Case Name:	Meadows v. Farrell		11/22/2010
Summary:	Meadows eventually filed an action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and other tort claims based on statements allegedly made by Farrell. Sentry Insurance told Meadows that a "case nurse," defendant Barbara Farrell, would meet with her and any doctors to "manage [her] care. "According to Meadows, Farrell did not "publish Dr. Huffer's retraction to the extent that the original false and/or misleading information had been published. "She also denied disseminating false, misleading, or private medical information about Meadows, or communicating to anyone that Meadows was addicted to and/or abusing drugs. Meadows's declaration did not include any reference to the alleged comments by Farrell about Meadows potentially getting fired and/or not getting chiropractic care.
Note:	A nurse case manager's motion to strike an applicant's lawsuit failed because the nurse failed to show that her allegedly injurious comments were protected speech.
Citation:	H035309
WCC Citation:	WCC 36822010 CA

Case Name:	Medrano v. WCAB		09/25/2008
Summary:	The letter advised Medrano that he was not eligible for vocational rehabilitation services based on his employer's offer of modified or alternative work. The WCJ determined that Medrano was entitled to full vocational rehabilitation services, as the offer of modified/alternative work was not appropriate because it was made while Medrano was still medically temporarily disabled, which meant he was completely unable to work. The termination date of the VRMA awarded was when Medrano returned to the labor market. The Board granted review and issued an Opinion and Decision agreeing with the WCJ's decision that Medrano was entitled to full vocational rehabilitation services. And State Fund should not be the beneficiary of the work Medrano undertook, because it was State Fund's denial of services that resulted in Medrano needing the work for compensation.
Note:	Vocational rehabilitation maintenance allowance (VRMA) is not a wage replacement benefit, and thus it is not subject to wage-loss credit.
Citation:	B202828
WCC Citation:	WCC 34292008 CA

Case Name:	Meeks Building Center v. WCAB (Najjar)		06/26/2012
Summary:	MEEKS BUILDING CENTER v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD MEEKS BUILDING CENTER et al. , Petitioners, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and SALEM NAJJAR, Respondents. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Applicant and respondent Salem Najjar worked as a paint sales associate at Meeks Building Center through June 12, 2007. The WCAB concluded that "the mandated payment for attending a [qualified medical evaluation] exam is not the equivalent of commencing temporary disability payments. "The WCAB granted Najjar's petition for reconsideration and rescinded the findings of fact and order of the WCJ. Because the WCAB could not determine on the record before it when temporary disability payments had in fact commenced, the matter was remanded.
Note:	A single payment of benefits to an injured worker for attending a defense-requested medical evaluation is a reimbursement of a medical-legal expense, not a payment of temporary disability benefits.
Citation:	C065944
WCC Citation:	WCC 39102012 CA

Case Name:	Mehta v. Activor Corp.		03/20/2018
Summary:	.             B276151 .             (Los Angeles County Super. Plaintiff initiated workers’ compensation proceedings (Mehta WCAB) 1 and sued Activor and Zaveri for damages pursuant to Labor Code section 3706 (Mehta v. Zaveri et al. , Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. YC057627 (Mehta I). Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Fraudulent Transfers .           Defendants next argue that “even if Mehta was a creditor and Activor was a debtor . V. Money Judgment as Remedy for Fraudulent Transfers  .           The Mehta I judgment against Activor included Mehta’s attorney fees for successfully prosecuting that action. There is no authority for the damages award in Mehta II against Activor, however, because those damages were already awarded to plaintiff in Mehta I.
Note:
Citation:	B276151
WCC Citation:	Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC 488531

Case Name:	Mejia-Gutierrez v. Comcast of California III		01/28/2013
Summary:	MEJIA-GUTIERREZ v. COMCAST OF CALIFORNIA III, INC. BERNARDINO MEJIA-GUTIERREZ et al. , Plaintiffs, SEABRIGHT INSURANCE COMPANY, Intervener and Appellant, v. COMCAST OF CALIFORNIA III, INC. , Defendant and Respondent. He did not rely on any Comcast employee to determine the safety of the jobsite because he had already made that determination. AC Square, not Comcast, instructed AC Square employees on how to use a ladder when replacing a drop line. Comcast has a system of cable wire inspection, the purpose of which is "safety for everyone," including employees and subcontractors. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent, Comcast of California III, Inc. Lambden, J. and Richman, J. , concurs.
Note:	A contractor was not liable as a matter of law, for injuries sustained by an employee of one of its subcontractors in a fall from a ladder.
Citation:	A132933
WCC Citation:	WCC 39782013 CA

Case Name:	Melman v. PDF Solutions, Inc.		03/22/2013
Summary:	MELMAN v. PDF SOLUTIONS, INC. PHILIP STEVEN MELMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PDF SOLUTIONS, INC. , et al. , Defendants and Respondents. In March 2009, Kibarian offered Melman employment through December 31, 2009, at his current salary plus 30,000 shares of PDF. In December 2008, Melman voluntarily began negotiations with PDF to end his employment in exchange for an increase in his PDF stock options. According to Melman, the investigator's notes include the following statements: "(1) PDF Board Chairman Lucio Lanza, Audit Chair Steve Heinrichs, and Board Member Albert Yu discussed their desire to fire Steve Melman at one or more PDF Board meetings. Melman argues that "because these statements demonstrated the discriminatory animus of PDF decision-makers, [he] should have prevailed on summary judgment. "
Note:	A former corporate officer with multiple sclerosis could not prove that his company terminated him on the basis of his disability as a matter of law.
Citation:	H037703
WCC Citation:	WCC 39962013 CA

Case Name:	Mendez v. LAUSD		04/09/2013
Summary:	This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8. 1115. WILLHITE, J. Elvira Tapia Mendez appeals from a summary judgment in favor of respondents Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and Marcia Koff, the principal of the school where Mendez worked. In the first week of October 2010, Mendez refused to proceed with the workers compensation claim the LAUSD had filed on her behalf. In March 2011, Mendez sued Koff for assault and battery and the LAUSD for wrongful termination under Labor Code section 1102. 5, subdivision (b). Mendez argues a jury could find she was terminated by principal Koff or someone at a higher level at the LAUSD who knew of her complaints. But the LAUSD carried its burden when it showed Mendez was laid off as a result of the RIF process.
Note:	A Los Angeles Unified School District clerk who decided to file a civil action against her employer and an elementary school teacher who she says attacked her instead of filing a workers' compensation claim is not entitled to a tort claim.
Citation:	B240919
WCC Citation:	WCC 40002013 CA

Case Name:	Mendiola v. Crestwood Behavioral Health		12/31/1969
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT  (Sacramento)  ---- .             CHRISTINE MENDIOLA, Plaintiff and Appellant, .             v. .             CRESTWOOD BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INC. , Defendant and Respondent. .             C082345 .             (Super. Ct. No. 34-2013- 00147943-CU-WT-GDS) .             Plaintiff Christine Mendiola worked with mentally ill residents in a locked facility at defendant Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. (Crestwood). .             On July 11, 2011, Mendiola was working the night shift and monitoring three clients on the patio during a smoke break. Crestwood failed to report the attack to the Department of Mental Health, its successor the Department of Social Services, or the county’s mental health director.
Note:	A California appellate court ruled that a health care worker was limited to a remedy through workers’ compensation for her injuries from an assault by a mentally ill patient.
Citation:	C082345
WCC Citation:	Super. Ct. No. 34-2013- 00147943-CU-WT-GDS

Case Name:	Mendoza v. Brodeur		08/18/2006
Summary:	CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE ERNESTO MENDOZA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GLENN BRODEUR, Defendant and Respondent. Defendant Glenn Brodeur hired plaintiff Ernesto Mendoza, an unlicensed roofer, to replace his roof. Plaintiff claims that defendant and his handyman, Robert Harris, approached plaintiff and asked him to work on defendant's roof. Section 3352 excludes certain persons from the section 3351 definitions of "employee," and thus excludes them from workers' compensation coverage. In his negligence cause of action, plaintiff alleged: "Plaintiff was hired as an employee by Defendant Brodeur to do roofing work on Defendant's home.
Note:	It was was premature to require the employee to come forward with evidence to show a triable issue of fact when the employer had not shifted the evidentiary burden.
Citation:	142 Cal. App. 4th 72
WCC Citation:	WCC 31742006 CA

Case Name:	Mendoza v. Huntington Hospital		06/03/2010
Summary:	ADJ6820138 ADJ6820197 AMELIA MENDOZA, Applicant, vs. HUNTINGTON HOSPITAL, Permissibly Self-Insured; and SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. (Adjusting Agent), Defendant(s). (EN BANC) We granted the petition for removal filed by applicant, Amelia Mendoza, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem and Trustee, Rafael Mendoza. *fn5 Applicant worked as a patient case associate for Huntington Hospital (Huntington). Applicant argued that the matter should be set for trial on the threshold issues of industrial injury and employment. *fn6 Applicant filed a timely petition requesting that the Appeals Board remove this matter to itself under section 5310 and WCAB Rule 10843.
Note:	[En Banc] AD Rule 30(d)(3) is invalid because it conflicts with sections 4060(c) and 4062.2 and exceeds the scope of section 5402(b).
Citation:	ADJ6820138
WCC Citation:	WCC 36342010 CA