fee has been erroneously paid pursuant to Labor Code section 5710(b)(4). In Mitchell vs. Golden Eagle Insurance, LAO 700455, applicant, Zennie Mitchell, filed a claim for cumulative trauma to her back, shoulder, neck, biceps, chest, psyche and head for the period February, 1992, to November 10, 1993. In Mitchell, the WCJ issued an order allowing a deposition attorney's fee without issuing a notice of intention. In Mitchell, the employee did attach a letter from his attorney requesting a deposition attorney's fee to the Pre-Application Request For Attorney's Fees.
Note:	Industrial injury not prerequisite to recover deposition atty. fee; Restitution appropriate for fee paid erroneously.
Citation:	60 CCC 205
WCC Citation:	WCC 3731995 CA

Case Name:	Mitchell vs. The Union Central Life Insurance Co.		05/26/2004
Summary:	DOROTHY WIMBERLY MITCHELL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE UNION CENTRAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al. , Defendants and Respondents. Dorothy Wimberly Mitchell went to work for Union Central Life Insurance Company in 1972, and held various positions (most recently, Life Department Manager) until 1999. On January 24, 2001, after Union Central had moved unsuccessfully for summary judgment, Mitchell served Union Central with an offer to compromise for $3,650,000. On January 31, Union Central served Mitchell with an offer to compromise for $1,010,000. The February 5 settlement discussions with the workers' compensation judge (at which he represented Mitchell and Almeida represented Union Central) "concerned only the value of .
Note:	C&R does not release third party liability unless evidence shows it was the intent of the parties.
Citation:	118 Cal.App.4th 1331
WCC Citation:	WCC 29882004 CA

Case Name:	Mnaskanian v. 21st Century Insurance		12/21/2007
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE ANAHID MNASKANIAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. st CENTURY INSURANCE, Defendant and Appellant. FACTS A. Anahid Mnaskanian went to work for 21st Century Insurance Company in 1995 as a file clerk, and was promoted to data entry operator in May 2000. A paralegal in the lawyer's office refused to give Jahelka permission to talk to Mnaskanian or to proceed, explaining that Mnaskanian wanted to return to 21st Century in a modified or alternate job, and that Mnaskanian had specifically inquired about a job in the mail room. In June, Mnaskanian (through her workers' compensation counsel) and 21st Century (through AIG's claims counsel) settled the workers' compensation case. Although he was (in his own words) "the top guy when it comes to Human Resources at 21st Century Insurance Company in California," he did not know about, let alone ratify, any wrongful act by any other 21st Century employee.
Note:	[Unpublished] Although the amount of an award of emotional distress damages is up to the jury, no award of emotional distress damages is proper in the absence of evidence that the plaintiff actually suffered such damages and will continue to do so in the future.
Citation:	B191052
WCC Citation:	WCC 32922007 CA

Case Name:	Monarch Consulting Inc. v Mahmoud Karkehabadi		01/06/2011
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO B214178 January 6, 2011 MONARCH CONSULTING, INC. , PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, v. MAHMOUD KARKEHABADI, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. Mahmoud Karkehabadi, also known as Mike Karkeh (appellant), appeals from a judgment after jury trial. White (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 266, 271; Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Gourmet Farms (1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 181, 187; Conolley v. Bull (1968) 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 189; Anaheim Builders Supply, Inc. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. In support of this argument, appellant cites Gordon v. Nissan Motor Co. , Ltd. (2009) 170 Cal. App. 4th 1103. V. Alter ego The jury made special verdict findings that appellant, Alliance and Confessions were alter egos of each other.
Note:	A trial court did not make an error in excluding an expert witness who was going to testify on customary practice in a breach of contract suit in which a movie production company was found to have made material misrepresentations to secure workers' compensation insurance, California's 2nd Appellate District Court of Appeals ruled.
Citation:	B214178
WCC Citation:	WCC 37002011 CA

Case Name:	Monarrez v. Auto Club of Southern California		12/12/2012
Summary:	MONARREZ v. AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RUBEN MONARREZ, an Incompetent Person, etc. , Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent. The issue presented by this appeal is whether the Automobile Club of Southern California (Auto Club) may be held liable for Monarrez's injuries. Technicians are recertified by Auto Club every four years and take a mandatory Auto Club orientation program every two years. Hirad has contracted with Auto Club for over 20 years, and 85 to 90 percent of Hirad's business comes from Auto Club. Monarrez is a member of Auto Club, and the Training Manual plainly says that to members, the technician "is" the Auto Club.
Note:	The Automobile Club of Southern California was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing a claim against it for the alleged negligence of a tow truck driver it had dispatched to assist a stranded motorist, since triable issues existed as to whether the tow truck company was an independent contractor or an agent of the Auto Club.
Citation:	B233512
WCC Citation:	WCC 39622012 CA

Case Name:	Mooney v. County of Orange		01/11/2013
Summary:	MOONEY v. COUNTY OF ORANGE VALERIE MOONEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, Defendant and Respondent. During the disability retirement application process, Mooney continued to engage in the interactive process with Chavis, and the County continued to seek a reasonable accommodation for Mooney. On January 8, 2010, the County offered Mooney the position of office assistant at the North County Field Services Office, which paid $17. 90 an hour. The court's minute order explained: "The undisputed facts show that [Mooney] was never formally terminated and that there have been on-going discussions between [Mooney] and [the County] regarding possible positions with the County. Section 31725 would require that the County reinstate Mooney to her former position if the County had dismissed her "for disability. "
Note:	A municipal employer which placed an injured worker on disability leave but continued the interactive process could not be said to have "dismissed" the worker, or "separated" her from her employment, as those terms are used in Government Code, as a matter of law.
Citation:	G046262
WCC Citation:	WCC 39722013 CA

Case Name:	Moore v. California Surety Investigations, inc., et al.		01/07/2011
Summary:	COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT STATE OF CALIFORNIA DIVISION ONE D055253 January 7, 2011 JAMES M. MOORE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, v. CALIFORNIA SURETY INVESTIGATIONS, INC. , ET AL. , DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS. Plaintiff James Moore injured his back while working as an investigator for defendants California Surety Investigations, Inc. (CSI) and Two Jinn, Inc. (TJ) (together Employer). Thereafter, Tipps spoke with Moore on September 6, 2007, and asked whether Moore would be interested in any job openings available at Employer's corporate headquarters in Carlsbad, California. The Lawsuit and Judgment There were no further communications between Moore and Employer until Moore served his complaint for damages. Reasonable Accommodations and the Interactive Process Reasonable Accommodation The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (§ 12900 et seq. )
Note:	An employer's efforts to find reasonable accommodations for an injured bounty hunter were thwarted by the employee refusing jobs and requesting all communications go through his attorney, California's 4th District Court of Appeals ruled in affirming a trial court's decision to throw out a discrimination suit filed under the Fair Housing and Employment Act.
Citation:	D055253
WCC Citation:	WCC 37012011 CA

Case Name:	Moore v. WCAB (Bob Longpre Pontiac)		11/13/1980
Summary:	ARTHUR MELVIN MOORE, Petitioner v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA and BOB LONGPRE PONTIAC, et al. , Respondents. Applicant petitioned for reconsideration contending that the report of Dr. Klein did not constitute substantial evidence to support the apportionment. Absent the industrial stress, it is possible that he would have had 25% less disease and 25% less coronary atherosclerosis. The Board rescinded the findings and award filed by the WCAB Judge and substituted in lieu thereof its own findings and award. On March 24, 1980, applicant's attorney filed a petition for writ of review in the Second Appellate District.
Note:	Petition filing untimely where attorney had knowledge of Board's decision but did not file w/i statutory period.
Citation:	45 CCC 1119
WCC Citation:	WCC 27811980 CA

Case Name:	Mora v. Hollywood Bed & Springs		07/14/2008
Summary:	Salvador Mora appeals a summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Hollywood Bed & Spring (Hollywood Bed), and its president, Larry Harrow. Factual Background Hollywood Bed manufactures metal bed frames, bed rails, rollaway beds, and similar products and parts. Hollywood Bed employed Mora as a power press operator beginning in approximately February 2000. Hollywood Bed filed objections to specific items of evidence submitted by Mora. The court entered a judgment in favor of Hollywood Bed and Harrow and against Mora in March 2007.
Note:	The statutory definition of 'specifically authorized' unambiguously requires an 'affirmative instruction' by the employer. The ordinary meaning of the words 'affirmative instruction' in this context is an express directive statement, rather than an implied statement or tacit acquiescence.
Citation:	B197576
WCC Citation:	WCC 33982008 CA

Case Name:	Morales-Simental v. Genentech		10/19/2017
Summary:	.           During his deposition, Ong gave various reasons for his trip to Genentech that morning. Genentech presented evidence that all of Ong’s lead technician duties were performed at Genentech during work hours. .           Ong resided in Hayward, California and commuted to Genentech in his own vehicle. The record shows no evidence that anyone from Genentech requested that Ong drive to Genentech in the dead of night. .           We concur: .           Ruvolo, P. J. .           Rivera, J. Gisselle Morales-Simental is the daughter of the deceased, Marisol Morales.
Note:	The 1st District Court of Appeal last week ordered publication of a decision it issued last month finding an employer could not be held vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of an employee in causing a fatal car accident.
Citation:	A145865
WCC Citation:	Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HG13678136

Case Name:	Moran v. Bradford Bldg., etc.		05/08/1992
Summary:	Procedural History Of Cases In Moran vs. Bradford Building, Inc. , Permissibly Self-Insured, et al. , LA 63401, a claim form (DWC 1) was mailed to the employer on March 13, 1990, alleging an injury '12/89 Ct in the nature of stress. 'On March 28, 1991, the presiding workers' compensation judge denied relief indicating: 'There is no statutory authority for the relief you seek. 'Carrier's attorneys sought reconsideration contending that it is within the Appeals Board's equitable powers to grant relief by dismissing the claim form. The presiding workers' compensation judge took no action on the petition for dismissal advising the parties: 'There is no provision to dismiss. 'Under the Reform Act, the filing of a claim form with the employer commences proceedings and establishes the jurisdiction of the Appeals Board.
Note:	WCAB has inherent and statutory authority to provide for dismissal of claim forms.
Citation:	57 CCC 273
WCC Citation:	WCC 3671992 CA

Case Name:	Morehouse v. WCAB		04/10/1984
Summary:	Morehouse requested preferential rehiring and was subject to recall if Goodyear reopened its Los Angeles plant. In February 1981 Morehouse filed an application for reemployment as a warehouseman in Goodyear's Los Angeles warehouse. On July 23, 1981, Bunderson telephoned Morehouse and said that if he was ready, he could go to work. In response to Bunderson's inquiry regarding Morehouse's back and knee, Morehouse said they were as good as when he was laid off. On August 12, 1981, Morehouse signed a 'Compromise Agreement and Release' (WCAB Form 15) settling his injury claim for $25,000.
Note:	Petition for 132a benefits is procedurally separate and distinct from application for ordinary benefits.
Citation:	154 Cal.App.3d 323, 49 CCC 313
WCC Citation:	WCC 27671984 CA

Case Name:	Morgan v. WCAB		10/24/1978
Summary:	JOHN T. MORGAN, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, CITY OF SANTA MONICA et al. , Respondents. OPINION ALLPORT, J. Petitioner John T. Morgan contends the board and the permanent disability specialist erred in the manner in which they rated the multiple factors of disability from his industrial injury. On March 29, 1977, Morgan filed a petition to reopen his claim, alleging new and further disability. Morgan renewed his objection to the rating by filing a written 'Motion to Strike Rating. 'Second, we observe that in the initial proceedings where Morgan received the 74 percent rating Morgan was rated solely for the hypertension condition.
Note:	Objection to reopen waived by failure to recon; Board must describe all disability, up to evaluator to decide MDT vs duplication.
Citation:	85 Cal.App.3d 710, 43 CCC 1116
WCC Citation:	WCC 26741978 CA

Case Name:	Morris v. County of Marin		02/03/1977
Summary:	RICHARD MORRIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MARIN, Defendant and Respondent (Opinion by Tobriner, J. , with Wright, C. J. , Mosk and Richardson, JJ. , and Sullivan, J. , concurring. [18 Cal. 3d 904] Douglas T. Maloney, County Counsel, Allen A. Haim, Deputy County Counsel, Boornazian, King & Schulze, George King and James L. McIntosh for Defendant and Respondent. The trial court ruled in favor of the county, concluding that even if the county had failed to comply with its statutory obligation, it could not be held liable for monetary damages. In July 1972, defendant Marin County issued a building permit to Guy Cahoon authorizing construction work on a building located in Muir Beach. (See, e. g. , Pulcifer v. County of Alameda (1946) 29 Cal. 2d 258, 262-263 [175 P. 2d 1]; French v. Edwards (1872) 80 U. S. (13 Wall. )
Note:	Failure of public entity to secure WC certificate of insurance from building permit applicant creates civil liability.
Citation:	18 Cal.3d 901, 42 CCC 131
WCC Citation:	WCC 24801977 CA

Case Name:	Morris v. Southern California Edison Company		02/04/2011
Summary:	NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS MORRIS v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY KENNETH MORRIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. Southern California Edison Company, plaintiff's former employer, is the defendant (SCE). Plaintiff Alleges Violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act SCE employed plaintiff for approximately 37 years. In his complaint plaintiff alleged causes of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (the FEHA, Gov. Code, 12900 et seq. ). "[T]rial error is usually deemed harmless in California unless there is a `reasonabl[e] probab[ility]' that it affected the verdict. "
Note:	A Los Angeles County Superior Court did not make any reversible errors when it ruled that Southern California Edison was not liable for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, an appellate court ruled in an unpublished decision.
Citation:	B221329
WCC Citation:	WCC 37142011 CA

Case Name:	Morton v. WCAB		07/22/1987
Summary:	RALPH W. MORTON, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and LUCILLE LYDON, Respondents (Opinion by Feinerman, P. J. , with Ashby and Hastings, JJ. , concurring. )[1] The Board granted reconsideration on its own motion pursuant to Labor Code section 5900, subdivision (b). Appeals Bd. , supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d at page 643 reaffirmed the Marcus holding, noting: 'Unfortunately, the WCAB fails to understand the full reach of the Marcus decision. Labor Code section 134 requires that the WCAB proceed in contempt proceedings in the same manner as courts of record. Accordingly, the WCAB must follow the applicable provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure pertaining to contempt.
Note:	The Board, and not the WCJ is empowered to ADJUDGE contempt.
Citation:	193 Cal.App.3d 924, 52 CCC 315
WCC Citation:	WCC 3721987 CA

Case Name:	Mosby vs. Liberty Mutual		06/23/2003
Summary:	FREDDIE CURTIS MOSBY, JR. et al. , Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al. , Defendants and Respondents. INTRODUCTION Freddie Curtis Mosby and his wife Sheri Mosby have sued his employer, Best Buy, and his employer's workers' compensation insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, for malicious prosecution and loss of consortium in the wake of Liberty Mutual's reporting Mosby to the local district attorney for workers' compensation insurance fraud. Liberty Mutual deposed Green and showed him surveillance tapes of Mosby walking up stairs the day of his evaluation. Liberty Mutual then stepped up its investigation of Mosby and, in October 1998, presented its case for fraud to the district attorney. Finally, we note the complaint includes allegations of racial animus by a doctor hired by Liberty Mutual to examine Mosby for workplace injuries, and makes other allegations that would further support a finding that Liberty Mutual showed racial bias.
Note:	Carrier has civil liability for malicious prosecution in unwarranted fraud prosecution.
Citation:	110 Cal.App.4th 995
WCC Citation:	WCC 29482003 CA

Case Name:	Motallebi vs. Astro Business Solutions		03/18/2003
Summary:	WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD STATE OF CALIFORNIA SHAHIN MOTALLEBI, Applicant, vs. ASTRO BUSINESS SOLUTIONS, INC. ; CANON USA; YASUDA FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE, Defendant(s). The workers' compensation lien claim was settled by defendant on June 4, 2001, the same day as the OACR was issued. EDD thereafter sought recovery from applicant of the UCD benefits paid during the period for which no lien claim was filed. On September 18, 1998, CUIAB issued a decision denying applicant UCD benefits for the period from May 8, 1998 through September 9, 1998. Thereafter, EDD paid additional UCD benefits for the period from September 10, 1998 through October 14, 1998.
Note:	Conditions under which the Board had no jurisdiction to determine an applicant's liability for repayment of UCD benefits to EDD.
Citation:	68 CCC __(2003)
WCC Citation:	WCC 29222003 CA

Case Name:	Mote v. WCAB		07/24/1997
Summary:	The workers' compensation judge (WCJ) found that Mote is entitled to indemnity for temporary total disability (TTD) and further medical treatment. Mote petitions for review to annul the order of the WCAB denying reconsideration of his petition to impose multiple penalties against respondents, Kimstock, Incorporated, his employer, and the California Compensation Insurance Company (Cal. The WCAB unreasonably denied a variety of statutory penalties due Mote for failures and delays in providing TTD, for untimely and incorrect adjustments to TTD, for failing to provide medical and psychiatric treatment and medications. Mote sustained industrial injury to his thumb, arm, leg, back, neck, internal systems, hearing and psyche. The parties stipulated that at the time Mote hurt his thumb his earnings of $800 per week warranted indemnity of $336 per week for TTD.
Note:	Employer liable for delay in increasing rate of TTD even though stipulated amount.
Citation:	56 Cal.App.4th 902, 62 CCC 891
WCC Citation:	WCC 24731997 CA

Case Name:	Motheral v. WCAB (Golden Empire Council)		08/25/2011
Summary:	BILL MOTHERAL, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and GOLDEN EMPIRE COUNCIL (BSA) et al. , Respondents. )1 Bill Motheral worked as a camp ranger for Golden Empire Council, Boy Scouts of America (the Council). Motheral was injured at work in August 2007 and was paid temporary total disability benefits from the date of his injury. At the hearing, an accounting specialist with the Council acknowledged that Motheral received lodging as part of his employment. The accounting specialist further testified that at the time of his injury, Motheral was paid $6. 62 an hour in cash wages.
Note:	A camp ranger's lodging, utilities, and car allowance should factor into his average weekly wage for the purpose of calculating his temporary disability benefits.
Citation:	C063646
WCC Citation:	WCC 37932011 CA