Case Name:	Duncan v. WCAB (X.S.)		11/25/2009
Summary:	After the SIBTF appealed to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB), the WCAB issued its OPINION AND DECISION. *fn4 Appellate Review All judicial powers under the workers' compensation system are vested in the WCAB, subject only to the review by the appellate courts of this state. )*fn5 WCJs hear and decide compensation claims as trial judges, and the WCAB functions as an appellate body. The WCAB has extensive expertise in interpreting and applying the workers' compensation scheme. Accordingly, the Decision of the Worker's Compensation Appeals Board is annulled and the case is remanded to the WCAB for further proceedings.
Note:	The cost of living adjustments pursuant to Labor Code section 4659, subdivision (c), for life pensions and total permanent disability indemnity, are added to those payments, per the words of the statute, starting January 1, 2004, and every January 1 thereafter.
Citation:	H034040
WCC Citation:	WCC 35832009 CA

Case Name:	Duthie v. WCAB, McDonnell Douglas Co.		11/27/1978
Summary:	JOHN H. DUTHIE, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, McDONNELL DOUGLAS COMPANY et al. , Respondents. OPINION TAMURA, Acting P. J. Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim for a heart disability suffered while in the employment of McDonnell Douglas Company. He had been employed as an administrator by McDonnell Douglas for nine years, and had just received a notice of imminent layoff. His opinion was that petitioner's condition stemmed from aggravation of his hypertension by the stress and harassment of his job. Prior to the nine-year span of present employment with McDonnell Douglas, petitioner had worked for McDonnell Douglas' predecessor Douglas Aircraft from 1962 to 1963, when he was laid off because of cancellation of a missile project.
Note:	Preexisting disability must occur at a definite, ascertainable time prior to industrial injury becoming P&S for legal apportionment.
Citation:	86 CA 3d 721, 43 CCC 1214
WCC Citation:	WCC 28441978 CA

Case Name:	Dutra v. Mercy Medical Center Mt. Shasta		09/26/2012
Summary:	MICHELLE DUTRA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MERCY MEDICAL CENTER MT. Plaintiff Michelle Dutra sued her former employer, defendant Mercy Medical Center Mt. Shasta (Mercy), for defamation and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleged Mercy committed libel per se by communicating to her and others in a private meeting its grounds for terminating her employment. Mercy informed plaintiff the grounds for her termination in a confidential meeting attended by plaintiff, a union steward, and Mercy supervisors.
Note:	Workers' compensation exclusivity barred a hospital housekeeper from suing her former employer in tort for allegedly terminating her in retaliation for her pursuit of benefits for an industrial injury.
Citation:	C067169
WCC Citation:	WCC 39352012 CA

Case Name:	Dykes v. WCAB		11/04/2008
Summary:	Perplexed by the WCAB's actions, Dykes asks whether the WCAB exceeded its powers by reopening and reconsidering his award which already had been exhaustively litigated and affirmed through the appellate process. "Gallo timely petitioned the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) for reconsideration, contending that the Labor Code mandated subtracting the percentage, not dollar amount, of the prior award from Dyke's disability award. Dykes argues that more than a simple change in the law is required to trigger good cause to reopen a WCAB decision. Dykes believes the WCAB was instead required to find our prior decision presented "exceptional circumstances of hardship and injustice. "Dykes lastly contends that permitting the WCAB to reopen a disability award based on a change in the law will cast doubt on all final WCAB awards and create "a recipe for mass relitigation," particularly when future disability tables are revised.
Note:	[Unpublished] The Supreme Court's decision in Brodie constituted good cause to reopen Dykes's prior disability award, even after it had been affirmed by this court and denied review by the Supreme Court.
Citation:	F055891
WCC Citation:	WCC 34592008 CA

Case Name:	Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County Part 1/3		04/30/2018
Summary:	Filed 4/30/18 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA  .             DYNAMEX OPERATIONS WEST, INC. , Petitioner, .             v. .             THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; .             CHARLES LEE et al. , Real Parties in Interest. .           Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeal should be affirmed. .           Dynamex is a nationwide same-day courier and delivery service that operates a number of business centers in California. .           Drivers are generally free to set their own schedule but must notify Dynamex of the days they intend to work for Dynamex. .           Drivers hired by Dynamex are permitted to hire other persons to make deliveries assigned by Dynamex.
Note:	California’s Supreme Court on Monday laid down a simple, three-part test to determine whether a person is an employee of an independent contractor, in a ruling that could have implications for workers’ compensation and the gig economy.
Citation:	S222732
WCC Citation:	Ct.App. 2/7 B249546, Los Angeles County Super

Case Name:	Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County Part 2/3		04/30/2018
Summary:	.           In addressing these largely unexplored issues, the Martinez court turned initially to the language and legislative history of section 1194. .           The court in Martinez then considered how the IWC, utilizing its broad legislative authority (see Cal. The court explained in this regard: “The verbs ‘to suffer’ and ‘to permit,’ as we have seen, are terms of art in employment law. .           The Martinez court summarized its conclusion on this point as follows: “To employ, then, under the IWC’s definition, has three alternative definitions. 74-77), the court concluded that the record did not indicate “the field representatives ever supervised or exercised control over [Munoz’s] employees” (id.
Note:	California’s Supreme Court on Monday laid down a simple, three-part test to determine whether a person is an employee of an independent contractor, in a ruling that could have implications for workers’ compensation and the gig economy.
Citation:	S222732
WCC Citation:	Ct.App. 2/7 B249546, Los Angeles County Super

Case Name:	Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County Part 3/3		04/30/2018
Summary:	(See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal. 4th at p. 1032 [class certification is not an abuse of discretion if certification is proper under any theory]. )Here the class of drivers certified by the trial court is limited to drivers who, during the relevant time periods, performed delivery services only for Dynamex. V. CONCLUSION .         For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 319, 326; Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435-436. )Defendant is only liable to those drivers with whom it entered into an agreement (i. e. , knew were providing delivery services to Dynamex customers).
Note:	California’s Supreme Court on Monday laid down a simple, three-part test to determine whether a person is an employee of an independent contractor, in a ruling that could have implications for workers’ compensation and the gig economy.
Citation:	S222732
WCC Citation:	Ct.App. 2/7 B249546, Los Angeles County Super

Case Name:	E & J Gallo Winery v. WCAB		05/20/2010
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT E & J GALLO WINERY, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and CARMELA GARCIA, Respondents. -ooOoo- *Before Levy, Acting P. J. , Cornell, J. , and Gomes, J. E & J Gallo (Gallo) petitions this court for a writ of review from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). Gallo subsequently terminated Garcia either for not working overtime on October 17, 2006, or for misleading Gallo about the medical appointment. *fn3 On February 6, 2007, Garcia petitioned the WCAB to reopen for new and further disability based on medical reporting from Drs. Gallo also contends the WCAB inappropriately placed the burden of proof as to temporary disability on the defense rather than on Garcia.
Note:	[Unpublished] Having found the record inadequate, the WCAB appropriately exercised its power to defer making a permanent disability award and seek additional medical evidence.
Citation:	F058643
WCC Citation:	WCC 36282010 CA

Case Name:	E & J Gallo Winery v. WCAB		07/31/2008
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT E. & J. GALLO WINERY, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and JOE RUBIO, Respondents. -ooOoo- *Before Vartabedian, Acting P. J. , Gomes, J. , and Hill, J. E. & J. Gallo Winery (Gallo) petitions for a writ of review from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). Gallo petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration, arguing the WCJ's denial of apportionment lacked any basis in law or fact. Gallo contends the WCAB should have reduced Rubio's permanent disability award because it met its burden of proving a prior industrial injury. As the WCAB concluded, it was Gallo that failed to meet its burden of proving apportionment due to overlapping injuries.
Note:	[Unpublished] In apportioning permanent disability, the employer carries the burden of proving that some or all of an injured worker's current level of permanent disability overlaps with a prior permanent disability.
Citation:	F055156
WCC Citation:	WCC 34052008 CA

Case Name:	E&J Gallo Winery v. WCAB (Dykes)		12/20/2005
Summary:	FACTUAL HISTORY David Dykes injured his back while working as a winery worker for E & J Gallo Winery (Gallo) in September 1996. Dykes returned to work with Gallo with a lighter duty and a medical restriction of lifting up to 50 pounds. Gallo timely petitioned the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) for reconsideration, contending that the Labor Code mandated subtracting the percentage, not dollar amount, of the prior award from Dyke's disability award. Gallo and the WCAB, however, contend that Dykes is not entitled to the life pension because his level of disability, after apportionment, is only 52. 5 percent. Gallo and the WCAB declined our invitation to demonstrate how this figure would be calculated for Dykes assuming a 73 percent level of disability.
Note:	Employee sustaining multiple disabling injuries while working for the same selfinsured employer is entitled to compensation for the total disability above any percentage of permanent disability previously awarded.
Citation:	134 Cal. App. 4th 1536
WCC Citation:	WCC 31342005 CA

Case Name:	Early Calif. Foods v. WCAB		02/21/1991
Summary:	Early California Foods, Petitioner v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board of the State of California and Mike Ellis, Respondents Mike Ellis filed an application for adjudication of claim on December 17, 1987, claiming max earnings. Early California, by Argonaut Insurance Co. , filed an amended answer on December 23, 1988 but never contested earnings. Argonaut, Early California's comp carrier, was not allowed at trial to present any evidence on the issue of credit for overpayment of temporary disability at an incorrect rate. Early California sought Reconsideration, which was denied by the WCAB because the employer should know what its employees earnings were. You are counseled to consult the full case for an accurate citation.
Note:	Issues not raised in defendant's Answer may be deemed waived.
Citation:	56 CCC 137
WCC Citation:	WCC 3541991 CA

Case Name:	Eby v. Idustrial Accident Comm'n		11/20/2011
Summary:	KATHERINE EBY et al. , Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al. , Respondents. After the accident two hammers and a wrecking bar about three feet in length were found in the automobile of the deceased. There is nothing in the record to show whether these tools belonged to the deceased or belonged to his employer. In the instant case it does not appear that the accident happened while the deceased was on any errand in the course of his employment. The question is wholly one of whether or not the evidence supports the finding of the Commission.
Note:	Evidence supports determination that injury was not in course and scope of employment despite presence of tools in employee's car.
Citation:	75 Cal.App. 280
WCC Citation:	WCC 30442025 CA

Case Name:	Edgar v. WCAB		11/28/1966
Summary:	DUANE EDGAR, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, NAVAJO FREIGHT LINES et al. , Respondents. Petitioner, a truck driver, sustained an admitted industrial injury to his left knee and back on July 14, 1964. On March 29, 1965, he filed a claim asserting that temporary disability continued and that he was in need of medical treatment. From that time to the date of the final hearing of the matter on March 15, 1966, he did not work. The minutes of the hearing show that petitioner was the only witness and that certain medical records were received in evidence.
Note:	Applicant has right to produce evidence to explain or rebut medical reports.
Citation:	246 Cal.App.2d 660, 31 CCC 376
WCC Citation:	WCC 25741966 CA

Case Name:	Edgar v. WCAB		11/28/1966
Summary:	DUANE EDGAR, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, NAVAJO FREIGHT LINES et al. , Respondents. Petitioner, a truck driver, sustained an admitted industrial injury to his left knee and back on July 14, 1964. On March 29, 1965, he filed a claim asserting that temporary disability continued and that he was in need of medical treatment. From that time to the date of the final hearing of the matter on March 15, 1966, he did not work. The minutes of the hearing show that petitioner was the only witness and that certain medical records were received in evidence.
Note:	Applicant has right to produce evidence to explain or rebut medical reports.
Citation:	246 Cal.App.2d 660
WCC Citation:	WCC 25771966 CA

Case Name:	Edgar v. WCAB (CHP)		06/24/1998
Summary:	OPINION NARES, J. - Petitioner Douglas Edgar (Edgar) seeks review of a decision of respondent Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). Edgar was placed on leave of absence with one year of full salary under former section 4800, fn. In July 1997, WCAB issued its opinion and decision after reconsideration, rescinding the decision of the WCJ. WCAB found that CHP, in calculating the vocational rehabilitation benefits it was required to provide to Edgar, was entitled to include the weekly sum of $246 for the weeks Edgar was both receiving full leave of absence salary under former section 4800, and participating in vocational rehabilitation. WCAB concluded that CHP paid a portion of the salary benefits to Edgar in lieu of VRMA, and thus a portion of the salary 'must be included in the amounts used to calculate the cap on vocational rehabilitation benefits. '
Note:	Full leave of absence salary for 1 yr. was not in lieu of vocational rehabilation.
Citation:	65 Cal.App.4th 1, 63 CCC 703
WCC Citation:	WCC 26731998 CA

Case Name:	Edward Carey Construction Co. v. State Fund		03/25/2011
Summary:	EDWARD CAREY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Defendant and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Appellant Edward Carey Construction Co. (CCC) appeals from a judgment of dismissal, entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF) without leave to amend. CCC relies on Security Officers Service, Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 887 (Security Officers), and its progeny, including MacGregor Yacht Corporation v. State Compensation Insurance Fund (1998) 63 Cal. App. 4th 448 (MacGregor Yacht). "First, and most importantly, State Fund ha[d] not denied Tilbury any benefits due to Tilbury under the insurance policy. SCIF's reliance on Charles J. Vacanti, M. D. , Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 800 (Vacanti), is misplaced.
Note:	A corporation may sue State Fund for a bad faith denial of benefits, despite the fact that the alleged bad faith damages arose from a claim filed by the employee/owner of the corporation.
Citation:	A128047
WCC Citation:	WCC 37372011 CA

Case Name:	Elayne Valdez v. Warehouse Demo Services		04/20/2011
Summary:	WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD STATE OF CALIFORNIA Case No. ADJ7048296 ELAYNE VALDEZ, Applicant, vs. OPINION AND DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION (EN BANC) WAREHOUSE DEMO SERVICES; ZURICH NORTH AMERICA, Adjusted by ESIS, Defendant(s). BACKGROUND Applicant Elayne Valdez filed a claim for industrial injury to her back, right hip, neck, right ankle, right foot, right lower extremity, lumbar spine and both knees, while employed as a demonstrator for Warehouse Demo Services on October 7, 2009. While the WCJ deferred the issue of MPN, he nevertheless rejected defendants argument that reports of non-MPN doctors are inadmissible. An MPN is established by an employer or insurer subject to the approval of the administrative director (AD). 8, 9762. 1 through 9762. 3. ) The statutory and regulatory scheme also imposes several other obligations upon both the insurer/employer and the injured worker.
Note:	California workers' compensation judges may not admit as evidence reports from doctors who are not a part of the employer's medical provider network if that MPN was validly established and properly noticed.
Citation:	ADJ7048296
WCC Citation:	WCC 37512011 CA

Case Name:	Eliapo v. SCI California Funeral Services		07/17/2009
Summary:	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ESTHER ELIAPO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SCI CALIFORNIA FUNERAL SERVICES, INC. , et al. , Defendants and Respondents. INTRODUCTION On September 9, 2002, plaintiff Esther Eliapo drove across town on an errand for her employer, defendant Oak Hill Improvement Company (Oak Hill). G. The Motion to Tax Costs The trial court awarded costs to Oak Hill and the related entity, SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. , both of which were represented by one attorney and were treated as a single defendant during trial. Rules of Court, rule 3. 1700(a)(1)), and since the caption on the memorandum of costs filed in this case lists only SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. , Oak Hill is not entitled to costs. SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. , is a related entity.
Note:	[Unpublished] Since plaintiff obtained no recovery in this case, the trial court had discretion to award expert fees as allowed under Code of Civil Procedure section 998.
Citation:	H031761
WCC Citation:	WCC 35442009 CA

Case Name:	Elijahjuan et al. v. the Superior Court of Los Angeles County		10/17/2012
Summary:	Hireem Elijahjuan et al. v. the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. B234794 /17/2012 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT HIREEM ELIJAHJUAN ET AL. , PETITIONERS, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, RESPONDENT; MIKE CAMPBELL & ASSOCIATES, LTD. , ET AL. , REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST. In contrast, here the court stayed litigation on the alleged violations of the Unfair Business Practices Act. "An appellate court has discretion to treat a purported appeal from a non-appealable order as a petition for writ of mandate. "(Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal. 4th 83, 97; Truly Nolen of America v. Superior Court (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 487, 498. )If the trial court were to conclude that the arbitration provision is not unconscionable, then I would order the trial court to reinstate the order compelling arbitration.
Note:	A trial court judge erred in directing a dispute between four workers and their employer based on their alleged misclassification as independent contractors to arbitration, since the terms of the agreement that some of the workers had signed only compelled arbitration for disputes regarding the application or interpretation of that agreement.
Citation:	B234794
WCC Citation:	WCC 39432012 CA

Case Name:	Elliot v. WCAB		02/25/2010
Summary:	After this matter became fully briefed, the WCAB issued its en banc decision in Cervantes v. El Aguila Food Products, Inc. (2009) 74 Cal. Comp. Cases 1336 (Cervantes), explicitly denouncing the Brasher holding relied on by the WCAB in this case. The WCAB agreed with respondents, granted reconsideration and rescinded the workers' compensation judge's order directing respondents to authorize the spinal surgery. Pointedly, the Cervantes court acknowledges that in the present case, the WCAB panel had followed the repudiated Brasher holding which the entire board, including the panelists deciding Elliott's case, now rejects. Unlike en banc decisions of the WCAB, significant panel decisions are not binding precedent in workers' compensation proceedings. However, the WCAB does deem them to be of "significant interest and importance to the workers' compensation community. "
Note:	The spinal surgery second opinion process commences after utilization review has denied the requested spinal surgery.
Citation:	A125585
WCC Citation:	WCC 36022010 CA

Case Name:	Elliot vs. WCAB		12/17/1987
Summary:	LANA ELLIOT, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, WILLIAM MURPHY et al. , Respondents (Opinion by Kline, P. J. , with Rouse, J. , concurring. 1 On October 31, 1985, the applicant (Lana Elliot) fractured her left wrist when she fell from a ladder while trimming a tree for her employers, Mr. and Mrs. William Murphy (Murphys). In denying the applicant's petition for reconsideration, the Board adopted the findings and recommendation of the WCJ. First, it is necessary to determine the minimum and maximum benefits based on the employee's "actual weekly earnings from all employers. "Unless otherwise specified, all code references herein are to the Labor Code, and all subsection references are to section 4453.
Note:	Board should give consideration to the worker's acutal earnings from all sources of employment.
Citation:	196 CA 3d 1497
WCC Citation:	WCC 29891987 CA

Case Name:	Elsner v. Uveges		02/07/2003
Summary:	ROWDY ELSNER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARL UVEGES, Defendant and Appellant, STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Intervenor and Appellant. Defendant Carl Uveges appeals a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Rowdy Elsner and intervenor State Compensation Insurance Fund (State Fund) on Elsner's complaint for personal injuries stemming from a construction site accident. Because Uveges considered Frey an experienced carpenter, Uveges did not feel he had to check his work for safety purposes; he expected Frey to be able to build a scaffold correctly. Elsner does not contend Uveges falls under section 6304's definition of employer and, indeed, Uveges' status as general {Slip Opn. Consequently, this is not a situation where Elsner seeks to impute negligence to Uveges; that is, hold him vicariously or derivatively responsible for the negligence of another.
Note:	CalOSHA standards, regs, citations not admissable in employee third party suit.
Citation:	106 Cal.App.4th 73
WCC Citation:	WCC 29152003 CA

Case Name:	Emmer v. Adobe Systems, Inc.		12/28/2007
Summary:	Ct. No. 1-04-CV013697) In this appeal, Jennifer Emmer seeks review of an order denying her special motion to strike the cross-complaint of respondent Adobe Systems Incorporated (Adobe) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425. 16 ("section 425. 16"), the "anti-SLAPP" statute. Background*fn1 Appellant began working for Adobe as an Engineering Manager in November 2000, after an extensive recruiting process. Appellant initiated an action against Adobe in November 2002, asserting one cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. After hiring appellant, Chen introduced her to other Adobe employees and told them that appellant had graduated from Harvard University, without being corrected by appellant. With regard to the claim of unjust enrichment, Adobe alleged that appellant had "unjustly received salary, bonuses, and benefits .
Note:	[Unpublished] It is the gravamen of the plaintiff's cause of action that determines whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies, and when the allegations referring to arguably protected activity are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.
Citation:	H030685
WCC Citation:	WCC 32952007 CA

Case Name:	Empl. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of WI v WCAB		02/28/1975
Summary:	Civil No. 44901 Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 4 CCC 820 February 28, 1975 OPINION BY: Rouse, J. The only reported case directing a supplemental award of attorney's fees under section 5801 is California Comp. Unfortunately, that case offers us no guidance as to procedures to be employed when the employer's petition for writ of review is summarily denied. It has been our practice, in that instance, to make no separate ruling on the employee's request for attorney's fees. Section 5801 and section 4903, subdivision (a), govern awards of attorney's fees and costs in appellate proceedings.
Note:	Provides guidance for awarding attorney's fees in appellate proceedings.
Citation:	46 CA 3d 104, 40 CCC 820
WCC Citation:	WCC 26341975 CA

Case Name:	Employers Compensation Insurance Co. v. Designer Studio Inc. unpublished		02/16/2021
Summary:	On July 3, 2017, Insurance Company sued Designer Studio for breach of contract based on allegations that Designer Studio made misrepresentations to procure a worker’s compensation insurance policy from Insurance Company, refused to provide Insurance Company with access to its corporate records, and failed to make premium payments on its insurance policy. Designer Studio argued it had a meritorious defense to the litigation because Insurance Company miscalculated Designer Studio’s policy premiums. It found Designer Studio presented evidence of a meritorious defense because Insurance Company likely miscalculated Designer Studio’s premium payments. It contends the trial court abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment and erred in ordering that the funds levied from Designer Studio be returned to Designer Studio. Insurance Company claims Designer Studio did not have a satisfactory excuse because Designer Studio and Baillieux are not the same person or entity; therefore, Designer Studio did not technically become incapacitated when Baillieux became ill.
Note:	A California appellate court ruled that an employer was entitled to have its default set aside in a breach-of-contract dispute with its workers’ compensation insurance carrier.
Citation:	No. D076293
WCC Citation:	No. D076293

Case Name:	Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Indust. Acc. Comm'n		03/01/1940
Summary:	EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and Mrs. GRACE BURNETT, Respondents. Mrs. Burnett, under her contract of employment, was required to live at her employer's residence, and, as part of her compensation, received her board and room. She returned to her employer's residence a little before 8 P. M. She put an apron over her street dress, and washed the dinner dishes. While engaged in shortening the dress she slipped and fell, fracturing her left ankle and dislocating her left elbow. The commission found that these injuries occurred in the course of, and arose out of, the employment, and made its award accordingly.
Note:	Evidence supports determination that live-in employee was sustained in course and scope of employment.
Citation:	37 Cal.App.2d 567
WCC Citation:	WCC 30581940 CA

Case Name:	Energetic Painting and Drywall Inc. v. WCAB		07/24/2007
Summary:	As we will explain, we agree with petitioners Energetic Painting and Drywall, Inc. , and its insurer Zurich North America Insurance Company*fn1 that the WCJ used the wrong schedule. In December 2006, Energetic petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration of the WCJ's decision to apply the 1997 schedule. While that petition was pending, the WCAB (sitting en banc) decided Pendergrass v. Duggan Plumbing (2007) 72 Cal. Comp. Cases 95. The three dissenting members of the WCAB concluded that the "plain language" of sections 4061 and 4660(d) required a different result. Thus, we are concerned only with whether Energetic was required to provide Ramirez with the section 4061 notice before January 1, 2005. .
Note:	Under Labor Code section 4061, an employer must give the notice required by that statute to the injured worker 'together with the last payment of temporary disability indemnity,' and the employer is 'not required' to provide that notice until the last temporary disability payment is made or has become due.
Citation:	153 Cal. App. 4th 633; 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 72 CC
WCC Citation:	WCC 32382007 CA

Case Name:	Energy Insurance Mutual Limited v. Ace American Insurance Company Part 1/2		08/10/2017
Summary:	Filed 7/11/17 Certified for Publication 8/10/17 (order attached) IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR .             ENERGY INSURANCE MUTUAL LIMITED, Plaintiff and Appellant, .             v. .             ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. .             A140656 .             (Contra Costa County Super. .           "SECTION V—DEFINITIONS .           "[¶] . [¶] .           "M. SEPARATION OF INSUREDS   .           "Except with respect to the Limits of Insurance this policy applies: .           "1. .           "And, the professional services exclusion read in part: .           "PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY EXCLUSION [] .           "[¶] .
Note:	The 1st District Court of Appeal this week ordered publication of its decision finding that Ace American Insurance Co. did not owe coverage for an insured’s alleged negligence that led to a fatal pipeline explosion.
Citation:	A140656
WCC Citation:	Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. MSC11-0060

Case Name:	Energy Insurance Mutual Limited v. Ace Insurance Company Part 2/2		08/10/2017
Summary:	(1 New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition (2009) Self-insured Retentions Versus Large or Matching Deductibles, § 1A. 02[3][a], p. 1A-10 (Rel. According to ACE, the AEGIS policy functions as primary insurance and the EIM policy is a first-level excess above it. (4 New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition, supra, Excess Insurance and Umbrella Coverage, § 24. 02 [2][c], p. 24-15 (Rel. )  In its brief, ACE refers to the policy as both an "excess commercial umbrella liability" and an "umbrella policy. "(4 New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition, supra, Excess Insurance and Umbrella Coverage, § 24. 02 [3] & [4], pp.
Note:	The 1st District Court of Appeal this week ordered publication of its decision finding that Ace American Insurance Co. did not owe coverage for an insured’s alleged negligence that led to a fatal pipeline explosion.
Citation:	A140656
WCC Citation:	Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. MSC11-0060

Case Name:	Engle v. Endlich		09/22/1992
Summary:	MARY L. ENGLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HAROLD ENDLICH, Defendant and Respondent. Procedural and Factual Statement On June 26, 1986, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants Coast Elevator Company (Coast) and Dr. Harold Endlich (Endlich) for recovery of damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained on July 1, 1985. It found that the settling defendant, Coast, was free of negligence but that Endlich and Hospital were each 50 percent negligent. On June 21, 1990, following a hearing, the court granted the motion of Endlich for reduction of the judgment in the amount of the workers' compensation lien. These sums were deducted from the $802,851 jury award to determine the net amount due on the judgment from Endlich.
Note:	No double recovery in damage award; reduced by compensation received.
Citation:	9 Cal.App.4th 1152, 57 CCC 617
WCC Citation:	WCC 24301992 CA